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1I. INTRODUCTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
War is a force that gives us meaning…the most 
powerful narcotic invented by humankind is war - 
Pulitzer Prize winning war correspondent Chris    
Hedges of the New York Times.  (Moyers, n.d.) 
War has a tremendous impact on society.  The accounts 
journalists transmit or send from the battlefield have 
immense power to shape our national conscience and 
direction.  In fact, Christiane Amanpour of the Cable News 
Network (CNN) quips that our modern world is the “age of 
government-by-news-cycle.” (McLaughlin, 2002) 
Trained to Pavlovian-like standards, the American 
public has a voracious appetite for news; so much of our 
daily lives are driven by the never-ending news cycle.  
Each day, millions of people pick up a newspaper, surf the 
internet, and migrate to the television sets like 
clockwork.    Information is power, and in such a serious 
and deadly endeavor as war, the American public demands to 
be in the know.  There at the frontlines of conflict, where 
history cannot hide from their trained eye, the individual 
war correspondent hunts for an illusive quarry-the truth.  
This study explores the content of reporting of embedded 
and non-embedded war correspondents during our nation’s 
latest war, Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
B. BACKGROUND 
September 17, 1862 was the bloodiest day in American 
history.  On that day the Battle of Antietam was fought 
outside the tiny hamlet of Sharpsburg, Maryland. For twelve 
hours, Union and Confederate soldiers tore into each other 
with unparalleled savagery. When the sun finally set on 
2that early autumn day, over 23,000 Americans were dead, 
wounded, or missing in action.  The armies departed, 
destined to fight for another two and a half years. 
(McPherson, 1982) 
In the days immediately following the clash of the 
armies around Sharpsburg, professional photographer 
Alexander Gardner and his assistant John Gibson snapped 
numerous photos as they wandered around the battlefield 
that was still covered with the fallen soldiers. These 
approximately 70 pictures were the first ever taken of 
American war dead.  A month later, in October 1862, a major 
exhibition of Gardner’s Antietam photographs was held at 
Mathew Brady’s New York City Gallery. (Antietam Image 
Gallery, n.d.)  A reporter for the New York Times covered 
the exhibit for the venerable newspaper, and penned an 
eloquent commentary on the stunning impact these 
groundbreaking photographs had on the public: 
As it is, the dead of the battlefield come up to 
us very rarely, even in dreams.  We see the list 
in the morning paper at breakfast, but dismiss 
its recollection with the coffee... We recognize 
the battlefield as a reality, but it stands as a 
remote one.  It is like a funeral next door... 
But it is very different when the hearse stops at 
your own door, and the corpse is carried out over 
your own threshold... Those who lose friends in 
the battle know what battlefields are... Mr. 
Brady has done something to bring home to us the 
terrible reality and earnestness of war.  If he 
has not brought bodies and laid them in our door-
yards and along streets, he has done something 
very like it. (Wolfe, 2003) 
Long before that October day, war was always good copy 
for the fledgling news industry.  On 17 July 1789, the 
Swiss journalist Gottfried Ebel provided a fascinating 
3account of the storming of the Bastille for his newspaper, 
the Zurich Zeitung:  “One saw with amazement how on this 
day an almost naked and unarmed people, inflamed by 
boldness alone, attacked entrenched positions, armed itself 
with what it found, and in ten minutes conquered the first 
fortress of the kingdom.”  (Morgan, n.d.)   
The news industry has matured immensely since Ebel 
watched the Bastille fall.  Similarly, the American 
public’s appetite for news has also grown and matured to 
monumental proportions.  Technological improvements have 
vastly increased the field reporter’s capability to quickly 
report the news to the eagerly waiting audience. To this 
end, newspapers dispatched journalists to the scenes of 
conflict to report and capture the struggle in vivid 
detail.  The list of war correspondents, according to 
Evans, “trails clouds of glory:” Hemingway, Churchill, 
Dumas, Kipling, Steinbeck, and Conan-Doyle are but a few 
who have ventured out to the battlefield to report their 
observations to the public. (Evans, 2003) The renowned 
author Stephen Crane reported from Cuba during the Spanish-
American War.  The “Greatest Generation” of World War II 
had Ernie Pyle and Robert Capa, who slugged their way 
through Europe and across the Pacific with U.S. forces.  
The war in Vietnam became the first “television war,” where 
Americans sat down at the dinner table each night to watch 
the latest news from the war zone.  The constant stream of 
news reports lamenting America’s quagmire in Vietnam has 
been credited with turning the public’s stance against the 
war effort. This was especially true when Walter Cronkite, 
the highly- revered anchor for CBS news, openly stated that 
the war in Vietnam could not be won.  (Trulock, 2003) 
4Perhaps soured by the outcome of that war, many 
believe that the U.S. Pentagon adopted a very defensive and 
protective posture regarding the civilian news media.  For 
example, in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, reporters were kept 
away from the frontlines and placed in large groupings of 
journalists called “pools.”  To the chagrin of the 
reporters, the pools were monitored and escorted by 
military officials.  (Smith, 1992) 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, and President George W. Bush’s declaration of a 
“global war on terrorism,” the Pentagon revisited its 
policy concerning media access to the military.  (U.S. 
Department of Defense 10 February 2003 Public Affairs 
Guidance (ASDPAG), 2003) Recognizing that it was necessary 
to obtain public and world support for “The War on Terror,” 
as well as the enormous impact pictures and stories 
directly from the battlefield (like Gardner’s 1862 
photographs) have in shaping public opinion, the Pentagon 
knew that they could not repeat the media mistakes of the 
first Gulf War.  Necessity is indeed the mother of 
invention and out of this need was born the concept of 
“embedded” media. 
Experimented with on a limited basis during the 
fighting in Afghanistan in 2002, the decision was made by 
the Pentagon to attach, or “embed,” civilian journalists to 
coalition military units should war with Iraq come to 
fruition.  The policy of embedding news media (Appendix A: 
Department of Defense Media Policy), as stated in an 
unclassified 10 February 2003 message from the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, was 
as follows: 
5The Department of Defense (DOD) policy on media 
coverage of future military operations is that 
media will have long-term, minimally restrictive 
access to U.S. air, ground and naval forces 
through embedding.  Media coverage of any future 
operation will, to a large extent, shape public 
perception of the national security environment 
now and in the years ahead.  This holds true for 
the U.S. public; the public in Allied countries 
whose opinion can affect the durability of our 
coalition; and publics in countries where we 
conduct operations, whose perceptions of us can 
affect the cost and duration of our involvement.   
Our ultimate strategic success in bringing peace 
and security to this region [the Middle East] 
will come in our long-term commitment to 
supporting our democratic ideals.  We need to 
tell the factual story – good or bad - before 
others seed the media with disinformation and 
distortions, as they most certainly will continue 
to do. Our people in the field need to tell our 
story – only commanders can ensure the media get 
to the story alongside the troops.  We must 
organize for and facilitate access of national 
and international media to our forces, including 
those forces engaged in ground operations, with 
the goal of doing so right from the start.  To 
accomplish this, we will embed media with our 
units.  These embedded media will live, work and 
travel as part of the units with which they are 
embedded to facilitate maximum, in-depth coverage 
of U.S. forces in combat and related operations.     
(ASDPAG, 2003) 
In accordance with this policy, U.S. and United 
Kingdom (U.K.) forces crossed the line of departure into 
Iraq during the late evening hours of 20 March 2003, 
commencing Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), fully outfitted 
with a full complement of embedded war correspondents.  
Their mandate was to report firsthand on the military 
campaign to topple Saddam Hussein, and to “tell the factual 
story – good or bad...” (ASDPAG, 2003) 
6Forty days later, when President George W. Bush 
declared an end to major combat operations on 01 May 2003, 
the American public and the world community were sharply 
divided over the concept and performance of the embedded 
media.  While many praised the raw strength, power, and 
honesty of the frontline reporting, others claimed that the 
embedded policy was a mere subterfuge to exert control over 
the media to ensure that only the U.S. government’s 
approved version of the war was reported.  (Schechter, 
2003) 
C. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
While the embedded war correspondents’ immediate and 
highly dramatic accounts offered a perspective on war not 
before seen by the news-hungry U.S. public, they also 
raised questions if the “embedding” process resulted in a 
more thematically narrow and perhaps biased coverage of the 
war than seen previously.  This study addresses the 
newspaper coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom by examining 
the content of the war reporting of various highly 
circulating U.S. newspapers.  It is posited that being 
attached—embedded—to military units resulted in the 
journalists producing a body of stories concerning military 
operations and personnel markedly different than non-
embedded reporters during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions provide the framework 
for the examination of the embedded and non-embedded 
journalists’ reporting during Operation Iraqi Freedom: (1) 
How did embedded journalists affect the content of U.S. 
news reporting of Operation Iraqi Freedom?  (2) Was the 
reporting of the embedded and non-embedded journalists 
balanced? (3) Were the critics’ accusations of “soda straw” 
7reporting justified? Or in other words, is the embedded 
corpus narrower in scope and depth than the non-embedded 
corpus?  
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This study examines the content of embedded and non-
embedded reporting during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The 
scope will include an historical overview of war reporting, 
a review of DoD media policy past and present, and a 
comprehensive review of literature concerning the embedded 
media in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The study contains a 
systematic examination of selected embedded and non-
embedded news reports of major national newspapers.  The 
stories will be selected from eight days of news reporting 
covering the period of March 21, 2003 to April 14, 2003.  
Ethnographic content analysis will be used to determine the 
particular content of the embedded and non-embedded 
reporting.  
F. LIMITATIONS 
A limitation of this study is the number of actual 
embedded war correspondents whose reporting is examined.  
While the total number of officially accredited embedded 
journalists fluctuated during the war, a list obtained from 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public 
Affairs (ASD-PA) dated 21 February 2003 claims 671 embeds 
assigned to U.S. units.  While this study concentrates only 
on journalists affiliated with the three of the five top 
circulating newspapers in the United States, these were but 
a fraction of the total number of embedded media.  There 
were great numbers of reporters from other major 
newspapers, news magazines, and local or regional 
newspapers also embedded with the U.S. forces.  Their 
stories and reporting were just as riveting and 
8professional as those working for the larger national 
newspaper organizations. 
Reporters of many nationalities – British, Italian, 
and Jordanian to name but a few – were also part of the 
embedded journalistic corps filing for their respective 
national newspapers.  This study focuses solely on American 
embedded reporters traveling with U.S. forces and filing 
for American newspapers.  To keep the study focused and 
control for possible bias, only American newspapers and 
American reporters are examined. 
Finally, this study does not take into account the 
large numbers of television and cable news reporters who 
were embedded.  Their reporting perhaps had a more 
pronounced influence on the American public’s comprehension 
of the conflict due to the ability to transmit pictures 
live from the scene.   However, this study only examines 
the print journalism of the embedded reporters to take 
advantage of the many databases available, allowing 
unlimited access to the hundreds of stories filed during 
the study time period.   
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This study is organized into five chapters.  Chapter 
II provides an historical overview of war reporting, the 
2003 U.S. Department of Defense media policy that 
established the embedded media program utilized during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the current debate over 
embedded media. 
Chapter III discusses the newspapers and reporters 
that were selected for this study and also addresses the 
methodology used to analyze the content of the embedded and 
non-embedded reporters’ stories.  Chapter IV examines the 
9actual content of the embedded and non-embedded reporters’ 
stories revealed by the analysis, while Chapter V provides 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Now to every army and almost every general a 
newspaper reporter goes along, filling up our 
transports, swelling our trains, reporting on our 
progress, guessing at places, inciting jealousy 
and discontent, and doing infinite mischief - 
Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman  (Knightley, 1975) 
At the dawn of the 20th century, a young journalist 
reporting for the London-based newspaper the Morning Post 
described the impact the war correspondent can have on man 
and the course of history by simply reporting the truth.   
“Ah, horrible war,” he stated, “amazing medley of the 
glorious and the squalid, the pitiful and the sublime, if 
modern men of light and leading saw your face closer, 
simple folk would see it hardly ever.” (Gilbert, 1994)  The 
journalist, reflecting on his observations of the Boer War, 
was none other than the future prime minister of England, 
Winston Churchill.  Without question, the drama of war 
demands eyewitnesses such as Churchill.  For beyond the 
actual belligerents’ personal histories, war correspondents 
are “the eyes of history.”  (Evans, 2003) 
As mentioned previously, the war correspondent hunts 
an illusive quarry—the truth.  Many would argue that the 
truth couldn’t survive the slings and blades of war.  
Almost 2500 years ago, Aeschylus, the father of Greek 
tragedy penned a rather pessimistic answer to this 
question. “In war,” he wrote, “truth is the first 
casualty.”   Unfortunately, from the Crimea to the Spanish-
American War to Operation Desert Storm, many would believe 
this to be an undisputable fact.  During the Second World 
War, an older and more experienced Winston Churchill 
12
bluntly stated, “In wartime, truth is so precious that she 
should be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” (Evans, 2003) 
Therein lay the paradox that plagues all war 
correspondents: “The essence of successful warfare is 
secrecy; the essence of successful journalism is 
publicity.”  (Evans, 2003)  Into this fray steps the very 
same war correspondent: the public’s advocate, faced by 
these competing desires.  What the war correspondent 
ultimately attempts to achieve is a balance between the 
hunt for the truth, the need for operational security, and 
the public demand for news.  Hopefully, the end result is a 
timely, objective account that keeps the public informed 
while not compromising the safety of the fighting men in 
harm’s way. 
B. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF WAR REPORTING 
1. The Genesis 
The concept of a trained newspaper journalist, 
dedicated to reporting on battles and military campaigns, 
truly came into being during the Crimea War (1853-55).  
That does not mean that armies were devoid of 
correspondents reporting on their actions in field prior to 
this time.  Of note is the London Times, which employed 
Henry Crabb Robinson.  Robinson reported on fighting along 
the Elbe River in 1807 and Corunna in 1808 during the 
Napoleonic Wars.  Charles Lewis Guneiso covered the Spanish 
Civil War (1835-7) for the Morning Post of London.  (Young 
and Jesser, 1997)   
Not to be outdone by their former masters, the 
fledgling American press also attempted to bring firsthand 
accounts from the battlefield to the reading public.  James 
M. Bradford wrote letters to his hometown newspaper during 
13
the War of 1812 describing the American army’s operations.  
What made Bradford unique was that he was in fact the 
editor of the Orleans Gazette, and had actually enlisted in 
the army to fight for his fledgling country.  Bradford’s 
proximity to the action and his professional training as a 
journalist perhaps makes him America’s first war 
correspondent.  (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  George 
Wilkins Kendall, a reporter from the Picayune of New 
Orleans, rode into battle with Texas Rangers as both a 
journalist and soldier during the Mexican War in 1846. 
(McLaughlin, 2002)  The intrepid reporter ended up 
capturing a Mexican flag during fighting on the Rio Grande.  
(Morgan, 2003)   To this day, war correspondents often find 
themselves unwilling participants in combat.  However, men 
like Bradford and Kendall, the journalist/soldier were the 
exception rather than the rule during the formative stages 
of war reporting.   
The most common method many newspapers employed was to 
temporarily hire active duty officers serving within the 
army to keep them abreast of the latest developments of the 
campaign.  They would do this via letters back to an editor 
at the home newspaper.  An example of this is Lieutenant 
Charles Naysmith, an artillery officer in the British Army, 
who wrote detailed letters describing the action in the 
Crimea for the London Times.  Unfortunately, Naysmith’s 
duties as a soldier or poor work ethic prevented him 
writing as frequently to his editors as they desired.  “I 
wish you would impress upon Naysmith with all your 
eloquence,” a clearly perturbed Times executive chastised 
an editor, “the absolute necessity of writing as often as 
he can and sending letters without delay.”  (Knightley, 
14
1975)  One can imagine the frustration of editors and 
publishers who were solely dependant on such a haphazard 
system for their information.  Harold Evans, who was 
awarded a knighthood in 2003 by Queen Elizabeth II for his 
contributions to the field of journalism, believes that one 
of the most pressing demands that helped to precipitate the 
establishment of the full-time, professional war 
correspondent was timeliness.  (Evans, 2003)  In light of 
this, several London newspapers sent dedicated 
correspondents to the Crimea to ensure that they got timely 
and accurate reporting.  The most renown of these reporters 
was William Howard Russell.  
2. Russell Sets the Standard 
“Billy” Russell is widely considered to be the first 
truly professional war correspondent.  In retrospect, 
Russell stated that he was the “miserable parent of a 
luckless tribe.” (McLaughlin, 2002)   His epitaph in St. 
Paul’s Cathedral in London simply declares Russell to be 
“the first and greatest” war correspondent.  (Knightley, 
1975)  Indeed, Russell’s ground breaking reporting set the 
standard for generations of war correspondents that 
followed him.  His objective, blunt accounts were shocking 
to a relatively ignorant reading audience and “considerably 
closer to the truth than anything the public had been 
previously permitted to learn.”  (Knightley, 1975)  
Although his candid reports may have stretched the bounds 
of operational security, many believe that his exposure of 
the carnage and horrible conditions experienced by the 
British Army greatly influenced policy within the 
government.  He was witness to the folly of the Light 
Brigade’s famous charge against the Russian guns at 
Balaclava, and later reported that the “army has melted 
15
away almost to a drop of miserable, washed-out, worn-out 
spiritless wretches…[it is] to all intents and purposes, 
with the exception of a very few regiments, used up, 
destroyed and ruined…”  (Knightley, 1975)  His goal was 
“the truth, and the belief that society can only hope to be 
just and healthy if it is blessed with an independent and 
critical and courageous press.” (Hankinson, 1982) 
3. The American Civil War 
The framework that Russell proved for his colleagues 
was put into practice almost immediately during the next 
great conflict to arise – the American Civil War.  The 
American Civil War was to be the first large-scale 
employment of war correspondents by the newspaper industry, 
both for the North, and the South, as well as several 
foreign newspapers.  Russell himself traveled to America to 
cover the war, but soon returned to England due to personal 
and professional problems with his editor.  (McLaughlin, 
2002)   
With the nation undergoing such a trauma in which 
virtually every family was somehow affected, it was quite 
natural that the newspapers—both Union and Confederate- 
would strive to fill the public appetite for news about the 
battles and campaigns.  War was big business for the 
newspaper industry.  A paper could expect to sell thousands 
more than its normal circulation (in some cases five times 
more) when major battles filled their headlines. 
(Knightley, 1975)  The New York Herald fielded 63 reporters 
to cover the fighting.  (Morgan, 2003)   Unfortunately, 
this enthusiasm for news flooded the industry with 
“correspondents more fit to drive cattle than to write for 
newspapers.”  (Knightley, 1975)   
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Into Russell’s wake flowed a rather unremarkable group 
of journalists who were “ignorant, dishonest, and 
unethical.”  (Knightley, 1975)   The average correspondent 
was “poorly paid, and employed by demanding and 
unscrupulous editors who wanted news at any price.” (Young 
and Jesser, 1997)  Objectivity was not yet a “guiding 
ethic” of the war correspondent (McLaughlin, 2002), and the 
overwhelming tendency to favorably slant news made the 
correspondent “a propagandist for the army he was 
covering.” (Morgan, 2003)   Just as ignored was the concept 
of operational security.  Often, orders of battle and other 
military information were published for all to read.  This 
combination made the war correspondent universally 
distrusted by the military, according to the photographer 
Mathew Brady.  (Young and Jesser, 1997)   
Yet another result of this distrust was increased 
censorship.  The Union War Department actually issued what 
was known as the “57th War Article,” which stated that 
journalists could be court-martialed if they revealed 
sensitive military information in their reporting.  
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  The thoughts of two Union 
generals about the war correspondent speak volumes 
concerning to as how they were viewed as the war 
progressed. The first is from Irvin McDowell, penned before 
the First Battle of Bull Run in 1861: 
I have made arrangements for the correspondents 
to take the field…and I have suggested to them 
that they should wear a white uniform to indicate 
the purity of their character.  (Knightley, 1975) 
Compare this to William Tecumseh Sherman, the man who 
burned Atlanta in 1864 and cut a sixty-mile swath of 
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destruction across Georgia during his famed “March to the 
Sea:”  
I hate newspapermen.  They come into camp and 
pick up their camp rumors and print them as 
facts.  I regard them as spies, which, in truth 
they are. If I killed them all there would be 
news from Hell before breakfast.  (Newseum, n.d.) 
In fact, Sherman harbored such a distrust of the press 
that he believed that during war they should have no 
rights, and that there was a direct correlation between 
censorship and victory: the greater the censorship, the 
higher the probability of victory.  (Aukofer and Lawrence, 
1995) 
The American Civil War had a profound effect on the 
news industry despite the poor performance of the field 
reporters. However, author Phillip Knightley (1975), in his 
definitive study of the war correspondent, The First 
Casualty, makes it clear that there were “good 
correspondents” such as H. Whitelaw Reid of the Cincinnati 
Gazette, Charles Coffin of the Boston Journal, and George 
Smalley of the New York Tribune, to name but a few. 
(Knightley, 1975)  On the positive side, the Associated 
Press (AP), where pooling the resources of multiple 
reporters to achieve greatest coverage, came into being 
during the Civil War. (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  One of 
the biggest impacts was the “formalization of patterns of 
censorship and indirect political and military control” of 
the press.  (Young and Jesser, 1997)   
This initial sour experience of the competing needs 
between the military and press during wartime have proved 
to be a bellwether for all the wars to follow.  “Soldiers 
wanted to avoid disclosure of sensitive information and 
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objected to criticism of their performance,” says author 
Loren B. Thompson (1991). “Journalists wanted unrestricted 
access to military information and the ability to use it in 
whatever manner they saw fit.” (Thompson, 1991)  Regardless 
of the problems, probably the greatest achievement of the 
Civil War experience for the news industry was to establish 
war correspondence as a specialized discipline within 
journalism. (Knightley, 1975)  A new breed of reporter was 
emerging; aggressive and prepared to go into harm’s way to 
get the story.  And all they needed, according to 
Knightley, was “bigger and better wars.” (Knightley, 1975)  
4. The Profession Grows 
The period between the end of the American Civil War 
and the beginning of World War I is nostalgically referred 
to as the “Golden Age” of the war correspondent.  
(Knightley, 1975)  The technologies that came into being 
during the Civil War (such as the telegraph and crude 
photography) were now being augmented by the arrival of 
better cable communications, more advanced photographic 
techniques, and, eventually, cinematography.  This made for 
faster reporting, but also created more friction between 
the military and the press concerning operational security. 
The individual war correspondent continued to develop 
and become an established part of the news industry.  
Newspapers touted their correspondents by name in the 
byline instead of the innocuous “from our own 
correspondent.” (Knightley, 1975)  Society, which was 
becoming more and more literate, continued the love affair 
with the press that blossomed in the 1860s.  The news 
industry, realizing that wars made good copy and increased 
circulation, fully embraced the war correspondent.  As a 
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result, “no conflagration went unreported” during this 
period. (Morgan, 2003) 
The greatest news events for American war 
correspondents during the “Golden Age” were the Indian Wars 
on the western frontier of the United States and the 
Spanish-American War of 1898.  While European journalists 
honed their craft during the many wars fought on the 
continent and Africa, American journalists awaited action 
worthy of reporting.  Of note is the presence of an AP 
reporter, Mark Kellogg, riding into fame with Lieutenant 
Colonel George Armstrong Custer and the 7th U.S. Cavalry at 
Little Big Horn on 26 June 1876.  (Morgan, 2003)  Kellogg’s 
last dispatch, written on 25 June 1876, calmly states that, 
“by the time this reaches you we will have met and fought 
the red devils with what result remains to be seen.  I go 
with Custer and will be at the death.” (Evans, 2003)   
The outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898 was 
cause for celebration among the highly competitive news 
industry.  Unfortunately, the jingoistic enthusiasm of the 
press once again tainted the reporting, giving birth to the 
“yellow journalism” so often attributed to this period.  
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  As a molder of public 
opinion, the newspaper was extremely effective.  Abraham 
Lincoln was convinced that newspapers were crucial to 
maintaining popular support during wartime.  (Aukofer and 
Lawrence, 1995)  William Randolph Hearst, publisher of the 
New York Journal, also appreciated the power of the press 
and the boon it would be for his paper should the United 
States go to war with Spain.  To that end he did his best 
to “deliberately incite war fever” (Morgan, 2003) and 
“inflame public opinion” (Knightley, 1975) about Spanish 
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atrocities to create popular support for a war with Spain.  
His incredible display of journalistic manipulation is 
illustrated by the infamous exchange of messages with his 
artist on scene before the war, Frederic Remington: 
Remington: EVERYTHING IS QUIET.  THERE IS NO 
TROUBLE  HERE.  THERE WILL BE NO WAR.  I WISH TO 
RETURN. 
Hearst:  PLEASE REMAIN.  YOU FURNISH PICTURES.  I 
WILL FURNISH WAR. (Knightley, 1975) 
The unexplained explosion and sinking of the USS MAINE 
in Havana harbor provided Hearst the event he needed to 
spin the United States into war.  Hearst’s unsubstantiated 
accusations of the “enemy’s secret infernal machine” 
created a ground rush of war support, which propelled the 
nation into war. (Knightley, 1975)  Thus, the Spanish-
American War was the first media-driven war. (Morgan, 2003)   
The most celebrated war correspondent of the conflict 
was Stephen Crane. The author of The Red Badge of Courage, 
Crane initially reported for Hearst and the Journal prior 
to the war, but left the paper for the New York World once 
war was declared.  (Knightley, 1975)  In this capacity with 
the World, he covered Theodore Roosevelt and the Rough 
Riders charge up Kettle Hill in the face of Spanish guns, 
and later, “saunters off in a khaki suit and slouch hat and 
captures a town himself.”  (Evans, 2003)  Crane personified 
the murky line between reporter and soldier, as did the 
other correspondent best remembered for the Spanish 
American War, James Creelman. (Knightley, 1975)  Creelman, 
who worked for the Journal, actually led a bayonet charge 
during the fighting in Cuba.  (Morgan, 2003) 
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The influence that the newspaper industry can have on 
policy and public opinion is perhaps the lasting lesson of 
the war.  Competing newspapers, greed, and a manipulative, 
disingenuous reporting “marked a moral low point in the 
coverage of conflicts by the American press.”  (Aukofer and 
Lawrence, 1995) 
5. The War to End All Wars 
The experience of the American war correspondent 
during World War I can be divided into two phases: pre and 
post April 6, 1917—the date that the United States declared 
war on the Central Powers.  From August 1914 when war 
erupted on the Continent, until America entered the 
bloodletting of the Western Front, American war 
correspondents remained relatively neutral in their 
reporting of the conflict.  This was especially true during 
the opening months of the war, when tales of German 
atrocities were rampant in French and British newspapers.  
Five noted American correspondents actually accompanied the 
German Army for two weeks during this period and reported 
that they did not observe the countless atrocities that 
emblazoned headlines of the Anglo-French press. (Knightley, 
1975)  On both sides, news reports minimized the carnage 
and attempted to demonize the enemy.  (Young and Jesser, 
1997)   
With the neutrality of the United States hanging in 
the balance, both sides targeted the American public 
through an aggressive propaganda campaign to encourage 
continued neutrality or intervention.   So complete and 
effective were the British efforts to bring America into 
the war on their side that they “penetrated every phase of 
American life, from the pulpit to the classroom, from the 
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factory to the office.  It was one of the major propaganda 
efforts of history, and it was conducted so well and so 
secretly that little about it emerged until the eve of the 
Second World War…”  (Knightley, 1975)  The German 
newspapers “were beaten hands down by a media campaign 
organized by the British Secret Service.” (Young and 
Jesser, 1997) 
This is an important fact because of the influence 
that this had on the prism through which American war 
correspondents viewed the conflict.  It virtually 
guaranteed that, “in American newspapers the war would be 
seen as if through British eyes.”  (Knightley, 1975)  With 
war fever in full pitch, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who 
vowed to make the world safe for democracy, created the 
Committee on Public Information (CPI) to “inspire the 
nation to fight” (Knightley, 1975), organize press 
operations that, “fed information to the news media,” 
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995), and let loose a “barrage of 
propaganda on the American public [that] cannot be 
overemphasized.” (Knightley, 1975)  Under the guise of 
patriotism, and forcing correspondents to work under 
draconian guidelines, the CPI imposed a subtle but 
effective brand of censorship on the war correspondent.  In 
effect, the CPI, headed by George Creel, “combined the 
efforts of propagandist and censor.” (Knightley, 1975) 
To simply say that the rules were strict is an 
understatement.  “To report on the war, each correspondent 
had to be certified as an accredited or visiting 
correspondent.”  (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  This 
entailed appearing before the Secretary of War (or 
designated representative) and swearing an oath to “convey 
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the truth to the people of the United States,” (Knightley, 
1975) and not print “advance reports about troop strengths, 
troop and ship movements, anti-aircraft defenses and harbor 
defenses.” (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  The 
correspondent’s newspaper was required to put up a $10,000 
bond to “ensure that he would comport himself ‘as a 
gentleman of the Press.’ ” (Knightley, 1975) Two major 
pieces of legislation passed by Congress reinforced the 
CPI’s stranglehold on the press.  The Espionage Act of 1917 
“prohibited the publication of any information that could 
even remotely be considered to offer aid to the enemy,” 
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995) while the Sedition Act of 
1918, “was used to justify censorship.” (Aukofer and 
Lawrence, 1995)  Taken together, “these Acts were catch-all 
legislation used to control the press with impunity.” 
(McLaughlin, 2002)   
“Flamboyant, energetic news seekers,” is how the 
correspondents were described.  (Knightley, 1975)  However, 
their attempts to shed light on the slaughter of the 
Western Front were largely stymied by censorship.  
Correspondents such as Floyd Gibbons of the Chicago 
Tribune, who accompanied the Marines in Belleau Wood (and 
lost an eye and a piece of his shoulder for his pains), was 
one of the most renown reporters of the war.  His reports 
of the fighting only made it past the censor because it was 
rumored that his wound was fatal and released as a tribute 
to his memory.  Gibbons survived, and his black eye patch 
became his trademark. (Gibbons, 1918)  American soldiers 
constantly mobbed Irvin Cobb of the Saturday Evening Post, 
probably the most popular and widely read correspondent, 
whenever he made an appearance at the frontlines. 
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(Knightley, 1975)  And Collier’s Weekly’s Jimmy Hopper, 
moving forward with U.S. soldiers near Cantigny, was 
mistaken by a group of Germans as an American officer, who 
promptly surrendered to him. (Knightley, 1975)  Herbert 
Bayard Swope’s inside coverage of the war from the German 
side prior to America’s entry into the war won a Pulitzer 
Prize in 1917—the ever first awarded for reporting. (Lande, 
1996)  Overall, reporting was characterized by constant 
exaggerations of success, the downplaying of casualties, 
and little appreciation for the horror of fighting “eye 
deep in hell.”   Censorship was the overriding lesson: 
“subservience among reporters to the military [censor], 
and, as a result, public ignorance at the home front.” 
(McLaughlin, 2002) 
6. The Greatest Generation 
The lessons learned by correspondents during the First 
World War had a lasting effect on the reporters who covered 
the war fought by the men now known as, “The Greatest 
Generation.” (Brokaw, 1996)  Concurrently, the government 
was also keenly aware of the important role the war 
correspondent and newspapers played in shaping public 
opinion.  “Public opinion,” said Supreme Allied Commander 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower “wins war.” (Knightley, 1975)  
This was the prevailing sentiment within the U.S. 
government and military leadership as 1940 turned to 1941 
and it became increasingly apparent that the United States 
would be involved in the war before long.  With war on the 
horizon, “news management was a vital part of [the United 
States’] overall strategy.” (McLaughlin, 2002)   
War came to the United States on 07 December 1941.  To 
a degree not seen since the Civil War, and definitely 
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beyond America’s involvement in the First World War, the 
entire nation was at war.  Every facet of society was 
touched by the war—from the 16.4 million men and women who 
served in the Armed Forces, to the thousands upon thousands 
of factory workers who supplied those 16.4 million men and 
women with the equipment to win the war. (Lande, 1996)  
With the stark reality of the battleships USS Arizona, 
Oklahoma, California, Nevada, and West Virginia resting on 
the bottom of Pearl Harbor, the American war correspondent 
“became another cog in the massive military machine the 
Americans constructed,” to defeat Germany and Japan. 
(Knightley, 1975) 
It is important to recognize the constraints under 
which the newspaper industry and war correspondent 
operated.  Just as the CPI controlled the information 
released to the public in the First World War, the Office 
of War Information and the Office of Censorship were 
created in 1942 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to do 
the same. (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  The Office of War 
Information was, “the medium for publicizing the American 
war effort at home and abroad,” whose goal was to ensure 
that the world was “given the impression that a just and 
perfect America was well on the way to a swift and total 
victory.” (Knightley, 1975)  The Office of Censorship dealt 
with “censorship of all civilian modes of communication,” 
which included telegrams, radio, films, and newspapers. 
(Knightley, 1975)  Of course, operational security was of 
utmost importance, with terms such as “loose lips sink 
ships” becoming the catch phrase for efforts to keep vital 
military information from carelessly falling into enemy 
hands.  To that end, press codes listed in detail the 
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matters forbidden to be reported upon.  These included, 
“location, movements and identity of units, ships, and 
aircraft; war production and supplies; weather forecasts 
and temperatures in major [U.S.] cities; casualties, and 
even locations of archives and art treasures.” (Aukofer and 
Lawrence, 1995)   
In addition to the larger governmental censorship and 
information programs, the military also employed its own 
censors who had the authority to “curb the release of news 
about their combat activities that was deemed to be 
potentially harmful to their fighting effectiveness.” 
(Voss, 1994)  The military censors were “overworked men in 
a desperate war,” that used the following simple criterion 
for determining if a certain bit of news should be made 
public: Is it a good thing for the army or navy if this 
information is made public? (Knightley, 1975)  Combined, 
the goal of the government programs and military censors 
could be reduced to two simple statements: positively 
influencing public opinion and maintaining operational 
security.   
Hundreds of reporters followed the Allied armies 
around the globe as they battled against the Axis powers.  
Like the First World War, the military used accreditation 
to maintain positive control of which reporters were 
granted access to the fighting.  For example, there were 
558 accredited correspondents covering the Allied invasion 
of Normandy on 06 June 1944. (Evans, 2003)  Each 
correspondent was required to have a U.S. passport as well 
as an official press pass from the War Department.  So 
armed, the reporters were grouped together in official 
“press camps” near the front lines that catered to their 
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administrative needs as well as gathering point for 
briefings and meetings. (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  Each 
camp was assigned 50 accredited correspondents. (Wagner, 
1989)  Reporters wore military uniforms without rank 
insignia, (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995) and were 
administered the equivalent privileges of a major or 
lieutenant commander. (Harris, n.d.) In fact, Eisenhower 
considered war correspondents to be “quasi staff officers,” 
and reminded them that as such, “your first duty is a 
military duty, and the one fact which you must bear in mind 
is to disclose nothing which would help the enemy.” (Young 
and Jesser, 1997) 
As in previous wars, the news industry was not 
altogether happy with complying with the restriction 
imposed by the military and the government.  However, “war 
correspondents went along with the general scheme for 
reporting the war because they were convinced that it was 
in the national interest to do so.” (Knightley, 1975)  The 
reporters' willingness to see themselves as part of the 
overall war effort was widespread. (Young and Jesser, 1997)  
The more well-known correspondents have become thoroughly 
integrated with the history of the conflict: Edward R. 
Murrow, reporting on the Britain’s “finest hour” as German 
bombs rained down on London in 1940; Ernie Pyle, the first 
soldier’s advocate, who told the story of the common 
infantryman’s everyday travails with mud, cold, poor 
rations, and death; and Ernest Hemingway, riding back into 
his beloved Paris at the head of a band of Resistance 
Fighters – a day ahead of the American Army. (Knightley, 
1975, Morgan, 2003)   
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Confronted as they were with censorship and the 
patriotic urge to support their country’s cause during the 
greatest conflict the world had ever seen, the performance 
of the correspondents during World War II is a matter of 
opinion, perhaps best explained when taken in context of 
the period.  Many reporters believed they were tied to 
something bigger than just their newspaper.  The comments 
of Canadian war correspondent Ross Munro speak for many of 
his generation: 
I was committed to the war completely and 
utterly,  right from the start.  I don’t think 
young people  today could ever feel the 
commitment that we had.  Maybe it was jingoism, 
chauvinism, and stupidity, but  we felt the 
Germans were going to wreck this world of  ours 
and that we would have to stop them.  The troops 
were committed to it and I think the 
correspondents were—I certainly was.  But it 
won’t happen again.  The war we were in was very 
clear-cut.  It really was a crusade. (Knightley, 
1975) 
The author John Steinbeck, himself a correspondent for 
the New York Herald Tribune, wrote: 
We were all part of the war effort.  We went 
along with it, and not only that, we abetted it.  
Gradually  it became a part of us that the 
truth about anything was automatically secret and 
that to trifle with it was to interfere with the 
war effort.  By this I don’t  mean that the 
correspondents were liars.  They were  not…It is 
in the things not mentioned that the truth lies… 
Yes, we wrote only a part of the war but at the 
time we believed, fervently believed, that it was 
the  best thing to do.  And perhaps that is why, 
when the  war was over, novels and stories by ex-
soldiers, like  “The Naked and the Dead” 
proved so shocking to a  public which had been 
carefully protected from contact with the crazy, 
hysterical mess. (Steinbeck, 1959) 
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Others became disillusioned with the paradox between 
the charge to seek the truth, emotionlessly reporting on 
the suffering, remaining patriotic, and supporting the war 
effort.  Robert St. John of the AP wrote that, “[W]e were 
all just leeches, reporters trying to suck headlines out of 
all this death and suffering.” (Knightley, 1975)  More 
critical was war correspondent Charles Lynch who plainly 
stated that it was: 
…humiliating to look back at what we wrote during 
the war.  It was crap-and I don’t exclude the 
Ernie Pyles [or other celebrated 
correspondents]…We were a propaganda arm of our 
governments.  At the start the censors enforced 
that, but by the end, we were our own censors.  
We were cheerleaders.  I suppose there wasn’t an 
alternative at the time.  It was total war.  But, 
for God’s sake, let’s not glorify our role.  It 
wasn’t journalism.  It wasn’t journalism at all. 
(Young and Jesser, 1997) 
7. The Forgotten War 
The war in Korea—or more appropriately, the police 
action in Korea—was “the worst reported war of modern 
times.” (Royle, 1989)  Only five years after the United 
States’ victory in World War II, the American military (and 
American press) found themselves on foreign shores engaged 
in combat operations.  Following the North Korean invasion 
of 25 June 1950, American forces, as part of a larger 
United Nations force, rushed to the Korean peninsula to 
stem the communist juggernaut as it drove deep into South 
Korea.  The scene witnessed by the first war correspondents 
arriving was one of utter confusion: fleeing civilians, 
routed South Korean and American forces, all retreating 
south before the North Korean forces. 
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At the beginning of the war, there was no press 
censorship as experienced by the correspondents following 
the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese, only a 
“voluntary code of war reporting aimed at preserving 
military secrecy…” (Knightley, 1975)  The stories coming 
from the correspondents echoed this hands-off approach.  
They wrote of beaten and under-equipped soldiers fleeing 
before the enemy, poor leadership, and lost opportunities.  
Marguerite Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune quoted a 
demoralized U.S. Army lieutenant who asked her, “Are you 
correspondents telling the people back home the truth?  Are 
you telling them out of one platoon of twenty men, we have 
three left?  Are you telling them that we have nothing to 
fight with, and that it is an utterly useless war?” 
(Higgins, 1951)  Such candid reporting of the war effort as 
witnessed during the opening months of the Korean War was 
unheard of during World War II.  The stories of 
disorganized retreats, poor morale, and lack of equipment 
quickly were branded by the military as unpatriotic, which 
labeled the reporters as traitors, and of “giving aid and 
comfort to the enemy.” (Knightley, 1975)   
In an effort to stem the public criticism that they 
believed had its roots in the blunt reporting of the war, 
the military quickly imposed bans on the press.  General 
Douglas MacArthur, Commander of United Nations forces in 
Korea took steps personally to remind the correspondents of 
their “important responsibility in the matter of 
psychological warfare.” (Knightley, 1975)  The voluntary 
code of war reporting caused confusion among the reporters 
because they did not have a firm grasp of what they should 
or should not report.  Eventually, the Department of 
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Defense imposed a system of censorship similar to that 
practiced during World War II.  Censors checked reporters’ 
stories to ensure that things such as “food shortages, 
panics, inferior U.S. equipment or the rampant corruption 
of the South Korean government” were not put into print. 
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  The restrictions on the press 
“went well beyond military or operational security.” (Young 
and Jesser, 1997)  Derogatory comments concerning troops or 
commanders were also forbidden.  All of this was “backed up 
by an informal ‘get on the team’ attitude which appeared to 
find a ready response among proprietors and editors.” 
(Young and Jesser, 1997)   
In examining the correspondents’ work during this 
conflict, despite showing physical courage on the 
battlefield, they “failed to show equal moral courage in 
questioning what the war was all about.” (Knightley, 1975)  
For the war correspondent, “Korea was the link, the 
indeterminate end of one era and the beginning of another.” 
(Young and Jesser, 1997)  The nature of the war—and the 
peace—set the stage for the next test of the war 
correspondent: Vietnam. 
8. The First Television War 
The Vietnam War marked “both a high point and a low 
point in the relationship between the military and the 
media,” (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995) and has had an immense 
impact on how the military viewed war correspondents and 
the media in general for many years.  Apart from the 
bloodshed on the battlefield, the one enduring legacy born 
of the Vietnam War (in regards to the media) was an almost 
visceral distrust between the U.S. military for the news 
media.  Known as the “Vietnam Syndrome,” this belief 
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basically revolves around the contention that the press was 
openly opposed to the war and that their negative reporting 
turned public opinion in the United States, ultimately 
costing America the war.  (McLaughlin, 2002)  “A popular 
argument is that the media were directly responsible for 
the loss of political and military will to continue the war 
in Vietnam.” (Young and Jesser, 1997) “Television brought 
death into people’s living rooms every day,” and “was a 
major factor in fuelling the anti-war movement …making 
Vietnam America’s least popular war.” (Swain, 2004)  
President Richard M. Nixon quipped that the war in Vietnam 
“was the first in our history during which our media were 
more friendly to our enemies than our allies.” (Evans, 
2003) 
This legacy of distrust was the low point of the 
media/military relationship.  The high point was that 
although the military was fully aware of the negative 
reporting, they did not impose censorship to restrict the 
press as they had in previous conflicts. (Aukofer and 
Lawrence, 1995)  Censorship as it existed was voluntary 
based on “guidelines covering some 15 areas concerning 
troop movements, equipment, and locations.” (Young and 
Jesser, 1997)  General William C. Westmoreland, Commanding 
General of U.S. forces in Vietnam, opted for this policy 
because “he trusted the goodwill of the American 
correspondents reporting the war.” (Matthews, 1991)  
However, in place of censorship, the military “mounted a 
public relations campaign, under highly professional 
direction, to get over its version of the war.” (Knightley, 
1975)  
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The strategy was two-fold: appeal to the natural 
patriotism of the press corps to support the war effort 
against Communism and saturate the media with “official” 
daily reports, briefings, and updates on the progress of 
the war.  Hopefully, the war correspondents would be kept 
somewhat in check and be less prone to report more negative 
stories and events.  “Anyone who questioned any aspect of 
official policy was at best a “liberal,” and at worst a 
“communist.” (McLaughlin, 2002)  An example of this mindset 
is demonstrated by a question leveled at AP reporter 
Malcolm Browne during a press conference in Saigon by 
Admiral Harry P. Felt: “Why don’t you get on the team?” 
(Knightley, 1975)  Vice President Hubert Humphrey, 
addressing correspondents in November 1967 told them that, 
“[W]hen you speak to the American people give the benefit 
of the doubt to our side…We’re in this together.” (Aronson, 
1970) 
“Westmoreland supplemented his voluntary [censorship] 
guidelines with a program that attempted to keep the press 
informed by providing regular background briefings for 
selected correspondents, 24-hour consultation services by 
knowledgeable public affairs officers, [and] daily press 
conferences…” (Matthews, 1991) This mechanism that the 
military used to keep the journalists up to date on the 
military operations within Vietnam was called the Joint 
United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), which was 
“manned by ‘professional’ briefers backed up with a 
formidable array of slides, backdrops and other visual 
aids.” (Young and Jesser, 1997) Unfortunately, “[T]he only 
thing missing was the truth. (Young and Jesser, 1997)  
Located in Saigon, the JUSPAO conducted daily briefs of the 
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day’s operations, which quickly became known among the 
journalists as the “Five O’Clock Follies” because of “the 
abundance of propaganda and lack of any real information.” 
(Zangrilli, 2003)  “If he was prepared to believe JUSPAO, a 
correspondent could cover the war simply by attending the 
briefings each day.” (Knightley, 1975)   
“The most troubling aspect was that, with few 
exceptions, the Follies became the principal source of 
information about the war.” (McLaughlin, 2002)  Before 
long, the “nonsensical claims made by the military led to 
outright contempt” for the JUSPAO briefings.  (Young and 
Jesser, 1997)  Many felt that they were “designed to feed 
the news media with a daily hard news story but were not 
taken seriously by most journalists because they were based 
on hasty, fragmentary, inevitably inaccurate field reports 
of action in a theatre of war where there was no actual 
front line, moving or stationary.” (McLaughlin, 2002)  As 
the war increased in intensity, and American casualties 
began to mount, this not-so-subtle attempt to control which 
news the journalists received was discounted more and more 
by the media.  “When there were eventually nearly 700 war 
correspondents in South Vietnam, it became inevitable that 
some of them would refuse to accept the official line at 
face value and would get out into the field to see things 
for themselves.” (Knightley, 1975)  The truth, as it always 
does, managed to find a willing audience.  “The sanitized, 
fantastically optimistic picture of the war’s progress” 
failed to convince reporters who had spent time in the 
front line units, rather than remaining in Saigon. 
(Reporters at War, n.d.) “Reporters who had only that day 
come in from the field were able to deride the ‘body count’ 
35
tally that JUSPAO used as the measure of success and could 
debunk the official version of events on the basis of 
having seen and recorded the true situation for 
themselves.” (Young and Jesser, 1997)   
The correspondents who covered the war in Vietnam were 
a varied lot.  There were old hands from World War II and 
Korea, renowned authors, freelance writers, college 
students, photojournalists, and reporters from major 
newspapers and network television stations. (Knightley, 
1975)  To get accreditation, a reporter simply needed a 
letter from their editor that accepted responsibility for 
the journalist. (Young and Jesser, 1997), while freelance 
reporters needed letters from two recognized media sources 
that were willing to purchase the writings of the reporter. 
(Knightley, 1975)  The number of correspondents in country 
varied as well.  In 1964 there were only 40 accredited 
journalists in Saigon; by the summer of 1965 there were 
more than 400. (McLaughlin, 2002) Young and Jesser (1997) 
state that, “[A]t any one time [when the war was at it 
height] there were upwards of 1000 accredited journalists 
in the country.” (Young and Jesser, 1997)  McLaughlin 
(2002) puts the number at 2000. (McLaughlin, 2002)  
The Vietnam War “was a new kind of war that required a 
new kind of correspondent.” (Knightley, 1975) While some 
correspondents readily accepted the official version from 
JUSPAO and became part of the military propaganda machine, 
it was those who did not who ensured that the whole story 
of the Vietnam War was revealed to the American public. 
(Knightley, 1975)  Reporters such as Peter Arnett, Larry 
Burrows, Dickey Chapelle, David Halberstam, and Michael 
Herr are some of the more renown.  Free to move from unit 
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to unit, the reporters “became very adept at hitching rides 
and, in many cases, were adopted by units with whom they 
shared the same dangers.” (Young and Jesser, 1997)  While 
it is generally acknowledged that the hierarchy of the 
military machine was not too fond of the media, differing 
views exist on how well liked the correspondents were by 
the men in the field.  Some were accepted by the rank and 
file and developed good relationships with their military 
sources. (McLaughlin, 2002) Others were not so readily 
accepted.  When reporter Michael Herr was being dropped off 
by a jeep at a front line unit, a soldier remarked, “Those 
bastards, I hope they die.” (Knightley, 1975)  Soldiers and 
Marines who suffered the daily dangers and deprivations of 
the common infantryman “resented the media’s intrusion into 
their grief or the filming of their dead and wounded,” 
(Young and Jesser, 1997) or the fact that the soldiers 
would be called to put their lives on the line if the 
reporters were caught in an ambush and wounded. (Kennedy, 
1993) 
Compared to previous conflicts, the war in Vietnam was 
better reported than any previous war America fought.   
(Knightley, 1975)  Vietnam has been called the first real 
“television” war (Young and Jesser, 1997) due to the 
advances in technology that permitted reports from the war 
zone to be viewed by the American public each evening on 
the broadcast news.  While there were only 10 million 
television sets in America during the Korean War, there 
were 100 million during the height of the Vietnam War. 
(Knightley, 1975)  For the first time, “the full weight of 
the modern media was deployed without restriction.” (Young 
and Jesser, 1997)  The war was also unique in another 
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aspect: the military had to deal with a news media that was 
not fully behind the country’s conduct of the war. (Young 
and Jesser, 1997): 
It became a war like no other, a war with no 
front line, no easily identifiable  enemy, no 
simply explained cause, no clearly designated 
villain on whom to focus  the nation’s hate, 
no menace to the homeland, no need for general 
sacrifice, and,  therefore, no nation-wide 
fervor of patriotism.  It was a vicious war, in a 
tiny,  distant, devastated, and backward 
nation, against what Bernard Kalb of CBS 
described as “the most faceless foe in our 
history. (Knightley, 1975) 
Against this confused backdrop, the correspondents did 
the best they could to report the real story of the 
fighting in Vietnam back to the American public.  Peter 
Arnett, who spent 13 years in Vietnam as a correspondent 
mused that, “[C]aught between the truth of what we saw and 
the nation’s sense of patriotism, the Vietnam reporters 
became something like outcasts, destined to defend their 
professionalism for the rest of their lives.” (Arnett, 
1996)  The most lasting effect of the war concerning the 
war correspondent was the complete erosion of trust of the 
military for the media.  The failure to control the media 
through censorship as in previous wars was not forgotten by 
the Pentagon.  The open media policy proved “self 
defeating,” as the appeal to patriotism fell on deaf ears. 
(Knightley, 1975)  “The U.S. Army,” stung by their defeat, 
“made up its mind that in the future its attitude toward 
media reporting would be different, certainly more 
restrictive…” (McLaughlin, 2002)   The distrust and 
contempt born of the “first television war” (Young and 
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Jesser, 1997) would greatly influence its “judgment in 
future handling of war reporting.” (Young and Jesser, 1997) 
9. The 1980s: Total Control 
Following the debacle in Vietnam (which produced the 
prevailing thought among the military that the reporting by 
the war correspondents and the media industry cost America 
the war) the military was “quick to appreciate the 
importance and impact of public opinion on operations.” 
(Young and Jesser, 1997)  The bitter taste left in the 
mouths of the officers who fought in Vietnam created a 
generation of future leaders that “felt they had more to 
lose than to gain by dealing with the press.” (Aukofer and 
Lawrence, 1995)  The press and correspondents were of no 
use to the commanders; dealing with the media was the realm 
of the public affairs officers within the military ranks.  
When the first major military operation of the post-Vietnam 
era (the invasion of Grenada) became imminent, the military 
hierarchy decided to keep the “news media in the dark as 
much as possible.” (McLaughlin, 2002) 
In October 1983 the U.S. military launched Operation 
Urgent Fury, the U.S. invasion of the Caribbean island 
nation of Grenada.  Urgent Fury was aimed at securing the 
safety of over 1000 American citizens on the island that 
were caught in the middle of a violent coup and restoring 
order.  The campaign was “marked by secrecy of planning, 
the absence of any public information annex in the 
operational plan, deliberate exclusion of the media, and 
the manipulation and management of news.” (Young and 
Jesser, 1997)  Even the spokesman for the Secretary of 
Defense, whose job it was to deal with the Washington press 
corps, did not learn of the invasion until it had begun. 
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(McLaughlin, 2002)  The rationale behind the secrecy and 
initial exclusion of the media was stated by Admiral Wesley 
McDonald as being a result of “the absolute need to 
maintain the greatest element of surprise in executing the 
mission to ensure minimum danger to U.S. hostages…and to 
the servicemen involved in the initial assault dictated 
that the press be restricted until the initial objectives 
had been secured.” (Braestrup, 1985)  Admiral Joseph 
Metcalf, USN, who commanded the U.S. forces, admitted that, 
“I had a great deal to do with keeping [the press] out.  I 
think I did the right thing.” (Braestrup, 1985)  Said 
General Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, about the decision to 
exclude the media: “As the meeting closed, somebody raised 
the question of the press.  We agreed that we would open 
Grenada to reporters at 5 o’clock the next afternoon, 
because by then Grenada would be ours.” (Schwarzkopf, 1992) 
Three hundred reporters were kept bottled up on 
Barbados, and when the military finally allowed 
correspondents in Grenada, they only allowed 15 reporters 
and photographers. (McLaughlin, 2002)  The fighting was 
over, and “there was nothing to report except the fact that 
they had not been able to report.” (Young and Jesser, 1997)  
The resulting news blackout infuriated the U.S. news 
industry.  “I’ve never seen such a mad dog and pony show 
before,” commented a news executive. “I just think that the 
goddamn thing is such a flagrant manipulation of the 
press.” (Young and Jesser, 1997)  In a reversal of the free 
flow of information experienced by the press in Vietnam, 
during Operation Urgent Fury there were “no press 
briefings, no press releases, no nothing.” (McLaughlin, 
2002)  In a legal suit filed against the Department of 
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Defense’s media restrictions during the invasion, the 
Washington Federal District Court dismissed the complaint, 
but ruled that the military could dictate restrictions on 
the press during operations. (McLaughlin, 2002)  Although 
Operation Urgent Fury was a comparatively small military 
operation, it proved to be a turning point in the evolution 
of media-military relations and for the future manner in 
which correspondents reported war.  
10. The Sidle Commission 
Relations between the media and military at the time 
of Operation Urgent Fury had atrophied to an “appalling 
state.” (Young and Jesser, 1997)  As a result of the media 
outcry over their exclusion during the operations in 
Grenada, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
John Vessey, USA, named retired Major General Winant Sidle 
to head an internal commission to review relations between 
the media and the military and reconcile press access with 
operational security. (Porch, 2004)  Named “The Sidle 
Commission,” the group consisted of seven military members 
and six media representatives and convened in February 
1984.  (Ben-Zedeff, 2004)  Sidle stated in the final report 
that, “[T]he American people must be informed about United 
States military operations and this information can be best 
provided through both news media and the government.  
Therefore the panel believes it is essential that the U.S. 
news media cover U.S. military operations to the maximum 
degree consistent with the mission security and the safety 
of the U.S. forces.” (Young and Jesser, 1997)  The major 
achievement of the commission was the establishment of the 
Department of Defense National Media Pool (DNMP). (Aukofer 
and Lawrence, 1995)  The concept of the DNMP was that “a 
group of journalists pre-selected from the major news 
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organizations would agree to abide by security regulations 
and share reports and be ready to move to the “seat of war” 
at a moment’s notice.  This group would be maintained in 
existence only until the main body of reporters appeared on 
the scene.” (Porch, 2003`)  Along with other 
recommendations for the inclusion of public affairs in 
operational planning, field support of reporters, and 
educating the force on media matters, it was hoped that the 
these changes would “smooth future relations with the 
press, obviating any need for military commanders to become 
more involved in the public affairs process than they had 
been before.” (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)   
It was not long before the DNMP was first used.  
During Operation Earnest Will, the U.S. Navy operation to 
escort re-flagged Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq War, 
the DNMP was “dispatched to the Persian Gulf, where the 
correspondents boarded U.S. Naval vessels on a rotation 
basis and reported back on the escort operations.” (Ben-
Zedeff, 2004)  This first deployment of the DNMP, 
consisting of 28 separate pool rotations and 47 transits of 
the Straits of Hormuz from July 1987 to April 1988, was a 
“markedly successful evolution.” (Matthews, 1991)  One 
correspondent commented, “First and foremost, [the DNMP] 
had been a success inasmuch as our audiences were better 
served for our having been there, rather than at our 
Washington desk’s, and for having covered the escort 
operations, albeit under unusual conditions.” (Matthews, 
1991)  
11. Operation Just Cause 
The next opportunity for American war correspondents 
to report on conflict was the U.S. invasion of Panama, 
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Operation Just Cause, in December 1989.  Despite the small-
scale success enjoyed by the journalists reporting during 
Operation Earnest Will, the pattern of secrecy that marked 
the Grenada operation re-emerged, and the DNMP did not 
deploy until it was too late to cover the action.  However, 
this time it was not the military that made the decision to 
deny the media.  “Military leaders played NO part in 
shaping that decision.” (Matthews, 1991)  The Secretary of 
Defense, Richard Cheney, “who held the media responsible 
for undermining public morale in Vietnam and “did not look 
on the press as an asset” (Porch, n.d.)  admitted that it 
was his decision alone that prevented war correspondents 
from reporting the opening actions of that short war. 
(Matthews, 1991)  Denied access, non-pool reporters 
traveled to Panama on their own to get whatever information 
they could.  (Porch, n.d.)  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Colin Powell, USA, later wrote, “We were 
slow in getting the press pool to Panama and to the action… 
Consequently, the press ate us alive, with some 
justification.  In the future, I knew, we had to do a far 
better job.” (Powell, 1995) 
12. Into the Storm 
In August 1990, Iraq launched an invasion into 
neighboring Kuwait.  In response, U.S. President George 
H.W. Bush ordered the immediate deployment of U.S. forces 
to Saudi Arabia to protect the oil rich nation from the 
Iraqi Army.  This six-month build-up of forces was coined 
Operation Desert Shield by the Pentagon, while the campaign 
to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait became known as Operation 
Desert Storm.  When the brief war was over, the Pentagon 
and the media had differing opinions of the effectiveness 
of the war correspondents’ coverage of the fighting.  
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Assistant Secretary of Defense Pete Williams bragged that 
America experienced “the best war coverage we ever had.” 
(Boot, 1991)  The press felt that they were “spoon-fed.” 
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  Fifteen Washington bureau 
chiefs, representing major news organizations throughout 
America, stated that the war was “the most uncovered major 
conflict in modern American history.” (Aukofer and 
Lawrence, 1995)  Furthermore, they wrote: 
Our sense is that virtually all major news 
 organizations agree that the flow of information to 
 the public was blocked, impeded or diminished by the 
 policies and practices of the Department of Defense.  
 Pools did not work.  Stories and pictures were late or 
 lost.  Access to the men and women in the field was 
 interfered with by a needless system of military 
 escorts and copy review.  These conditions meant we 
 could not tell the public the full story of those who 
 fought the nation’s battle.  (Aukofer and Lawrence, 
 1995) 
However, General Powell did not agree with the 
complaints: 
The image of World War II’s legendary Ernie Pyle, 
filing stories from European foxholes and Pacific 
beachheads, was thrown in our faces by our 
critics.  Yet, press coverage of Desert Storm was 
unprecedented. Of the 2,500 scheduled journalists 
overall, 1,400 crowded the theater of operations 
at the peak.  Compare this figure with 27 
reporters going ashore  with the first wave at 
Normandy on D-Day…Of the 1,350 print stories 
submitted by the press pool reporters,  one was 
changed to protect intelligence procedures.  
(Evans, 2003) 
The two major complaints for war correspondents during 
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm were the ad hoc pool 
system that was developed by the military, and the daily 
press briefings to the assembled reporters in Saudi Arabia. 
(McLaughlin, 2002)  The problem of the ad hoc pool system 
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was simply one of numbers. The first members of the 
established DNMP arrived in Saudi Arabia on 13 August 1990. 
(Ben-Zedeff, 2004)  Saudi Arabia’s initial reluctance to 
allow any journalists at all in the kingdom assisted the 
Pentagon in maintaining a grip on the initial information 
flow, but not for long.  “Early in the build-up the Saudis 
made a simple announcement,” recalled General Powell, “They 
were not going to allow any reporters into their country.” 
(Powell, 1995)   
The Pentagon immediately knew that, although they may 
secretly desire to maintain positive control of the war 
correspondents (in light of their experience in Vietnam), 
they could not allow a repeat performance of the press 
debacle that occurred in Panama.  “That we knew, could not 
stand,” continued Powell about the Saudi policy, “You do 
not send nearly a half million Americans, plus thousands of 
other nationals, halfway around the world to prepare for a 
major war and then impose a news blackout.” (Powell, 1995) 
The Saudi government eventually began to grant visas to the 
hordes of war correspondents that wanted to cover the 
deployment. (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995) Much to the 
chagrin of the Pentagon, it quickly became evident that the 
enormity of the brewing conflict—the first large-scale 
deployment of U.S. forces since Vietnam—drove the appetite 
for news beyond the capacity of the 17 war correspondents 
of the DNMP.  Although it remained in existence for three 
weeks, “media pressure for increased accreditation [on the 
DNMP] overloaded and finally collapsed the system.” 
(McLaughlin, 2002)  It was precisely due to such large 
numbers of reporters streaming into Saudi Arabia—800 
flooded into Saudi Arabia during the initial build-up of 
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forces—that the Pentagon devised the ad hoc “combat pool” 
system. (Porch, n.d., Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995, Young and 
Jesser, 1997) 
As stated by Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams, the 
combat pool system had three purposes: “It gets reporters 
out to see the action, it guarantees that Americans at home 
get reports from the scene of action, and it allows the 
military to accommodate a reasonable number of journalists 
without overwhelming the units that are fighting the 
enemy.” (McLaughlin, 2002)  It also meant, “the only way 
any journalist could cover the war and remain officially 
sanctioned by the U.S. military and the Saudi government 
was to be a member of a pool.” (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  
In a manner, the pool system was a subtle method of 
controlling the war correspondents.  This was largely due 
to the specter of Vietnam that still haunted the U.S. 
military as it prepared for its first serious challenge 
since their less-than-graceful withdrawal from that country 
in 1975.  The last thing the military wanted was a 
prolonged, bloody war reported every night on the 
television and newspapers. (Young and Jesser, 1997)   
The main complaint expressed by war correspondents 
assigned to the combat pool system was one of de facto 
censorship and manipulation, (Porch, 2004, Young & Jesser, 
1997) as well as a denial of access of reporters to best 
position themselves to cover the breaking stories. (Aukofer 
and Lawrence, 1995)  The tight restrictions of media travel 
infuriated the war correspondents, who thought they would 
be able to move freely around the battlefield as they had 
in Vietnam, jump on a helicopter, hitch a ride on a truck, 
get their story, and quickly return to Dhahran to file 
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their reports. (Porch, 2003)   Secretary of Defense Richard 
Cheney rebuffed the reporter’s complaints, saying that the 
correspondents “didn’t have any concept of how the nature 
of warfare had changed, or that we were going to do our 
operations at night or that we were going to move very fast 
or that if we didn’t provide the transportation for them, 
there wasn’t any way that they were going to be able to 
keep up.” (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995) 
Critics state that for the “first time in American 
history reporters were essentially barred from accompanying 
the nation’s troops into combat.” (Blanchard, 1992)  The 
combat pools “offered journalists very little in the way of 
first-hand action…they saw little or nothing of the brief 
and much vaunted ‘land war’” (McLaughlin, 2002) There were 
exceptions.  Molly Moore, a Washington Post war 
correspondent, accompanied the U.S. Marines during their 
breach of the Iraqi defenses along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border 
and the subsequent attack to liberate Kuwait City. (Moore, 
1993) However, those non-pool accredited correspondents 
(only 186 participated in the pools) were even more 
restricted in their movements (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995): 
Those not assigned to pools would have access to 
several military briefings held in Riyadh, one by 
CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and two others by 
British and Saudi commands.  In addition unaired 
background briefings were provided to the media.  
Otherwise, travel within the theater of 
operations by  media reps was prohibited. (Young 
and Jesser, 1997) 
These official briefings conducted by American, 
British, and Saudi military officials have received much 
criticism.  “While the pooling system kept journalists well 
away from the real action, the briefings kept real 
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information away from journalists.” (McLaughlin, 2002)  The 
high-tech Pentagon videos of “smart bombs” were akin to 
“video war games that played to the whoops, cheers and 
laughter of the assembled journalists…” (McLaughlin, 2002)  
“The briefings proved immensely popular with home 
audiences, giving the impression that the public was 
getting the news straight from the horse’s mouth.” (Young 
and Jesser, 1997)  By showing only “selected highlights 
from the most successful missions” of combat aircraft, the 
military again became de facto assignment editors for the 
war correspondents, sanitizing the information released to 
the public. (Young & Jesser, 1997) 
Many reporters worked outside the pool system, risking 
have their credentials revoked and immediate deportation 
from the region.  They quickly were given the moniker of 
being a “unilateral.” (McLaughlin, 2002) Chris Hedges of 
The New York Times was one such war correspondent.  Michael 
Kelly, of the Boston Globe, accompanied Egyptian forces 
into action, bypassing the pool system. (Reporters at War, 
n.d.) Another unilateral was decorated combat veteran, 
retired U.S. Army Colonel David Hackworth, who said that 
unescorted media [unilaterals] often found themselves 
staring down the gun barrels of American troops who were 
instructed to treat such unilaterals as hostile. (Young and 
Jesser, 1997)  “Although I managed to get out on my own, we 
didn’t have the freedom of movement to make an independent 
assessment,” said Hackworth, “Everything was spoon fed.  We 
were animals in a zoo and the press officers were the 
zookeepers who threw us a piece of meat occasionally.” 
(Young and Jesser, 1997) 
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13. The Aftermath: A New Policy 
In the opinion of the media cognoscenti, “the Gulf War 
[Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm] pool system produced 
a mediocre product.” (Porch, n.d.)  The evidence suggests a 
“familiar pattern of deliberately denying media access to 
the earliest phases of operations, followed by a policy of 
media containment and limitation.” (Young and Jesser, 1997)  
In a letter sent to Secretary of Defense Cheney after the 
war, news executives clearly stated their displeasure in 
the manner in which they were permitted to report to the 
American public.  “We believe that the Pentagon Pool 
arrangements during Operation Desert Storm made it 
impossible for reporters and photographers to tell the 
public the full story of the war in a timely fashion,” they 
wrote, “We believe it is imperative that the Gulf War not 
serve as a model for future coverage.” (Italics added) 
(Young and Jesser, 1997) 
In the spirit of cooperation, the Pentagon and the 
news industry worked together to try to solve the access 
and censorship problems that caused such heartache during 
the war.  The result was a set of guidelines titled the DoD 
Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations, 
published in April 1992. (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995) The 
document contained ten principles that reaffirmed “open and 
independent reporting,” by accredited journalists provided 
access to all major units (with restrictions on access to 
Special Operations units). (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995) It 
also stated that journalists should be permitted to ride 
aboard military vehicles and aircraft when feasible, and, 
echoing the letter sent to Secretary Cheney, that “pools 
are not to serve as the standard of covering U.S. military 
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operations.”  (Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  The events of 
September 11, 2001 would quickly put to test the military’s 
dedication to ensuring that the mistakes of the past 
concerning the employment of media during wartime were to 
be not repeated. 
14. A Paradigm Shift: September 11, 2001 
While it is important to understand the evolution of 
the war correspondent, it is perhaps more important to 
examine more recent events that shaped the media’s role 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  On September 11, 2001, the 
world was forever changed in the blink of an eye by the 
terrorist attacks on the United States.  Suddenly, after a 
decade of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions around the 
globe, the U.S. military was suddenly confronted with 
fighting a global war on terrorism.  The first American 
military action of the 21st century was called Operation 
Enduring Freedom, a long-term campaign targeting the Usama 
Bin Ladin, the Taliban, and the Al Qaeda terrorist network.  
And just as they had done since the birth of the Republic, 
American war correspondents covered the action to ensure 
that the public kept informed.  Initially, however, the 
media was not welcomed with open arms by the military—a 
disturbing flashback to the strict control of the post-
Vietnam era. 
The first offensive action of Operation Enduring 
Freedom was a raid on a Taliban airbase and complex by U.S. 
Army Rangers and Delta Force operators in the vicinity of 
Kandahar, Afghanistan during the early morning hours of 
October 20, 2001.  Because of the secretive nature of such 
special operations, reporters were literally “kept in the 
dark.” (Isaacson and Jordan, 2003)  However, military 
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cameramen of the Joint Combat Camera Center did record the 
action with a specially equipped night vision camera 
(Isaacson and Jordan, 2003), and the “grainy, green-tinted 
footage of determined commandos and billowing parachutes 
dominated the television news that night.” (Hersh, 2001)  
When queried if such operations against the Taliban would 
continue in future, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Richard B. Myers, replied, “Some things are going 
to be visible, some invisible.” (Hersh, 2001)  
Unfortunately for the Pentagon, Seymour Hersh of The New 
Yorker wrote “a scathing account of the mission, alleging 
it was bungled.” (Isaacson and Jordan, 2003)  With no war 
correspondents along, “there was little independent 
reporting to inform the debate.” (Isaacson and Jordan, 
2003)  
With the American public hungry for positive news 
after the tragedy of September 11, 2001, this was not 
welcome news for the war correspondents waiting in the 
wings.  As had occurred in the past, the need for 
operational security in wartime was at conflict with the 
journalist’s quest to keep the public informed.  The claim 
that “[M]ission considerations including sensitive special 
operations tactics and the volatile security environment in 
Afghanistan inherently limited media opportunities in that 
theater…” was of no comfort to the journalists. (Leedy, 
2003)   
In November 2001 conventional forces—U.S. Marines and 
soldiers—went on the offensive in Afghanistan.  Similar to 
Operation Desert Storm, war correspondents were confined to 
“centralized briefings and carefully corralled pool[s].” 
(Isaacson and Jordan, 2003)  As a result the Pentagon “paid 
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the price for not facilitating coverage.” (Leedy, 2003)  
“There was nobody there to tell the story of the youth of 
America going out and doing this great mission with such 
success in real tough terrain,” said a U.S. Army officer in 
retrospect.  “It was a missed opportunity [to tell their 
story]…” (Miracle, 2003)  The lack of correspondents in the 
field again denied the Pentagon the opportunity to counter 
false reports and propaganda.  An example of this is an 
incident in which it was reported through the grapevine 
that soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division ran over a 
child and beat a man to death during a raid.  “[W]e should 
have had reporters on that raid because the villagers 
lied…we didn’t have any evidence to rebut their 
allegations.” (Leedy, 2003)   
With such restrictions emerging (again), it is little 
wonder that antagonism began to build between the media and 
the military (again). (Berkowitz, 2003)  “There is a war 
being fought by Americans and we’re not there to chronicle 
it.  We have access to the Northern Alliance, we have 
access to the Taliban, we have practically zero access to 
American forces in theater.” (Hickey, 2002)  The tension 
came to a head when reporters were “locked in a warehouse 
on December 6, [2001] so that they could not cover troops 
injured by a stray [friendly] bomb.” (Lee, 2004)  Of 
course, the media did not sit still for such outrageous 
censorship.  “A gross abuse of the ground rules for the 
press pool,” reported the New York Times. (Hickey, 2002)  
The resulting uproar prompted a quick apology from 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Victoria 
Clarke: “We owe you an apology,” she said in a memo to news 
bureau chiefs dated December 6, 2001.  “The last several 
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days have revealed shortcomings in our preparedness to 
support news organizations in their efforts to cover U.S. 
military operations in Afghanistan.” (ASD-PA, 2001a)  
Furthermore, she recognized that: 
We [the Pentagon] have a significant 
responsibility to provide your correspondents the 
opportunity to cover the war.  It is a 
responsibility that we take seriously.  Our 
policy remains the same as it always has been: 
Keeping in mind our desire to protect operational 
security and the safety of men and women in 
uniform, we intend to provide maximum media 
coverage with minimal delay and hassle.  That has 
not always been the case over the last few days, 
particularly with regard to the coverage of the 
dead and wounded returning to the Forward 
Operating Base known as Rhino. (ASD-PA, 2001a) 
Clarke stated that guidance had been reissued to all 
military commands, reemphasizing the Secretary of Defense’s 
and Chairman of the Joint Chief’s intent that for “maximum 
coverage [and] minimum hassle,” (ASD-PA, 2001a) and that 
the Pentagon’s goal was for “longer duration, larger 
numbers, and unilateral filing status for news 
organizations covering the military action in Afghanistan.” 
(ASD-PA, 2001a)  At a December 13, 2001 press briefing, 
Clarke also said that the Pentagon did not like the pool 
system any more than the press did, but the limited 
transportation assets available in theater to move 
journalists to the scene of the action was a factor in the 
media’s access being less than acceptable. (ASD-PA, 2001b)  
However, by the end of December 2001, the Pentagon 
terminated the requirement that all reporters in 
Afghanistan remain part of an official press pool, and 
reporters began to “roam about the country freely.” 
(Synovitz, 2002)  Although the requirement was removed, the 
53
press pools still remained in effect to facilitate easier 
access to war correspondents who still desired to use the 
military for transport to remote areas. (Synovitz, 2002)  
Access was indeed slowly getting better for the war 
correspondents.  And in March 2002, a major step toward 
making access even better was taken by the Pentagon when 
they experimented with a concept called “embedding.” 
15. Martin Savidge Rocks The Boat 
 “When the public affairs posture changed from passive 
to active, it was difficult to catch up and get the media 
out in front with the troops,” commented U.S. Army Colonel 
Melanie R. Reeder, a public affairs officer deployed in 
Afghanistan. (Miracle, 2003)  Out in front with the troops 
was exactly what the war correspondents wanted—at least the 
most adventurous ones.  “Some reporters weren’t even living 
at the base [Kandahar airport]; they had a house in town, 
with cooks, a staff and showers,” said CNN war 
correspondent Martin Savidge. (Wall, 2003)  Savidge was an 
aggressive, seasoned correspondent who desired greater 
access.  “We had been camping out, literally, at the 
Kandahar airport, living on the base for about six weeks.  
You could see military coming and going, and it was 
frustrating that this sort of activity was going on and we 
couldn’t go on it,” reflected Savidge. (Wall, 2003)   
After Savidge blasted the Pentagon’s mismanagement of 
the media during a live interview on CNN’s “American 
Morning,” he was approached by a public affairs officer who 
simply said, “Let’s go to the mountains.” (Wall, 2003)  
Perhaps after all the miscues during the early months of 
the campaign in Afghanistan, all the publicity concerning 
lack of access, the censorship gaff over friendly fire, 
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dealing with a public and media hungry for substantive news 
on the war on terror, and the scorching condemnation by 
Savidge, military commanders and public affairs officers 
decided to try something new. (Pool, 2002)  Savidge, along 
with a few other select correspondents, were about to 
become the Pentagon’s first experiment with the current 
method of “embedding” media within U.S. military units.   
16. Operation Anaconda 
Nestled into the mountains of Eastern Afghanistan is 
the Shi-e-Kot valley.  In March 2002 the Shi-e-Kot was a 
haven for Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters, and the U.S. 
military was determined to go into the series of bunkers 
and cave complexes in the valley and clean them out for 
good. (Pool, 2002)  U.S. Marine Captain Jeff Pool was in 
charge of the group of correspondents.  “My 
responsibility,” said Pool, “was to safeguard the media 
crews’ lives and ensure complete, open access to personnel 
and combat operations.” (Pool, 2002)   
The group consisted of Savidge and his cameraman, an 
Agence France-Press (AFP) print reporter, a journalist from 
the Discovery Channel, and a U.S. Army photojournalist. 
(Pool, 2002)  The correspondents were instructed on the 
ground rules concerning operational security and obeying 
without pause the commands of the soldiers they were 
accompanying.  (Pool, 2002)  During the 17-day offensive 
against the Taliban, Savidge and his fellow correspondents 
provided unique insight into the United States’ new global 
war on terrorism.  Savidge, upon returning from the 
operation on March 19 said during an interview: 
We were embedded.  This idea of embedding 
journalists  is almost a throwback to World War 
II.  There was some  done in Vietnam.  The 
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journalist goes along into the  fight and has 
access to everything that the soldier  has 
intelligence reports, the briefings before the 
event occurs-and then going in. (Martin Savidge, 
2002) 
Indeed, the correspondents rode into battle with the 
soldiers on Chinook helicopters, trudged up treacherous 
mountain ravines, and suffered in the freezing temperatures 
of fighting at 8000 feet. (Pool, 2002)  Not surprisingly, 
the correspondents were well received by the soldiers.  
“The soldiers appeared happy to have the media along and 
treated them just like any other soldier, in part because 
they were sharing the experience, not just reporting on it. 
(Pool, 2002)   
Despite initial criticisms that “journalists have been 
denied access to American troops in the field in 
Afghanistan to a greater degree than in any previous war 
involving U.S. military forces,” (Hickey, 2002) the media 
was pleased with the more open policy the Pentagon 
instituted during the latter parts of the campaign in 
Afghanistan.  Of special note was the experiment with 
embedding correspondents during Operation Anaconda. As far 
as both the media and military were concerned, both sides 
won.  “Operational security was not compromised, and both 
the public and military benefited from a full and 
independent chronicle of the largest U.S. ground operation 
[Operation Anaconda] in a decade.” (Isaacson and Jordan, 
2003)  CNN military affairs correspondent Jamie McIntyre 
gave the military “good marks for access” during Operation 
Anaconda, while Associated Press reporter Susanne Schafer 
stated that “the situation for journalists improved during 
Anaconda.” (Cortes, 2002)  The “embed” genie was out of the 
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bottle, and there would be no denying the war 
correspondents access the next time the military went to 
war. 
17. The Embedded Policy 
The concept of embedding reporters had occurred to a 
certain degree before Savidge and his fellow journalists 
accompanied soldiers into the Shi-e-Kot.   Recall Robert 
Capa going ashore in the first wave at Omaha Beach on June 
6, 1944, or Joe Galloway flying into the Ia Drang valley 
with the 7th Cavalry in 1965.  “In many respects, embedding 
is hardly a novel concept, but revives World War II and 
Vietnam practices.” (Porch, 2001)   
As previously discussed, the access and censorship 
problems experienced by war correspondents during Operation 
Desert Storm in 1991 resulted in a set of guidelines titled 
DoD Principles for News Media Coverage of DoD Operations. 
(Aukofer and Lawrence, 1995)  However, the lack of any 
major conflict and the advent of multiple humanitarian and 
peacekeeping operations during the post-Desert Storm era 
largely left the policy untested.  Briefly tested in during 
military operations in Haiti in September 1994, and 
expanded during the peacekeeping intervention in Bosnia in 
December 1995 (Porch, 2001, Porch, n.d.) the concept of 
embedding journalists never truly had the fertile 
environment that the post September 11, 2001 era provided 
for the media.  A fertile environment meant support for the 
program at the highest levels of the civilian and military 
establishment.  Unfortunately, the first true test for the 
Pentagon’s open policy—Afghanistan—proved to be a failure 
until Operation Anaconda. 
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The embed experiment during Operation Anaconda proved 
to be a harbinger for how war correspondents would ply 
their trade during the next conflict the United States 
found itself engaged—the liberation of Iraq from Saddam 
Hussein.  The select group of correspondents who covered 
Operation Anaconda, “helped blaze the path for a large-
scale, Secretary of Defense-dictated, embedded-media 
program in Operation Iraqi Freedom.” (Miracle, 2003)  
Looking back at the campaign in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army 
quickly came to the conclusion that “[W]hen journalists 
were provided access, the accurate story was told.  When 
they were not provided with information [read access], the 
result was speculation, misinformation, and inaccuracy.” 
(Miracle, 2003)  It seemed only natural that the next time 
the military and media had to interact, the Pentagon was 
determined that access would no longer be a question.  
It was against this background—the ongoing Global War 
on Terrorism and the enthusiastic response to the revived 
embed program—which the Pentagon began to craft, shape, and 
greatly enhance the embedded policy in anticipation for a 
war against Iraq.  During a forum entitled “Assessing Media 
Coverage of the War in Iraq: Press Reports, Pentagon Rules, 
and Lessons for the Future” conducted at The Brookings 
Institution in June 2003, Victoria Clarke discussed the 
genesis of the embedded program that would be instituted 
for Operation Iraqi Freedom: 
It was actually an extraordinary evolution of a 
concept that already existed…It had to do with 
the  fact that we knew if we went to war, we’d 
have a lot  more people out there, a lot more 
soldiers, sailors,  airmen, and Marines.  It had 
to do with the fact that we knew the more people 
saw the U.S. military, the  more they would 
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understand the mission and how they were going 
about their jobs, and the more the people saw of 
the Iraqi regime…I knew with great certainty if 
we went to war, the Iraqi regime would be doing 
some  terrible things and would be incredibly 
masterful with the lies and the deception.  And I 
could stand up there at that podium and Secretary 
Rumsfeld could stand up there and say very 
truthfully the Iraqi regime is putting its 
soldiers in civilian clothing so they can ambush 
our soldiers.  Some people would believe us and 
some people wouldn’t.  But we had  hundreds and 
hundreds of credible, independent  journalists 
saying  the  Iraqi regime is putting their 
soldiers in civilian clothing. (Brookings, 2003)   
From the first indications that another major ground 
campaign would be conducted, the Pentagon was fully in 
support of including the media in its war plans.  “We’ve 
been doing embeds on a smaller scale for years and have all 
known that the program works extremely well,” said U.S. 
Army Major General Larry Gottardi, the Army chief of public 
affairs during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In fact, U.S. Army 
Field Manual 46-1 (FM 46-1) Public Affairs Operations (July 
1997) defines embedding as: 
…the act of assigning a reporter to a unit as a 
member  of the unit.  The reporter eats, 
sleeps, and moves  with the unit.  The reporter 
is authorized open access  to all sections of 
the unit and is not escorted by  public affairs 
personnel.  Rather, the unit is the reporter’s 
escort.  Reporters file their stories from  unit 
locations and security is accomplished at the 
source, by establishing with the reporter what 
can be  covered and reported on and what cannot 
be reported  on, or when material can be 
reported. (FM 46-1, 1997) 
Appropriately, the U.S. Army “assembled a tentative 
list of media interested in embedding in September 2002, 
long before OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] became a viable 
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contingency.” (Leedy, 2003)  “It was helpful this time 
[that] you had the backing of the DoD.  When the Secretary 
of Defense is telling commanders that it’s important—of 
course it helped,” Gottardi commented.  (Ayers, 2004)  
Brigadier General Ronald Rand, USAF, director of public 
affairs for the U.S. Air Force, echoed Gottardi’s 
sentiments.  “The big difference was that it was organized, 
systematic, and directed top-down,” he said in February 
2004.  “Because of the White House, [General Tommy] Franks 
[who commanded U.S. forces in Iraq], and all the 
components, we worked harder and more effectively and 
efficiently, even with the unilaterals [non-embedded 
journalists].” (Ayers, 2004)   
In February 2003, as the northern Kuwaiti desert began 
to swell with the arrival of thousands of U.S. and British 
soldiers and Marines in preparation for the eventual 
invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon issued a 13-page message to 
all the U.S. services instituting the embedded media 
program for what would soon be called Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  The document, dated February 10, 2003, carried a 
cumbersome title: Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) On 
Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/ 
Deployments In The U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) Area Of 
Responsibility (AOR). (ASDPAG, 2003)  However, the policy 
was clear.  War correspondents would have access that would 
be unmatched in the history of war reporting.  As Clarke 
stated above, the embedded reporters would serve a two-fold 
purpose: be an honest, objective broker on the scene, 
countering any enemy propaganda, and keep the U.S. public 
informed on the daily progress in the race to Baghdad.  The 
endstate was to manage perceptions and positively influence 
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public opinion to help bring a speedy conclusion to the 
war: 
The DoD policy on media coverage of future 
military  operations is that media will have 
long-term,  minimally restrictive access to 
U.S. air, ground, and  naval forces through 
embedding.  Media coverage of any  future 
operation will, to a large extent, shape public 
perception of the national security environment 
now  and in the years ahead.  This holds true for 
the U.S.  public; the public in Allied countries 
whose opinion  can affect the durability of our 
coalition; and  publics in countries where we 
conduct operations,  whose perceptions of us 
can affect the cost and  duration of our 
involvement.  Our ultimate strategic  success 
in bringing peace and security to this region 
will come in our long-term commitment to 
supporting  our democratic ideals.  We need to 
tell the factual  story—good or bad—before 
others seed the media with  disinformation and 
distortions, as they most certainly  continue 
to do.  Our people in the field need to tell our 
story—only commanders can ensure that media get 
to the story alongside the troops.  We must 
organize  for and facilitate access of national 
and  international media to our forces, including 
those  forces engaged in ground operations, 
with the goal of  doing so right from the 
start.  To accomplish this, we  will embed 
media with our units.  These embedded media  will 
live, work and travel as part of the units with 
which they are embedded to facilitate maximum, 
in- depth coverage of U.S. forces in combat and 
related  operations.  Commanders and public 
affairs officers  must work together to balance 
the need for media  access with the need for 
operational security.  (ASDPAG,  2003) 
Reading the Secretary of Defense directed PAG, war 
correspondents must have been greatly encouraged, guardedly 
optimistic, and openly pessimistic—all at once.  This was a 
return to the access enjoyed by their predecessors during 
the heady days of World War II—perhaps even better 
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considering the immense leaps in media technology that 
promised real time reporting from the front lines of which 
Ernie Pyle or Joe Galloway could only dream.  Examining the 
PAG, one finds that it is replete with phrases such as, 
“ensure a full understanding of all operations,” “access to 
operational combat missions,” “seats aboard vehicles…will 
be made available to allow maximum coverage of U.S. troops 
in the field,” “media are provided with every opportunity 
to observe actual combat operations,” and “gender [of the 
war correspondent] will not be an excluding factor under 
any circumstance.” (ASDPAG, 2003)  Said Walker Lundy, 
editor of the Philadelphia Enquirer: “I’d rather cover a 
war this way than the way we did during the Persian Gulf 
War.  Unless it’s a diabolical trick by the military, I’m 
pretty impressed that they’re doing this.” (Kurtz, 2003)  
Others had their reservations.  Before the war commenced, 
longtime CBS news anchorman and Vietnam War correspondent 
Dan Rather opined that, “I have trepidations.  There is a 
pretty fine line between being embedded and entombed.  The 
best story in the world is not worth a damn unless you can 
get it out.” (Madore, 2003) 
Lest there be any misunderstanding, there were 
restrictions on the embedded war correspondents.  Paragraph 
4 of the PAG lists “ground rules” by which each embedded 
correspondent was obligated to abide.  The ground rules 
listed what information was releasable and what was not 
releasable by the media “since their publication or 
broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives.” 
(ASDPAG, 2003)  Furthermore, the PAG states that violation 
of the ground rules could result in immediate removal of 
the embed, and to ease the worries of censorship, “[T]hese 
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ground rules recognize the right of the media to cover 
military operations and are in no way intended to prevent 
release of derogatory, embarrassing, negative or 
uncomplimentary information.” (ASDPAG, 2003) 
18. Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Prior to the war commencing, Victoria Clarke 
reiterated that “very, very senior people in this building 
[the Pentagon] and Central command truly understand how 
important it is… [they all] recognize the importance of 
what we’re trying to do” in regards to the embedded media 
program. (Zwirko, 2003) As February 2003 turned into March, 
the rhetoric in Washington and Baghdad increased as it 
became more likely that the U.S. led coalition would indeed 
cross the border and move to remove Saddam Hussein from 
power.  In early March, those journalists who had not 
accompanied units from the United States as they made the 
journey into the Persian Gulf began to arrive in Kuwait.   
Among their number were correspondents from major 
newspapers, network and cable television stations, smaller 
market newspapers as well as magazines such National 
Geographic, People, and the National Journal. (Kurtz, 2003, 
ASD-PA, 2003b)  After being briefed by public affairs 
officers and issued chemical protective equipment, the war 
correspondents were transported to the numerous military 
camps in the Northern Kuwaiti desert where they were 
formally embedded into their respective units. 
All told, the total number of embedded war 
correspondents officially sanctioned by the Pentagon varies 
according to the source.  The numbers quoted in various 
sources prior to and after the war include “approximately 
500,” (Miracle, 2003) “more than 500,” (Zwirko, 2003) “some 
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600,” (Shafer, 2003) “more than 600,” (Ayers, 2004), 
“approximately 700,” (Ranade, 2003) to “700-plus,” (Smith, 
2003).  Even during the previously mentioned media forum 
held at The Brookings Institution in June 2003, the 
moderator, journalist in residence Ron Nessen, was unsure 
of the exact number: “The most memorable media development 
of the war coverage, it seems to me, was the concept of the 
embedded reporters.  And I don’t know, I’ve heard different 
numbers, 500, 600, 700 reporters, who were assigned to one 
unit throughout the war.” (Brookings, 2003)  An official 
list of embedded media obtained from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs dated February 21, 
2003 gives the number as 671. (ASD-PA, 2003b)  Knight 
Ridder Newspapers had more war correspondents embedded with 
coalition forces than any other media organization: 31 
reporters and photographers and one artist. (Brookings, 
2003)   
Being an embedded journalist was not solely limited to 
American reporters.  Journalists from the UK, Germany, 
Japan, Norway, Saudi Arabia, France, Czechoslovakia, 
Canada, Israel, Russia, Australia, Canada, China, Korea, 
and even Al Jazeera—the controversial anti-American network 
based out of Qatar. (ASDnames, 2003, Kurtz, 2003)  Foreign 
news agencies were granted around 150 slots, with Al-
Jazeera getting four  – one each with the U.S. Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Marine Corps. (Carlson, 2003)  The 
commitment the media made to the embed program also went 
beyond the human capitol of sending reporters into harm’s 
way.  Prior to the war CNN devoted $25 million for war 
coverage, with the broadcast networks estimating that their 
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coverage would cost approximately $1 million a day. (Kurtz, 
2003) 
The embedded media were not to be the only reporters 
on the battlefield.  Being embedded was not the only option 
for war correspondents that desired to report on the 
campaign in Iraq.  Journalists could journey forth into 
Iraq independently, depending on their own good luck to 
move safely about the battlefield and report on what on 
whatever they desired.  This freedom of movement was 
extremely attractive for many war correspondents, who 
feared that being embedded with the military would mean de 
facto censorship and restriction of movement—thereby 
stifling their eternal quest to report the true story to 
the American public. (Shafer, 2003)  These journalists were 
called “unilaterals” in the vernacular of the Pentagon, and 
one account has approximately 2,000 unilaterals in Kuwait 
prior to the war commencing. (Miracle, 2003)  Of course, 
the unilateral reporter, while having more freedom to move 
to the cover the story they desire, were also sacrificing 
the security and safety of being protected by the coalition 
forces.  
Some news organizations planned to “send their most 
hardened correspondents to report independently from the 
region.” (Campagna, 2003)  Many were already in Baghdad and 
planned to stay there for the duration of the war. 
(Campagna, 2003)  NBC correspondent Richard Engel was one 
American reporter to secretly remain in Baghdad for the 
entire war.  His experiences as a unilateral journalist in 
the enemy’s capital during wartime are documented in a 
recently published book, Fist In The Hornet’s Nest. (Engel, 
2004)  The Pentagon, concerned over the safety of 
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unilateral reporters moving unsupervised about the 
battlefield, warned them to leave Iraq when the war 
actually commenced. (Campagna, 2003) 
It can be argued that the embedded media during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom were better prepared to cover the 
fighting from the front lines than any previous generation 
of war correspondents.  Barbara Starr, CNN Pentagon 
correspondent, stated in February 2003 that the embed 
program would be an “unprecedented test for the American 
and world news media as it is for the military.  You know, 
the Pentagon press corps has complained and whined for 
years that we’ve had no access to the battlefield, that we 
don’t get access to troops.  Well, now they’re taking us 
right to the front lines with them. So reporters are going 
to have to live like soldiers.  It’s going to be very, very 
challenging.” (PBS, 2003)  With that in mind, the Pentagon, 
in an effort to better “prepare media for the threats of 
modern warfare, and enhance understanding between the 
Pentagon and the fourth estate,” (PBS, 2002) conducted 
abbreviated “media boot camps” for the war correspondents 
selected to be embedded.  Included in the training syllabus 
were evolutions such as endurance hikes, first aid, and 
chemical warfare defense drills.  (Miracle, 2003) Conducted 
at military based around the United States, the “short 
courses in war” was the first time the military trained 
journalists prior to the commencement of hostilities. (PBS, 
2002)  In late 2002, some 350 reporters underwent such a 
training period at the Marine Corps base located in 
Quantico, Virginia.  (PBS, 2002)  Sixty more correspondents 
were hosted at Fort Benning, Georgia. (Leedy, 2003) CBS 
News correspondent Byron Pitts, who has covered conflicts 
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in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and the Persian Gulf commented 
that, “I think that the journalists who are here today walk 
away with a clear understanding of the physical, emotional, 
and psychological demands that war will have on the 
military.  I think the military walks away with some 
appreciation that there are some of us who take our jobs 
seriously, who are respectful of the job that they do, and 
that we make an effort to be as professional in our job as 
they are.” (PBS, 2003) 
19. The Current Debate 
On April 9, 2003, only 22 days after U.S. and UK 
forces crossed the border into Iraq launching Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Marines pulled down the enormous statue 
of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad’s Firdos Square, symbolically 
marking the capture of the capitol city.  Within a week, 
the Marines had moved north to Hussein’s hometown of 
Tikrit, which they captured with minimal resistance.  The 
war in Iraq was officially declared over on May 1, 2003 
when President George W. Bush stated that major combat 
operations were ceased.  In true American fashion, almost 
immediately the debate began on how effective the 
Pentagon’s experiment with embedding media actually turned 
out. 
A cursory examination of the multitude of editorials, 
stories, and even books that have been written during and 
since the official declaration of the end of major combat 
operations on May 1, 2003 reveals that the criticisms fall 
into two obvious camps: pro-embedded and con-embedded.  
Even within these camps are two smaller groupings that 
deserve examination.  For simplicity they can be 
generically labeled “the military,” and “the media.” The 
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first examined in this study is the U.S. military’s opinion 
of the embedded media program. 
(a) The Military Reaction: Getting Their Story 
Out To The Public 
By the end of May 2003 the U.S. military began to 
publish what is called in the military vernacular “after 
action reports” (AAR) and “lessons learned” regarding their 
experiences during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Included 
within these AARs are sections discussing their impressions 
of the embedded media program.  The two major ground units 
that conducted the drive to Baghdad, the U.S. Army 3rd 
Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID (M)), and the U.S. 
Marine 1st Marine Division (1st Mardiv)—and had the most 
embedded reporters attached to their maneuver brigades and 
battalions—offered interesting commentary to the debate. 
The 3ID received their embedded media on March 
11, 2003. (3IDAAR, 2003) The AAR stated that “two days 
before the ground war, the 3ID (M) provided the media a 
broad overview of the [war] plan, including tentative 
timelines…as the operation progressed, media were allowed 
unprecedented access to plans.  We know of no media that 
violated the trust during the entire operation.” (3IDAAR, 
2003)  Other comments included that as the war progressed, 
and the division saw the quality work produced by the 
embedded reporters, “[I]t was evident that the program was 
working according to our expectations.” (3IDAAR, 2003)  In 
summation, the division concluded that: 
Overall, the ambitious media embed program 
executed by the 3ID (M) was an unqualified 
success.  Media that became part of the team told 
first-hand accounts of 3ID (M) fairly and 
accurately.  Neither  mission accomplishment 
nor the integrity of the media was compromised.  
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The media we surveyed spoke highly of their 
experience and stated the embed far exceeded 
their expectations.  Soldiers, media, and the 
American  public were the true beneficiaries. 
(3IDAAR, 2003) 
The 1st Mardiv received 80 embedded journalists on 
March 10, 2003. (1stMardivAAR, 2003)  The Marine Corps has 
always been media friendly, and this was reflected by the 
Division Commanding General’s sentiment that, “Left unsung, 
the noblest deed will die.” (Plenzer, 2004)  The Marines 
felt that “[T]he presence of embedded media significantly 
reduced the Iraqi ability to conduct a propaganda 
campaign,” while it “promoted bonding between the military 
and the media.” (1stMardivAAR, 2003)  In a separate article 
penned by the 1stMardiv Public Affairs Officer in February 
2004, Capt Joseph M. Plenzer recalls a question a reporter 
asked concerning how much real access the embeds were going 
to be allowed. 
Embed: Really, how close are you going to allow 
me to get to the frontlines? 
Plenzer: I can put you in the back of an LVTP-7 
amphibious assault vehicle with 18 angry grunts, 
drive you within 300 meters of the objective, and 
send you in the assault as the Marines storm the 
enemy’s trench lines and drive bayonets into 
their hearts. (Plenzer, 2004) 
Plenzer said the room went silent, and that you 
could hear a pin drop.  (Plenzer, 2004)  Finally, one 
“skittish” reporter asked, “Is he serious?” (Plenzer, 2004) 
The 1stMardiv stated that the embed program, 
“served as a lens to focus the world’s attention on the 
Division’s combat story, favorable or not.” (1stMardivAAR, 
2003)    In conclusion, the Marine Corps stated: 
69
The media program in this campaign worked well 
for both the military and the media.  The media 
received unprecedented access, and the Marine 
Corps was able to get its story to the American 
and international publics as never before.  In 
this instance [Operation Iraqi Freedom], the 
embedding media was a limited success for the 
Division.  This paradigm should not be blindly 
followed and a thorough risk-benefit analysis 
must be conducted before embedding media in the 
same fashion for future combat operations. 
(1stMardivAAR, 2003) 
(b) The Media Reaction: Access, Content, 
Censorship, and Objectivity 
The commentary by the media industry concerning 
the embedded program centers around four main issues: 
access, context, censorship, and objectivity.  There are 
many accolades written about the unparalleled access that 
war correspondents had to the troops and front line action 
during the pre-invasion build-up in Kuwait and the 
subsequent drive to Baghdad.  A war correspondent embedded 
with the 101st Airborne Division stated that, “[G]iven past 
experience, where access was spotty, this time it was 
universally excellent…Particularly once the war started and 
the 101st moved into Iraq—I had access to the operations 
center and was at [101st commander Maj. Gen. David H.] 
Petraeus’ elbow constantly.” (Ayers, 2004)  CBS war 
correspondent John Roberts, embedded with the U.S. Marines’ 
2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion said, “The level 
of access was really terrific…We had access to officers 
whenever we needed them, and they were happy to speak with 
us on the caveat that security was observed.” (Ayers, 2004)  
Mark Mazetti of U.S. News and World Report, also embedded 
with the Marines, agreed: “Before the war started, they 
briefed us on the whole battle plan for the Marines.  We 
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got to see where they scrapped the plan [and adapted to the 
changing situation on the battlefield].” (Ayers, 2004)  
CBS’ Dan Rather commented that, “…it wasn’t perfect…in some 
cases [they] embedded people, but they didn’t let them up 
with the far-forward units.  But there’s [little] to 
complain about, and there’s a lot to applaud.” (Miracle, 
2003) 
There were, however, those who were not as 
pleased as Roberts and his colleagues.  A reporter embedded 
aboard the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln said 
that the embeds were forced to abide by ground rules much 
more restrictive than the Pentagon’s.  Reporters were 
banned from the mess decks so they could not interact with 
the sailors, and had a military “minder” noting their every 
question and answer levied of the ship’s crew. (Shafer, 
2003)  On the ground in Iraq, Jerry Zrewmski of the USA 
Today said, “I felt like a hostage…I was thinking I would 
be going to Iraq for two days, but a general’s change in 
plans changed this to at least a five-day adventure—and far 
more danger than I’d expected.” (Shafer, 2003)  And Bob 
Franken of CNN offered an interesting perspective on 
access:  
If there was combat, I wasn’t usually able to 
move out and go shoot the other side.  In fact, 
one could argue that one of the inherent problems 
with the embeds is that we didn’t have anybody 
embedded with the Iraqi side.  But the fact is 
that we did not.  Physically we couldn’t cover 
that.  So chances are there is a lot that we 
missed simply because we physically were unable 
to get to it. (Brookings, 2003) 
Another criticism concerning lack of access 
centered around covering special operations forces—echoing 
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complaints from operations in Afghanistan two years 
earlier.  “One area where it didn’t work at all was with 
the special operation forces—no one knows what they were 
doing to this day,” said Rick Atkinson of the Washington 
Post.  “For conventional forces and for all the services 
they were very accommodating, but not with the special op 
forces.” (Ayers, 2004) 
The question of access was in fact a major 
consideration that persuaded many war correspondents to 
report the conflict as unilaterals.  “The risk of embedding 
is that you won’t be able to see anything…the real danger 
is not being killed but being seriously out of position,” 
said one unilateral journalist.  (Shafer, 2003)  Many 
unilateral reporters speak of being treated as “second-
class citizens” in the eyes of the military simply because 
they were not official embeds. (Shafer, 2003)  The New 
Yorker’s Jeffrey Goldberg, who was a unilateral during the 
war, believed that the embed system was a de facto 
credentialing system that endorsed some reporters and 
rejected others who were not part of it. (Shafer, 2003)  
“As far as the ‘coalition military press machine’ was 
concerned…the unilaterals were one level lower than 
Republican Guardsmen.” (Shafer, 2003) 
(c) The Big Picture 
A universal criticism of the embed program was 
that with so many embedded reporters filing countless 
stories from their individual units, it was difficult to 
get a clear picture of the war as a whole. (Brookings, 
2003, Ranade, 2003, Smith 2003, Zwirko, 2003, Ayers, 2004, 
Harper, 2004,)  Pentagon media spokesman U.S. Army Major 
Tim Blair admitted in a briefing the day before Hussein’s 
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statue came tumbling down in Firdos Square that, “[T]here’s 
so much [news] that it’s hard to keep track of every report 
coming out of the region.” (Zwirko, 2003)  Blair, who was 
the Pentagon’s point man on the embedded program, also 
warned that the many separate reports streaming in from the 
battlefield should be considered just that—separate 
reports.  “It’s a small snapshot of that particular piece 
of the battlefield, so you have to keep every one of those 
reports in perspective.” (Zwirko, 2003)   
Some critics thought that the focus at the 
individual soldier and Marine-level came at the expense of 
the overall story of the war. (Ayers, 2004)  Reporting by 
the embeds, although wonderful in its detail and real-time 
nature, was negatively described as looking through a 
“soda-straw,” (Pasquarett, 2003, Smith, 2003) or “into a 
microscope.” (Harper, 2004)  One embedded war correspondent 
compared being embedded as being the same as the number-two 
dog in a sled dog team.  “You saw an awful lot of the dog 
in front of you, and a little to the left and right.” 
(Smith, 2003)    Phil Bronstein, editor of the San 
Francisco Chronicle, said, “we’re only able to see little 
slices of the pie,” while an ABC News executive commented 
that “we were looking at the battlefield through 600 
straws,” and that, “it was difficult to conceptualize it 
[the war].” (Kurtz, 2003) 
Not surprisingly, other journalists thought 
differently.  They recognized their place in the hierarchy 
of the news chain, and that it was up to other journalists 
and editors in the United States to piece together the many 
disparate pieces of any certain breaking story.  “I 
certainly did not get a clear picture of the war because we 
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were so isolated,” said an embedded reporter with the 101st 
Airborne Division.  However, he conceded that it indeed was 
his job “to look at things through a microscope, not 
binoculars.” (Kurtz, 2003)  “I’d like to call it a bright, 
intense look at a small slice of the war,” opined John 
Roberts of CBS.  “The reason you have so many embedded 
reporters is that every day they each bring a slice, and 
then when you put all the slices together—with [CBS News 
National Correspondent] David Martin at the Pentagon, 
etcetera—then you have the whole pie.” (Ayers, 2004)   Rick 
Atkinson added, “If you buy into the proposition you’re 
going to be with a unit, then that’s what you are going to 
see.  The obligation of the reporter is to make the best of 
[his or her situation].” (Ayers, 2004)   
Coverage, overall, tended to be more 
comprehensive in the major newspapers than that shown in 
live and recorded television reports. (Smith, 2003)  
Writers at the newspapers could take all their embedded 
reporters’ daily stories and notes that were electronically 
sent from the battlefield and combine them with other’s 
notes to produce a clearer picture than television images 
of firefights and burning vehicles, which tended to be “run 
and run endlessly…[they were] not informative.  There’s an 
entertainment factor that’s huge on television in creating 
this drama.” (Kurtz, 2003)  Although “irresistibly 
fascinating,” the television reports were “not crammed with 
information.” (Friedman, 2003)  A CNN anchor warned his 
audience that the reports were “snapshots” and that “its 
our job here to put it all together.”  (Friedman, 2003)  
The always articulate George Will of ABC News stated that 
“today’s problem—live television from journalists with 
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units engaged in Iraq—is the problem of context.  Up-close 
combat engagements almost always look confusing and awful 
because they are.” (Friedman, 2003)  The “News Hour with 
Jim Lehrer” stated that, “the greater significance of much 
of what was shown was lost amid the ‘almost addictive’ and 
highly dramatic reports.” (Ranade, 2003) 
The summary stories in the newspapers were “aided 
immeasurably by the full-page maps that charted troop 
movements, most of which were simpler and easier to 
comprehend than the high-tech studio sand tables favored by 
the corps of television generals.” (Smith, 2003)  
Newspapers had the benefit of being able to partially 
digest what was being reported before having to produce a 
product for public consumption.  Said one newspaper editor: 
“I thought it was newspapering at its very best.  We were 
able to take a breath and sort out what happened, compared 
to the overwhelming immediacy of television, where there 
was no ability to step back and provide context.” (Kurtz, 
2003)   “The fog of war makes foggy news,” said Robert 
Lichter of the Center for Media and Public Affairs.  “War 
is too messy to package into sound bites and two-minute 
stories.”  
(d) Censorship and Objectivity 
As seen by the history of war reporting, 
censorship has always been an issue for the war 
correspondent.  It was no different for the journalists who 
covered Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Obviously, those 
unilateral correspondents had no serious threats to their 
ability to report whatever they desired, regardless of 
content.  They effectively traded the relative safety and 
up-close access to the military of the embedded program for 
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freedom of movement and freedom from censorship.  Of 
similar nature has been the concern for objectivity in 
reporting.  In examining the current debate on embedding, 
both these issues were very much a concern for the news 
industry and those journalists being embedded. 
Prior to the war, there were many fears among the 
media about the embedded program.  A common comment was 
that “embed” really meant “in bed,” (Isaacson and Jordan, 
2003) and that the program was a truly ingenious method of 
the Pentagon subtly imposing censorship on the media.  
(Berkowitz, 2003)  The argument goes that the very act of 
being physically embedded within a military unit—sharing 
all their hardships, privations, and dangers—would 
effectively eliminate journalistic objectivity, and provide 
de facto censorship on the news coming out of the 
battlefield. (Anderson, 2003, Berkowitz, 2003)  Others 
labeled the embedded journalists as “cheerleaders” for the 
military. (Brookings, 2003, Kurtz, 2003)  Said one 
commentator: “There was cheerleading going on.  There was a 
certain amount of gushing.” (Ranade, 2003)  Bob Franken, 
commenting on the possible loss of objectivity of the 
embeds, reported, “I, quite frankly, think that some were 
[losing their objectivity].  There was a sort of Stockholm 
syndrome.  It’s very tempting to become part of the unit.” 
(Brookings, 2003)  Others complained that the entire 
program was “something that ensured favorable coverage of 
the military.  You are more connected to the military 
organization than you are to your own news organization.” 
(Ranade, 2003)  More harsh criticism was offered by Norman 
Solomon of the Institute for Public Accuracy, who said that 
the war correspondents were “so embedded with the troops, 
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they may as well be getting a P.R. retainer from the 
Pentagon.” (Zwirko, 2003)   
The issue of objectivity and censorship remains 
the largest question emerging from the embedded program.  A 
workshop conducted at the U.S. Army War College’s Center 
for Strategic Leadership entitled Reporters on the Ground: 
The Military and the Media’s Joint Experience During 
Operation Iraqi Freedom “failed to come to a consensus as 
to whether an embedded reporter can report about a unit 
with complete objectivity.” (Pasquarett, 2003)  “Most 
journalists who are honest will tell you it’s impossible to 
be totally objective…In wartime, you probably wouldn’t want 
to,” commented author Michael Sweeney. (Karras, 2003)  
Steve Bell, a journalism instructor at Ball State 
University offered the following thoughts once the news 
stories began to flow from the embedded reporters: 
There’s a lot of criticism now that the embedded 
journalists are in bed with their units...I 
haven’t seen real examples of that.  I think that 
we are getting good journalism, of course, 
they’re the home team.  We’re Americans, they’re 
Americans.  When you report from a military unit 
consistently, you get to know the people, you are 
sharing their daily life, there is an emotional 
connection and attachment that comes with it, 
but…that doesn’t mean you’re going to hide things 
that are embarrassing or negative, not if you’re 
a good reporter. (Berkowitz, 2003) 
C.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The tale of war correspondents during the 150 years 
that they have plied their trade has been one of many highs 
and lows.  They have endured excessive censorship, 
questions of objectivity, and troubles with access to the 
front lines.  Conversely, they have experienced tremendous 
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access and freedom on the battlefield.  Advances in 
technology have greatly enhanced the ability of war 
correspondents to transmit breaking news almost 
instantaneously to a news hungry public.  The events of 
September 11, 2001 catapulted the United States into a 
global war on terrorism, which demands to be reported on.   
Recall Pulitzer Prize winning war correspondent Chris 
Hedges’ thoughts on war:  “War is a force that gives us 
meaning…the most powerful narcotic invented by humankind is 
war.” (Moyers, n.d.)  The war correspondent is the conduit 
through which the public receives its information on such 
defining moments in our history.  With the embedded media 
program practiced in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the American 
public was able to view the face of modern warfare as never 
before.  As the fight continues in Iraq today, reporters 
embedded with soldiers and Marines in places such as 
Baghdad, Fallujah, and Mosul continue to offer valuable 
insight to the struggle to defeat the growing insurgency 
within that troubled country.  The debate will always exist 
as to the true effectiveness of the embedded war 
correspondent.  The affect that this embedding of 
journalists within the U.S. military—and how this study 
will attempt to determine if the program truly does allow 
the correspondent to report in a different manner than his 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a 
newspaper. Truth itself becomes suspicious by 
being put into that polluted vehicle. . . . The 
man who never looks into a newspaper is better 
informed than he who reads them: inasmuch as he 
who knows nothing is nearer to truth than he 
whose mind is filled with falsehood and errors. -
President Thomas Jefferson (Plath, n.d.) 
This study addresses the newspaper coverage of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom by examining the content of the 
embedded and non-embedded war reporting of various 
newspapers.  This chapter will specifically discuss the 
research methodology used in completing this study.  The 
corpus will be addressed, as well as discuss ethnographic 
content analysis and the ten exploratory factors that were 
used to compare the work of both groups of reporters. 
B. NEWSPAPERS SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS 
After examining a wide variety of national, state, and 
local newspapers, as well as major news magazines, an 
initial list of potential sources was complied.  Following 
careful consideration it was determined that those 
newspapers with a large, national circulation would be 
examined rather than smaller, local newspapers—because 
national newspapers were able to fund numerous journalists 
to cover the war.  This fact alone made the corpus of this 
study much easier to identify.  The five top U.S. 
newspapers ranked by weekday circulation averages for the 
six months ending March 31, 2003 (AdAge.com, 2003) are 
listed in Table 1: 
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Table 1.   U.S. newspapers by circulation 




1 USA Today 2,162,454 2,602,556 
2 Wall Street 
Journal 
1,820,600 0 
3 New York Times 1,130,740 1,672,965 
4 Los Angeles 
Times 
979,549 1,396,045 
5 Washington Post 796,367 1,049,322 
 
The newspapers that included a sufficient and equal 
number of embedded and non-embedded correspondents, as well 
as published articles were: 
1) The New York Times 
2) Los Angeles Times 
3) Washington Post 
An initial reading of the articles revealed that they 
could sufficiently answer the research questions of this 
study.  As a review, the research questions are: (1) How 
did embedded journalists affect the content of U.S. news 
reporting of Operation Iraqi Freedom?  (2) Was the 
reporting of the embedded and non-embedded journalists 
balanced? (3) Were the critics’ accusations of “soda straw” 
reporting justified? Or in other words, is the embedded 
corpus more narrow in scope and depth than the non-embedded 
corpus?   
C. REPORTERS SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS  
Concurrent with selecting which newspapers to be 
examined in this study was the identification and selection 
of which reporters’ articles would become part of the 
corpus.   Embedded reporters were selected from the 
official embedded assignments dated 17 February 2003 
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provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of 
Public Affairs (ASDnames, 2003) and open sources on the 
internet (MarineParents.com, 2003).  Non-embedded reporters 
were obtained by searching the various newspaper websites 
and newspaper databases such as LEXIS/NEXIS and Proquest.  
Tables 2 and 3 list the selected embedded and non-embedded 
reporters affiliated with each newspaper. 
 
Table 2.   Embedded correspondents 
New York Times Los Angeles Times Washington Post 
Dexter Filkins David Zucchino Peter Baker 
John Kifner Geoffrey Mohan William Branigin 
Michael Wilson Tony Perry Steve Vogel 
 
Table 3.   Non-embedded correspondents 
New York Times Los Angeles Times Washington Post 
Thom Shanker Bob Drogin Vernon Loeb 
Eric Schmitt Michael Slackman Thomas E. Ricks 
David E. Sanger Greg Miller Jonathan Weisman 





D. THE CORPUS 
The number of embedded and non-embedded stories 
included in the original corpus was 311 embedded and non-
embedded articles.  Upon a thorough reading of these 
articles, it was decided to choose certain dates within 
this time period around which this study would be centered.  
The dates were chosen according to major events in the 
ground campaign to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. 
(Cordesman, 2003, Kusnetz, Arkin, and Meigs, 2003) 
Once these dates were identified, the next days’ news 
articles for the selected embedded and non-embedded 
reporters were chosen for inclusion in the final corpus.  
For example, the above sources state that the initial 
invasion of Iraq by U.S. and United Kingdom (UK) forces 
occurred during the evening 20 March 2003.  Taking into 
account the time difference between print reporters in the 
war zone and their respective newspapers located in the 
United States, the news articles from 21 March 2003 were 
selected to be part of the corpus.  In this manner, the 
major news events of the ground campaign served as a focus 
to examine the body of work produced by the embedded and 
non-embedded reporters to see how the content of their 
reporting in light of these events differed as a function 
of their embedded or non-embedded status.   
By selecting specific dates during the 20 March-14 
April 2003 time period, the corpus was reduced from 311 to 
93 stories total.  This number reflects 31.8 % of the all 
embedded and non-embedded news articles written by the 
selected journalists selected for this study.  Table 4 
lists the major news events of the war and the news dates 
chosen for this study. 
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Table 4.   Major news events of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Date Event News Day 
20 March 2003 U.S. and UK forces cross into Iraq; 
seizure of the Rumalyah oil fields 
21 March 2003 
23 March 2003 The “Worst Day of the War”: The ambush of 
the U.S. Army 507th Maintenance Company; 
heavy U.S. Marine casualties in An 
Nasiriyah 
24 March 2003 
25 March 2003 Fierce sandstorms and Iraqi paramilitary 
attacks threaten to bring drive to Baghdad 
to a halt; intense fighting in Najaf and 
An Nasiriyah; U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld warns that Iraqi military 
may use chemical weapons as U.S. forces 
cross “red line” south of Baghdad 
26 March 2003 
27 March 2003 Sandstorms abate in central Iraq; heavy 
fighting continues in Najaf and An 
Nasiriyah;  
28 March 2003 
01 April 2003 U.S. prisoner of war PFC Jessica Lynch 
rescued in An Nasiriyah; U.S. forces 
prepare to cross Karbala Gap; U.S. 101st 
Airborne Division secures Najaf airfield 
02 April 2003 
05 April 2003 U.S. 3d Infantry Division conducts 
“Thunder Run” into Baghdad; U.S. Marines 
reach Diyala River east of Baghdad; 
06 April 2003 
09 April 2003  U.S. Marines reach downtown Baghdad and 
topple statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos 
Square; Looting erupts in Baghdad; Iraqi 
government effectively disappears 
10 April 2003 
13 April 2003 U.S. Marines advance on Tikrit, Saddam 
Hussein’s hometown; U.S. Marines rescue 
seven U.S. prisoners of war north of 
Baghdad; Looting continues in Baghdad;  
14 April 2003 
 
Every attempt was made to examine an equal number of 
embedded and non-embedded reporters for each newspaper, 
with the endstate being an equal number of embedded and 
non-embedded news articles.  Table 5 addresses the total 
number of embedded and non-embedded articles analyzed, 






Table 5.    News articles by source 





New York Times 15 14 29 
Los Angeles 
Times 
19 8 27 
Washington Post 16 21 37 
Total 50 43 93 
 
 










Embedded 9 45 50 54 
Non-Embedded 11 55 43 46 
Total 20 100 93 100 
 
The New York Times trio of Dexter Filkins, John 
Kifner, and Michael Wilson, all embedded with U.S. forces, 
penned 15 articles chronicling their experiences (Table 7).  
Their non-embedded counterparts Thom Shanker, Eric Schmitt, 
and David E. Sanger wrote 14 articles covering the progress 
of the war (Table 8). 
 
Table 7.    New York Times Embedded reporters 
Embedded Reporter Number of Articles 
Dexter Filkins 7 
John Kifner 5 




Table 8.   New York Times Non-embedded reporters 
Non-Embedded 
Reporter 
Number of Articles 
David E. Sanger 3 
Eric Schmitt 6 
Thom Shanker  5 
Total 14 
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The Los Angeles Times provided three embedded 
reporters and 4 non-embedded reporters. Their body of work 
includes 19 embedded articles (Table 9) and eight non-
embedded articles (Table 10). 
 
Table 9.   Los Angeles Times Embedded reporters 
Embedded Reporter Number of Articles 
Geoffrey Mohan  4 
Tony Perry  8 
David Zucchino  7 
Total  19 
 
 
Table 10.   Los Angeles Times Non-embedded reporters 
Non-Embedded Reporter Number of 
Articles 
Bob Drogin 3 
Greg Miller  3 
Michael Slackman 1 
Alissa J. Rubin 1 
Total 8 
 
The final newspaper examined was the Washington Post. 
A total of six reporters—three embedded and three non-
embedded—wrote 16 (Table 11) and 21 (Table 12) articles, 
respectively. 
Table 11.   Washington Post Embedded reporters 
Embedded Reporter Number of Articles 
Peter Baker 8 
William Branigin 6 




Table 12.   Washington Post Non-embedded reporters 
Non-Embedded Reporter Number of Articles 
Vernon Loeb 10 
Thomas E. Ricks 6 





Appendix B (Daily News Coverage) illustrates in detail 
the news coverage during the time period of the study, 
listing the number of stories each reporter submitted each 
day from March 20, 2003 to April 14, 2003. 
E. ETHNOGRAPHIC CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Ethnography is the systematic recording of human 
cultures. (Merriam-Webster, 1987)  Ethnographic Content 
Analysis (ECA) was first introduced in 1987 by Dr. David E. 
Altheide of Arizona State University and is currently 
regarded as “a specific method of qualitative analysis.” 
(Altheide, 1987)  According to Altheide, “ECA is an 
integrated method, procedure, and technique for locating, 
identifying, retrieving, and analyzing documents for their 
relevance, significance, and meaning. The emphasis is on 
discovery and description, including search for contexts, 
underlying meanings, patterns, and processes, rather than 
mere quantity or numerical relationships between two or 
more variables.”(Altheide, 1996) 
 ECA was derived from Altheide’s attempt to combine 
traditional objective content analysis with participant 
observation, or “how a researcher interacts with 
documentary materials so that specific statements can be 
placed in proper context for analysis.” (Altheide, 1996)  
Documentary materials—documents—are defined by Altheide as 
“any symbolic representation that can be recorded or 
retrieved for analysis.” (Altheide, 1996)  Of the three 
classes of documents available for researchers—primary, 
secondary, and auxiliary—this study focuses on newspaper 
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articles, which are defined in primary documents. 
(Altheide, 1996)   
As mentioned above, ECA differs from traditional 
quantitative content analysis (QCA) in that “the major tact 
of QCA is to verify or confirm hypothesized relationships 
rather than discover new or emergent patterns.” (Altheide, 
1996)  Table 13 compares ECA and QCA on 14 different areas. 
(Altheide, 1996) 
 
Table 13.   Comparison of QCA and ECA 




Research goal Verification Discovery; verification 
Reflexive research design Seldom Always 
Emphasis Reliability Validity 
Progression from data 
collection, analysis, 
interpretation 
Serial Reflective, circular 
Primary researcher 
involvement 
Data analysis and 
interpretation 
All phases 
Sample Random or stratified Purposive and theoretical 
Prestructured categories All Some 
Training required to 
collect data 
Little Substantial 
Type of data Numbers Numbers; narrative 
Data entry points Once Multiple 
Narrative description and 
comments 
Seldom Always 
Concepts emerge during 
research 
Seldom Always 
Data analysis Statistical Textual; statistical 
Data presentation Tables Tables and text 
The goal of ECA is “to be systematic and analytic but 
not rigid.” (Altheide, 1996)  Altheide states that 
categories and variables do indeed play a part in the 
framework of the study, in that they serve as initial 
guides for the researcher.  However, ECA embraces two 
unique tenets: other variables will come to surface as the 
researcher collects and analyzes data, and the fact that 
ECA has “an orientation toward constant discovery and 
constant comparison of relevant situations, settings, 
images, meanings, and nuances.” (Altheide, 1996)  It is 
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critical for the reader to understand that “although items 
and topics can still be counted and put in emergent 
categories, it is also important to provide good 
descriptive information.” (Altheide, 1996) 
F. STUDY FACTORS   
To answer the research questions listed above, the 
embedded and non-embedded writings were examined using the 
factors listed below: 
- News sources 
- Lead paragraph 





- Balanced reporting 
- Theme development 
G. NEWS SOURCES, LEAD PARAGRAPH, AND INVERTED PYRAMID 
Perhaps one of the most important decisions a reporter 
can make in writing a news article is from where they will 
gather their information.  The sources a reporter depends 
upon can vary from wire reports to news conferences to 
interviews.  Of course, for a reporter who depends upon 
interviews, it is essential to understand that each source 
has a specific view and opinion of events.  This varying 
level of situational awareness dramatically affects the 
content of a news story.  An interview conducted in the “D” 
ring of the Pentagon will likely yield different results 
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than one conducted in the back of an armored vehicle as it 
speeds across the desert.   
Each news article written for public consumption is 
constructed according to certain journalistic techniques.  
Being organizational products, they are assembled for 
public review according to a certain routine and standard.  
Altheide labels this as process, or “how something is 
actually created and put together.” (Altheide, 1996)  
Journalism instructor Lisa Greeves identifies one of the 
more important techniques every journalist uses as the 
“Lead,” or the opening elements of story. (Greeves, n.d.)  
The lead can be crafted in one of three ways: (1) news 
lead, (2) quote lead, and (3) description lead. (Freep.com, 
n.d.)  The following are examples of each: 
News lead: In one of their bloodiest raids into 
Lebanon in years, Israeli warplanes killed dozens 
of Muslim guerrillas with rockets and machine-gun 
fire Thursday as they pounded a training camp of 
the pro-Iranian party of God. (Freep.com, n.d.) 
Quote lead: “I have the worst job in the Army.'' 
This is an example of a good quote lead because 
the reader asks, ``What could that possibly be?” 
(Freep.com, n.d.)  
Description lead: Penciled sketches of an air 
strike, complete with renderings of F14s and 
Patriot missiles. And on the ground, tiny people 
run for cover. That's how 8-year-old Jimmy Zayas 
pictures war in the Middle East... (Freep.com, 
n.d.) 
Another technique used by journalists in organizing 
and constructing their stories is the “inverted pyramid.”  
Inverted pyramid describes a form of news story with the 
most newsworthy facts first and remainder in order of 
descending importance. (Greeves, n.d.)  According to Rich 
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Cameron, chair of the journalism department at Cerritos 
College in California:  
An example of a regular pyramid story might be an 
old-fashioned mystery where the reader is 
introduced to more and more important clues as he 
or she reads on…With an inverted pyramid story we 
give away the solution (or in our case the 
summary) at the very beginning.  The rest of the 
story contains less and less important 
information until we just stop. (Cameron, n.d.) 
H. ANGLE, SCOPE, AND DEPTH 
The unique prism of the embedded or non-embedded 
reporter directly translates to the several factors of the 
reporters’ writing when making an evaluation of the content 
of an article.  These include the angle the journalist 
addresses his subject, resulting in either “soft” of “hard” 
news, the scope of the article, the depth of the reporting, 
and the specific framing used by the author.   
The “angle” of an article is defined as “the outlook 
we [reporters] take on the subject, the point of view we 
adopt.” (YRE, n.d.)  For example, if a reporter chooses to 
write about the U.S. Army’s M1A1 battle tank, they could 
focus on the soldiers who operate it, their training, or 
the technical aspects of the machine.  In writing about a 
battle, a reporter could choose to simply describe the 
events in a fact-driven, no-nonsense manner, or delve into 
the actual personalities of a certain soldier or Marine 
that fought I that same battle.  The “angle” one adopts as 
a reporter in writing on a subject is applicable in 
determining if a story is “hard” or “soft” news.  “Hard” 
and “soft” can also be translated as “news” and “feature” 
stories.  Both are defined below: 
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News stories are the basis for all of the paper - 
often opinion and feature pieces are built on 
news stories. They follow the basic rules of 
journalism and are usually most concerned with 
reporting events and other news in a 
straightforward, informative manner…Features are 
in-depth human-interest stories. They are often 
not bound by breaking stories and can be covered 
at any given time, [and]…allow the reader to take 
a look at something they have not seen before, to 
bring to visibility that which is invisible.  
(Jteacher.com, n.d.) 
The scope and depth of an article as well address the 
content of a news article.  Scope is concerned with the 
either narrow or broad expanse of the article.  For 
example, an article focused solely on a single event would 
be more narrow in scope than an article dealing with 
multiple events or issues.  Using the above example of an 
article about the M1A1 battle tank, a story focusing only 
on the initial training and qualifications of the soldiers 
operating the tank would be narrow in scope compared to an 
article discussing the initial training, advanced training, 
maneuvers, exercises, and eventual deployment overseas. 
Depth of an article simply refers to the richness and 
profundity—thoroughness and completeness in detail—of the 
reporters’ writing.  Both scope and depth are essential to 
affirming or denying the accusations listed in Chapter II 
that describes embedded reporters’ work in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom as “soda-straw” reporting. (Pasquarett, 2003, 
Smith, 2003)  Scope and depth are closely related to the 
episodic or thematic framing of a news story.  
I. EPISODIC AND THEMATIC FRAMING 
Shanto Iyengar, a professor of political science and 
communication studies at the University of California at 
Los Angeles, explores the framing effects of television 
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news on political issues in his book, Is Anyone 
Responsible? How Television Frames Issues. (Iyengar, 1991) 
Framing is “the selection, emphasis and exclusion of 
particular pieces of information that lead observers to 
particular conclusions or narrow possible courses of 
action.”(Kilpatrick and Leweke, 1997) Communicators, (in 
this study, embedded or non-embedded reporters) “select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the 
item described." (Entman, 1993)   
Iyengar states that television frames topics in two 
ways—episodic and thematic. (Iyengar, 1991)  Episodic 
framing shows an “event-oriented report and depicts issues 
in terms of concrete instances.” (Iyengar, 1991) Thematic 
coverage describes issues in more general terms rather than 
specific instances: "The thematic frame, by contrast, 
places public issues in some more general or abstract 
context and takes the form of a 'takeout' or 'backgrounder' 
report directed at general outcomes or conditions" 
(Iyengar, 1991) In summation, the difference in the two is, 
“[E]pisodic framing depicts concrete events that illustrate 
issues, while thematic framing presents collective or 
general evidence.” (Iyengar, 1991)  
Episodic and thematic framing is easily applied to 
newspaper reporting.  It is important to note that every 
news story contains both episodic and thematic to different 
degrees, but, in general, newspapers tend to be more 
episodic in reporting. (Iyengar, 1991)  As applied to this 
study, episodic framing would be used to describe a single 
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firefight or capturing an objective—specific events or 
cases.  Thematic framing would be used to describe an 
article about the overall progress of the war to date, 
strategy, and other larger issues.  
J. BALANCED REPORTING 
Of major concern to the critics of the embedded media 
program was the thought that the reporters’ close proximity 
to the soldiers and Marines racing to Baghdad would cost 
them their journalistic objectivity.  A common comment was 
that “embed” really meant “in bed,” (Isaacson and Jordan, 
2003) and that the program was a truly ingenious method of 
the Pentagon subtly imposing censorship on the media.  
(Berkowitz, 2003)  Accordingly, another factor useful in 
examining the news content of the embedded and non-embedded 
reporters is to explore how balanced the reporting was from 
both sources.  Presenting only one side of an issue, or 
avoiding controversial subjects such as friendly fire 
casualties, equipment malfunctions, or illegal killings by 
U.S. personnel would obviously not equate to balanced 
reporting—as feared by the critics of the embedded program. 
As one critic opined: “[It was] something that ensured 
favorable coverage of the military.  You are more connected 
to the military organization than you are to your own news 
organization.” (Ranade, 2003) 
K. THEME DEVELOPMENT 
Context is the social situation surrounding the 
document that assists the audience “to grasp the 
significance of the document itself, even independently of 
the content of the document.” (Altheide, 1996)  For this 
study context can be applied to the actual embedding or 
non-embedding of journalists within ground forces.  Simply 
by virtue of their physical location, the context of the 
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embedded reporters articles—the circumstances in which the 
article is authored—is obviously different from those non-
embedded journalists.  The difference lies in the prism 
through the journalist views the events—from the back of a 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle racing into Saddam International 
Airport or within the sterile confines of the offices of 
the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, or Washington Post. 
In tracking discourse, it is understood that meanings 
and patterns do not immediately appear, but “emerge or 
become more clear through constant comparison and 
investigation of documents over time.” (Altheide, 1996)  
This is the concept of emergence—the gradual shaping of 
meaning—as it applies to ECA. (Altheide, 1996)  Through 
examining both embedded and non-embedded reporting against 
the backdrop of major events in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
over a 26-day period, certain themes and nuances are 
revealed. 
The corpus of this study consisted of 93 articles, 
which were read and analyzed for specific themes, nuances, 
and meanings to determine general topical categories for 
analysis.  The initial coding, achieved through qualitative 
data analysis software (Nvivo), produced six topical 
themes, as well as emergent coding of seven additional 
topical themes.   
L. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter addressed the research methodology 
employed to analyze newspaper coverage of embedded and non-
embedded reporters during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The 
initial step taken to determine the corpus of the study 
involved selecting newspapers that could answer the 
research questions.  Through national circulation figures 
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as of 31 March 2003, three newspapers were selected.  With 
the newspapers selected, embedded and non-embedded 
reporters were identified.  
With several journalists’ names identified, internet 
literary search engines such as LEXIS/NEXIS and Proquest 
were used to determine how prolific they were concerning 
coverage of the war.  If a sufficient number of stories 
were available, the reporter was selected to become part of 
the corpus.  Once the corpus was identified, individual 
news days during the time period this study encompasses 
were chosen according to the major tactical actions 
occurring on the battlefield.  Each day of articles was 
then thoroughly read and coded for certain themes, nuances, 
images, and meanings, using NVivo.  From this exploration, 
13 categorical topics were identified to facilitate the 
exploration of the research questions. ECA was used for 
‘tracking discourse,’ or following certain issues, words, 
themes, and frames over a period of time, and across 
different newspapers.  Journalistic techniques, or “study 
factors,” were then used to explore the differing content 


























The public have an insatiable curiosity to know 
everything. Except what is worth knowing. 
Journalism, conscious of this, and having 
tradesman-like habits, supplies their demands. 
(Wilde, The Soul of a Man Under Socialism, 1895) 
In the above quote, Oscar Wilde pokes fun at the 
tendency of the news media’s attempt to barrage the reading 
public with meaningless information.  While some may still 
agree with Wilde’s assertion, it is undeniable that the 
world in which he formed his opinions concerning journalism 
was a much less complex place than that it is today.  Here, 
at the turn of the 21st century, journalists are the 
“eyewitnesses to history,” providing valuable insight to 
matters of great interest and importance.  This is 
especially true of the embedded war correspondents that 
covered the campaign to overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003.    
This study examines a body of news articles produced 
by embedded and non-embedded journalists during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.  Nine factors comparing the work of the 
embedded and non-embedded reporters were then used to 
explore the differing content of these two groups of 
journalists. These exploratory factors were determined from 
universally recognized journalistic techniques employed in 
constructing news articles (Freep.com, n.d., YRE, n.d., 
Jteacher.com, n.d.) and previous studies regarding the news 
media. (Iyengar, 1991, Entman, 1993, Kilpatrick and Leweke, 
1997)  The factors of the embedded and non-embedded 
journalists’ reporting that were explored are listed in 
Table 14.  
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The presentation of the findings of this study will 
follow the same pattern for all nine factors analyzed.  The 
results of each factor will be discussed, addressing the 
writing of both embedded and non-embedded reporters.  
Passages from the data set will be cited to support the 
analysis.  Passages will be referenced according to a 
format identifying the author, newspaper, and date of 
article.  As a review, the following abbreviations apply: 
NYT is the New York Times, LAT is the Los Angeles Times, 
and WP is the Washington Post.  Embedded journalists are 
designated by their last name alone, while all non-embedded 
journalists are designated by the initials “NE” (non-
embedded), and their last name.  For example, (Baker, WP, 
21 Mar) references a passage from embedded journalist Peter 
Baker in the 21 March 2003 edition of the Washington Post.  
(NE Miller, LAT, 10 Apr) references a passage written by 
non-embedded journalist Greg Miller in the 10 April 2003 
edition of the Los Angeles Times. 
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1. Factor # 1: News Sources 
This topic involved the sources that the embedded or 
non-embedded journalist used in crafting their story for 
publication.  In examining the articles for this factor, 
the embedded reporters displayed an overwhelming tendency 
to use soldiers and Marines on the battlefield describing 
the event or action within their article.  These eyewitness 
accounts gave an air of authenticity and granularity to the 
war that was not present in the non-embedded reporters’ 
accounts.  Embedded reporters, traveling with the 3d 
Infantry Division and 1st Marine Division included these 
sources for their reading audience (bolded sections 
indicate the individual quoted):  
Pfc. Justin Davis, 19, of Chattanooga, was 
guarding the perimeter of this camp, headquarters 
of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. He saw "a 
big ball of fire" and knew ‘we're finally at 
war.’ Pfc. Mark Johnson, 18, from Auburn, Ala., 
saw ‘a big fireball and black and smoke.’ (Baker, 
WP, 21 Mar) 
Wearing goggles against the sandstorm, their 
faces covered with dust, Army mechanics toiled by 
flashlight and ‘chem light’ to prepare the 
vehicles for battle. ‘Five layers of dirt are 
keeping me warm,’ one mechanic joked. (Branigin, 
WP, 26 Mar) 
‘The rule of thumb is: If he doesn't put his 
weapon down, he's not surrendering,’ said a 
company first sergeant. ‘In that case, take him 
out.’ (Zucchino, LAT, 02 Apr) 
By sunset, Corpsman Smith's ambulance overflowed 
with his wounded Marines, and even some Iraqis he 
had tried to save.  ‘All the stretchers were full 
of blood,’ Corpsman Smith recalled, looking at 
interior of his ambulance, now scrubbed clean and 
reeking of disinfectant. ‘I was shooting guys 
with morphine. Pretty much all of them had 
gunshot wounds.’ (Filkins, NYT, 06 Apr) 
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‘I put about 200 rounds through his windshield 
from 500 meters,’ said Sgt. Derrick January, 31, 
of Missouri, the gunner for the tank. ‘I hit him 
at 175 meters with a HEAT round. Allah was 
thinking of him today.’ (Mohan, LAT, 10 Apr) 
‘Nasiriyah was supposed to be a six-hour fight,’ 
said Gunnery Sgt. Tracy Hale, 32, of 
Philadelphia, who was injured in the battle and 
brought to the field hospital here. ‘It's already 
been five days. Five days of nonstop, 24-hour 
fighting.’ (Baker, WP, 28 Mar) 
One of the rocket-propelled grenades hit close to 
Cpl. Willie Anderson, 23, from Bossier City, La., 
‘I saw about five people standing behind the 
building,’ he said. ‘They got a (expletive) RPG,’ 
he said. ‘All I could do was cover my face. It 
blinded me and knocked me back. That's all I 
remember.’ (Baker, WP, 28 Mar) 
Of note are the persons the reporters are quoting; all 
individuals on the ground conducting the assault into Iraq.  
This results in a very personal accounting of the action.  
Compare this with the sources employed by non-embedded 
reporters; high-ranking administration officials, the 
ubiquitous “Pentagon official,” or “defense expert.”  
‘Combat is our last choice,’ one Pentagon 
official said. ‘And if you can tip the balance 
without a full-scale operation, don't you owe it 
to your country to do that?’  (NE Miller, LAT, 21 
Mar) 
Daniel Benjamin, a senior fellow at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, a 
Washington think tank, said the strike could lead 
Hussein and other leaders to wonder ‘if the 
United States targeted that particular location 
because of either a traitor in their midst or 
communications that were even more compromised 
than they knew.’ (NE Loeb, WP, 21 Mar) 
‘Iraqi soldiers and officers must ask themselves 
whether they want to die fighting for a doomed 
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regime or do they want to survive,’ Mr. Rumsfeld 
told reporters. (NE Schmitt, NYT, 21 Mar) 
‘At a minimum,’ added Tom Donnelly, a defense 
expert at the American Enterprise Institute, 
‘there's surely no downside for making it obvious 
that we know where he is, we're coming after him, 
and if we didn't get him this time, we're going 
to get him one of these times.’ (NE Loeb, WP, 21 
Mar) 
‘If I were in Baghdad and I was looking south and 
I saw a U.S. Army division that is on the 
outskirts of Baghdad, I don't know that that 
would be shock, but I'd certainly be a little 
concerned,’ General Myers told reporters. ‘And 
they'll have a lot more to be concerned about 
shortly.’ (NE Schmitt, NYT, 26 Mar) 
Retired military officers were frequently used as 
sources by the non-embedded reporters.  The non-embedded 
journalists, lacking front line access, amply sprinkled 
their writings with quotes from these self-touted experts 
on the Iraqi military, military planning, military history, 
military strategy, and infantry tactics—presumably to lend 
authenticity and credibility to the article.   
‘We're looking at air power that is 10 times more 
powerful than it was in the 1991 Gulf War,’ said 
retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas G. McInerney. 
(NE Loeb, WP, 06 Apr) 
‘It was a big swallow for the land forces to move 
out with unsecured flanks and a tenuous logistic 
supply line,’ said retired Air Force Gen. Charles 
Horner, the commander of the air campaign in the 
1991 war against Iraq. ‘But that kept the Iraqis 
off guard.’ (NE Ricks, WP, 10 Apr) 
Of interest was that, at times, non-embedded reporters 
“sampled” sources from their embedded counterparts to 
better illustrate a larger theme.  Peter Baker of the 
Washington Post interviewed Marines wounded during the 
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fighting in An Nasiriyah at an field hospital called Camp 
Viper, and provided the following quote in an article 
titled, “A 'Turkey Shoot,' but With Marines as the 
Targets.” 
‘Nasiriyah was supposed to be a six-hour fight,’ 
said Gunnery Sgt. Tracy Hale, 32, of 
Philadelphia, who was injured in the battle and 
brought to the field hospital here. ‘It's already 
been five days. Five days of nonstop, 24-hour 
fighting.’ (Baker, WP, 28 Mar) 
Jonathan Weisman, a non-embedded reporter also writing 
for the Washington Post included Baker’s source in his 
article titled, “Casualties, Expectations Might Collide; 
Experts Warn of Rising Losses as Factor in Support for 
War.” 
‘Nasiriyah was supposed to be a six-hour fight,’ 
a wounded gunnery sergeant said at a field 
hospital yesterday. ‘It's already been five days. 
Five days of nonstop, 24-hour fighting.’ (NE 
Weisman, WP, 28 Mar) 
The assessment of this factor reveals that the use of 
individual soldiers and Marines as sources was highly 
employed by the embedded reporters.  Embedded access to the 
personal insights of a 19-year-old Marine or 31-year-old 
Army sergeant resulted in more personal accounts of combat 
action from the embedded reporters.  Non-embedded 
reporters, whether thousands of miles from the fighting in 
the United States or across the border in Kuwait, appeared 
to rely on government officials, military officers, and 
retired analysts in their accounts.  
2. Factor # 2: Lead Paragraph 
The journalistic term “lead paragraph” describes the 
opening elements or introduction of story. As described in 
Chapter III, they are classified as being a news, quote, or 
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descriptive lead.  Embedded reporters displayed a tendency 
to use news and descriptive lead paragraphs in their work.  
Of the 50 embedded articles, 25 used descriptive leads, 23 
used news leads, with the remaining two having used quote 
lead paragraphs.  Examples are provided below: 
News lead paragraph: 
HEADLINE: A NATION AT WAR: IN THE FIELD NASIRIYA; 
A Sudden Iraqi Attack at Sunset Surprises a Key 
Marine Center South of the Euphrates 
BYLINE:  By Michael Wilson 
DATELINE: NASIRIYA, Iraq, March 27 
 
LEAD PARAGRAPH: Even as Marine officers 
proclaimed this Euphrates River city secured 
after four days of street fighting, Iraqi troops 
launched at sunset Wednesday the largest and most 
organized surprise attack yet on the American 
positions south of the river. 
Quote lead paragraph: 
 
HEADLINE: A NATION AT WAR: IN THE FIELD FIRST 
MARINE DIVISION; Orders in Place, Word Goes Out 
That 'This Is It' 
BYLINE:  By John Kifner  
DATELINE: WITH THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION, in 
central Iraq, April 1 
 
LEAD PARAGRAPH: "This is it," said Brig. Gen. 
John F. Kelly, assistant commander of the First 
Marine Division. 
Descriptive lead paragraph: 
HEADLINE: WAR WITH IRAQ / BATTLING THE ELEMENTS; 
Troops Face Off With Grit                  
BYLINE: By Tony Perry and Geoffrey Mohan  
DATELINE: Southern Iraq, March 26 
LEAD PARAGRAPH: The sand is like thick powder, 
choking men and machinery. When the rain starts, 
it becomes the texture of peanut butter. 
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Everything turns burnt orange, then all goes 
dark. 
During the same time period non-embedded reporters 
overwhelmingly used news lead paragraphs along with a much 
smaller amount of descriptive lead paragraphs.  From the 43 
non-embedded articles in the corpus, 35 contained news lead 
paragraphs, while eight articles used descriptive lead 
paragraphs.  Of interest was the discovery that the non-
embedded reporters, while not directly quoting an 
individual to begin their article, often stated that the 
previously penned information in the news lead paragraph 
was obtained from an official source, i.e., “…defense 
officials said Friday,” or “…the nation’s top battlefield 
commander said yesterday.”  This occurred in 16 of the 35 
news lead paragraphs.  The following are examples of the 
non-embedded journalists’ lead paragraphs: 
News lead paragraph: 
HEADLINE: Missing Soldier Rescued;  
U.S. Forces Remove POW From Hospital 
BYLINE: Vernon Loeb and Dana Priest, Washington 
Post Staff Writers                           
DATE: April 2 
 
LEAD PARAGRAPH: Jessica Lynch, a 19-year-old 
private first class missing since the ambush of 
an Army maintenance company 10 days ago in 
southern Iraq, has been rescued by Special 
Operations forces, defense officials said 
yesterday. 
Descriptive lead paragraph: 
HEADLINE: WAR WITH IRAQ; In Shiite Ghetto, a 
Vacuum Is Filled by Brutal Street Justice     
BYLINE: Michael Slackman                             
DATE: April 14 
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LEAD PARAGRAPH: Samir Ali Alou had a large knife 
and a mission: to help die-hard supporters of 
Saddam Hussein kill and terrorize Shiite Muslims, 
hoping to spark sectarian violence. 
By virtue of their embedded access, the embedded 
reporters were privy to a seemingly endless source of 
unique and original insights that were not available for 
their counterparts thousands of miles away writing about 
the conflict.  This resulted in more descriptive lead 
paragraphs being written to introduce their work than the 
non-embedded reporters. 
3. Factor # 3: Inverted Pyramid 
This factor addresses the journalistic technique known 
as the “inverted pyramid.” This term describes a form of 
news story with most important facts first and remainder in 
order of descending importance. Ken Blake, Ph.D.  
Middle Tennessee State University, summarizes the meaning 
of the inverted pyramid: 
To understand what the ‘inverted pyramid’ name 
means, picture an upside-down triangle—one with 
the narrow tip pointing downward and the broad 
base pointing upward. The broad base represents 
the most newsworthy information in the news 
story, and the narrow tip represents the least 
newsworthy information in the news story. When 
you write a story in inverted pyramid format, you 
put the most newsworthy information at the 
beginning of the story and the least newsworthy 
information at the end.  (Blake, n.d.) 
The corpus revealed that non-embedded reporters 
utilized the “inverted pyramid” more often in their writing 
than the embedded reporters. 
Of interest was the discovery that among both embedded 
and non-embedded reporters, the inverted pyramid was more 
often found coupled with stories that used news lead 
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paragraphs.  Articles with descriptive lead paragraphs were 
less likely to use the inverted pyramid.  They often 
appeared to start in the present, then flashed back to the 
past to inform the readers of additional interesting and 
important details to provide a fuller understanding of the 
story.  The Washington Post’s William Branigin, embedded 
with the 3d Infantry Division, used the inverted pyramid in 
his March 24, 2003 article carrying the headline: Iraqi 
Militia No Match For Armored Column: 
DATELINE: NEAR NAJAF, Iraq March 23 
U.S. Army troops led by tanks and armored 
vehicles overwhelmed Iraqi irregulars firing 
machine guns from pickup trucks today and, 
continuing a relentless U.S. advance, pushed on 
to seize an airfield near the sacred city of 
Najaf only 100 miles from Baghdad.  
 
The resistance by Iraqi militiamen proved no 
match for the more than 70 M1 Abrams tanks and 60 
M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles of the 3rd Infantry 
Division's 2nd Brigade that clanked into the 
encounter and opened fire. But it tied up some of 
the unit's gunners for several hours. Afterward, 
mangled vehicles and the bodies of dead 
militiamen littered a dirt road within sight of 
Najaf, a city on the west bank of the Euphrates 
River that is the most prominent center of 
worship for Iraq's Shiite Muslims.  
 
Along an earthen berm between a muddy plain and a 
road used by the advancing U.S. column, the 
bodies of four men wearing olive green uniforms 
lay where they fell, apparently waiting in ambush 
for U.S. forces. Nearby lay assorted military 
paraphernalia and ammunition, including rounds 
for a rocket-propelled grenade launcher.  
 
One of the men wore shoulder boards indicating he 
was a senior officer, according to a U.S. soldier 
who happened upon the bodies after participating 
in a recovery operation to pull out tanks and 
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armored personnel carriers that got stuck in an 
adjacent marshy plain.  
 Following the simple formula for the “inverted 
pyramid,” Branigin begins his article with the most 
important details of the story—the advance to Baghdad 
continues on despite resistance.  He then addresses the 
resistance in more detail, describing the fight in general 
terms.  He concludes this section with even more 
granularity as he writes about the grisly results of the 
fight.  Had a reader only time to digest the lead 
paragraph, they still would be able to understand the theme 
of the article without reading another sentence. 
4. Factor # 4: Scope 
Scope addresses the narrow or broad expanse of the 
article and is linked to framing.  Both groups of reporters 
submitted articles that could be considered “broad” in 
nature.  However, when compared to the non-embedded 
journalists, the study revealed that embedded reporters, 
lacking the larger ability to piece together the events of 
the battlefield beyond their immediate observation, tended 
to compose articles that were more narrow in scope than the 
non-embedded journalists. An example of this concerns the 
fighting by U.S. Marines in An Nasiriyah in March 2003: 
Even as Marine officers proclaimed this Euphrates 
River city secured after four days of street 
fighting, Iraqi troops launched at sunset 
Wednesday the largest and most organized surprise 
attack yet on the American positions south of the 
river. Infantry units reported as many as 1,000 
Iraqi soldiers mustering at a railroad depot just 
south of Nasiriyah. American artillery units 
opened fire on them, but the Iraqi fighters had 
already fanned out southward toward crucial 
Marine outposts. The regimental headquarters and 
the central command of the artillery batteries 
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both received machine-gun fire and faced the 
threat of being overrun. (Wilson, NYT, 28 Mar) 
Elements of at least three regular army units, 
the 6th Armored, 11th Infantry and 51st 
Mechanized divisions—whose willingness to fight 
had been a huge question mark before the war 
began—are aggressively engaging the coalition 
forces in Basra, Nasiriyah and Najaf, among other 
locations, said Anthony H. Cordesman, a former 
Pentagon official at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies who is an expert on the 
Iraqi military. (NE Loeb, WP, 28 Mar) 
Michael Wilson, embedded with the Marines in An 
Nasiriyah penned a much narrower account of the fighting in 
comparison to non-embedded reporter Vernon Loeb.  Wilson 
described the Marines’ fight for the city, while Loeb 
discussed the broader implications of the fighting.  This 
trend held true for the embedded and non-embedded articles 
within the corpus.  The embedded reporters, to a degree 
denied knowledge of the surrounding events across the wide 
expanse of the battlefield, provided more focused or narrow 
stories than their non-embedded counterparts. 
5. Factor # 5: Depth 
Depth of an article refers to the richness and 
profundity of the reporters’ writing.  Just as scope is 
linked to framing, it is also linked to depth.  A quick 
measure of this factor would involve a determination by the 
reader as to how thoroughly the reporter describes the 
action of an event in his or her writing.  In explaining 
the same event, two reporters will inevitably emphasize 
different aspects of the story or dig deeper in their 
investigation of the facts to expose more information to 
their reading audience. Consider they following embedded 
passages: 
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Colonel Saylor and other intelligence and 
operations officers here at division headquarters 
characterized the attackers mainly as members of 
militias associated with Mr. Hussein and his 
sons, the Fedeyeen and Al Quds Brigade along with 
hard-core Baath Party supporters.  The officers 
believe that the attackers may be getting 
rudimentary military direction from Republican 
Guard officers.  Their weapons are the light 
equipment common to guerrillas and armies 
throughout the third world: shoulder-fired 
rocket-propelled grenades, Soviet-era AK-47 
assault rifles and some small mortars. Colonel 
Saylor and other officers said that they had 
discovered arms caches along the route and that 
some of the guerrillas were traveling in Toyota 
pickup trucks. Most seemed to be operating in 
civilian clothes. The colonel added that in some 
towns, "it's the Baath Party headquarters, that's 
where they pour out of." (Kifner, NYT, 28 Mar) 
The detail provided by John Kifner paints quite a word 
picture for his reader.  The passage specifically addresses 
the enemy organizations offering the most resistance 
(instead of a generic reference to the “Iraqi army”), from 
where they are getting their guidance (“Republican Guard 
officers”), and what type of weapons and vehicles the enemy 
is using in their attacks.  Tony Perry also provides 
incredible granularity in his writing below.  Notice the 
details in his passage: barefoot men armed with rakes and 
pitchforks, hiding behind agricultural berms, and the exact 
enemy tactics used against the U.S. forces.  
In some cases, these attacks are both futile and 
bloody, with young men, armed only with rakes and 
pitchforks, running barefoot at U.S. troops, said 
Col. Ben Saylor, 1st Marine Division chief of 
staff.  The fighters, generally between 18 and 35 
years old, tend to hide behind agricultural berms 
-- mounds of dirt that separate fields and often 
are used as irrigation channels. They then jump 
up and charge at Marine positions from as far as 
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100 yards away, said Saylor.  Some charges are 
coordinated, albeit ineffective -- part of 
delayed ambushes that begin with a rocket-
propelled grenade or small arms fire on the U.S.-
led forces from one side of the road, followed by 
a mass charge from the other side by men with 
small hand weapons. (Perry, LAT, 28 Mar) 
Writing on the same subject of enemy resistance, 
Thomas E. Ricks of the Washington Post wrote:  
Iraqi troops and militias used ruses, ambushes 
and other guerrilla tactics yesterday that 
exploited the risks inherent in the fast-moving 
Pentagon war strategy, inflicting more than a 
score of American casualties and raising 
questions about how effective the U.S. approach 
has been in convincing Iraqi troops and civilians 
that President Saddam Hussein's removal is 
inevitable.  (NE Ricks, WP, 24 Mar)  
On March 26, 2003, Vernon Loeb of the Washington Post 
wrote: 
Pentagon officials acknowledged that Saddam's 
Fedeyeen complicates the issue of securing the 
supply lines, a concern that has plagued senior 
Army generals for months. Rumsfeld noted that the 
Fedeyeen had used battlefield treachery to attack 
U.S. forces after feigning surrender. He likened 
them to "terrorists." (NE Loeb, WP, 26 Mar) 
Using “battlefield treachery,” “guerrilla tactics,” 
and “terrorists” are more generic terms when compared to 
the in-depth descriptions of “Toyota pickup trucks” and 
Iraqis “armed only with rakes and pitchforks running 
barefoot at U.S. troops.”  One can see from the examples 
that the embedded reporters’ ability to question the 
soldiers and Marines engaged in combat—or witness the event 
oneself—allows the journalist to write in greater depth 
than their non-embedded counterparts.  
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6. Factor # 6: Angle 
The angle is the reporter’s point of view and is most 
usually associated with “hard” news stories or “soft” 
feature articles.  Feature articles usually are not bound 
by breaking news events and explore a subject from that 
differing “angle,” shedding light on a particular aspect of 
the larger story that would more than likely be overlooked.  
The public appetite for immediate news about the war 
demanded that both groups of reporters compose “hard” news 
stories about the actions on the ground.  The cold, hard 
facts about the full-throttle advance to Baghdad, and the 
fighting along the way dominated the articles of both 
embedded and non-embedded reporters.  Examination of the 
corpus revealed that complementing these “hard” news 
stories were comparable numbers of “soft” news stories 
submitted by both embedded and non-embedded journalists. 
Each reporter’s body of work during the time period of this 
study was peppered with varying numbers of feature stories. 
For example, embedded reporter Michael Wilson of The New 
York Times has three articles in the corpus of this work.  
The dates and headlines of these articles were: 
March 24: A NATION AT WAR: WITH THE TROOPS OF 
TASK FORCE TARAWA; Marines Meet Potent Enemy In 
Deadly Fight 
March 28: A NATION AT WAR: IN THE FIELD IN 
NASIRIYA; A Sudden Attack at Sunset Surprises a 
Key Marine Center South of the Euphrates 
April 6: A NATION AT WAR: IN THE FIELD WITH 
MARINE TASK FORCE TARAWA; In 100 Degree Heat, 
Marines become Traffic Police to Protect Roads in 
the Rear 
The articles of March 24 and March 28 are news 
articles describing the U.S. Marines fighting in An 
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Nasiriyah.  The third article (April 6) is a feature 
article—a human-interest story describing the comparatively 
mundane task of guarding the supply lines, the living 
conditions the Marines, their worries, their complaints, 
and the early April heat and mosquitoes of southern Iraq. 
Non-embedded reporter Jonathan Weisman of the Washington 
Post provided five articles in the study corpus.  Of these 
five, three can be classified as feature stories: 
March 28: Casualties, Expectations Might Collide; 
Experts Warn of Rising Losses as Factor in 
Support for War 
April 2: Rumsfled And Myers Defend War Plan; 
Officials Say Criticism Is ‘Bogus’ and Slap at 
Troops 
April 14: Iraq Chaos No Surprise, but Too Few 
Troops to Quell It 
The above stories were not tied to breaking news events, 
but rather served to provide additional information to the 
“hard” news stories written by both embedded and non-
embedded reporters.  Of special benefit to the reading 
public was that the feature articles of the embedded 
reporters played a vital role in putting a “human face” on 
the war by writing feature stories highlighting the trials 
and travails of the common soldier or Marine. These 
articles often focused on such details as the effect of the 
heat on the soldiers, the biting insects, the quality of 
the rations, church services, or the lack of mail from 
home.  When compared to the larger events of the drive to 
Baghdad, they may seem somewhat inconsequential, but stress 
the point to the reader that war is a human endeavor, 
fought by husbands, wives, sons, and daughters—not nameless 
machines or icons on a map.  
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7. Factor # 7: Framing 
Embedded reporters, accompanying soldiers and Marines 
into battle, provided detailed, episodic first-hand 
accounts of events as they occurred on the ground.  The 
non-embedded reporters employed more thematic framing 
within their articles concerning this topic—placing the 
small, detailed accounts of the embedded journalists into 
the greater context of the campaign to overthrow Saddam 
Hussein.  The first examples provided are from embedded 
journalists.  Consider the episodic focus of the following: 
It began Friday morning, when an American M1 
Abrams tank, on the leading edge of the Marines' 
drive into the capital, was destroyed by an Iraqi 
missile in an ambush. For the next several hours, 
street-to-street fighting raged here, with as 
much horror and confusion as the Pentagon's war 
planners had imagined. The Americans won 
overwhelmingly. There was valor here and 
pointless death. There was fighting in the 
streets and in tight places, where the tanks and 
bombs could not go but the men with rifles could. 
A leading Iraqi officer met an ignominious end. A 
number of Iraqi civilians, swept up in the 
whirlwind, died here…The Marines said their 
Iraqis foes fought harder on Friday than at any 
other time in the war. Their aim was truer. They 
held their ground. And they were well armed. By 
the end of the day, three Marines had been 
killed; one lieutenant was shot in the throat, 
another in the head. An M1 tank was destroyed. 
(Filkins, NYT, 06 Apr) 
Filkins’ writing about the initial push by the Marines 
into Baghdad episodically describes a single fight with the 
Iraqi defenders among many that occurred on that day.  The 
reporting specifically mentions the day of the week 
(“Friday”), the duration of the fight (“several hours”, “by 
the end of the day”), as well as providing rich detail 
about the tenacity of the enemy and the casualties suffered 
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by each side (“M1 tank” destroyed, “leading Iraqi” killed, 
“three Marines” killed).  Similarly, Larry Zucchino wrote 
the following: 
Before it was over, the column had thundered 
through a Republican Guard gantlet, killing 1,000 
Iraqi soldiers and destroying 30 antiaircraft 
batteries, according to Col. David Perkins, 
commander of the 3rd Infantry Division's 2nd 
Brigade. The numbers could not be independently 
verified.  One American tank commander was killed 
in the three-hour foray from here into Saddam 
Hussein's capital, which American commanders said 
was designed to stun an Iraqi leadership that had 
claimed in news conferences that U.S. forces had 
not yet crossed the Euphrates River, more than 20 
miles southwest of the city's outskirts. 
(Zucchino, LAT, 06 Apr) 
The above passage by Zucchino also includes many 
indicators of episodic framing.  Like Filkins, he discusses 
a specific time period of the action (“three-hour foray”), 
and specific details particular to this action (“one 
American tank commander” killed, “1000 Iraqi soldiers” 
killed, “30 antiaircraft batteries” destroyed).   
The non-embedded journalists’ accounts are about the 
overall progress of the war to date, U.S. strategy, and 
other larger issues.  It was also evident that the non-
embedded journalists took the individual accounts of their 
embedded counterparts and compiled them, providing their 
reading audience with the larger themes of casualties, 
resistance, and the blistering advance on Baghdad: 
Iraqi troops and militias used ruses, ambushes 
and other guerrilla tactics yesterday that 
exploited the risks inherent in the fast-moving 
Pentagon war strategy, inflicting more than a 
score of American casualties and raising 
questions about how effective the U.S. approach 
has been in convincing Iraqi troops and civilians 
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that President Saddam Hussein's removal is 
inevitable.  (NE Ricks, WP, 24 Mar) 
Thomas Ricks writes thematically about the resistance 
the U.S forces began to see on March 23, 2003.  He does not 
specify individual incidents or actions on that day, but 
rather uses more generic descriptors such as “ruses, 
ambushes and other guerrilla tactics.”  The level of detail 
describing casualties (“scores”) is also more generic than 
that seen in the previous passages provided by embedded 
reporters.  Another example of thematic framing comes from 
New York Times non-embedded reporter Eric Schmitt: 
After three days of routing Iraqi forces and even 
labeling their advance toward the Iraqi capital 
"the Baghdad 500," U.S. soldiers had a series of 
sobering engagements. One unit of Iraqi regular 
troops ambushed a U.S. convoy. Others trapped 
U.S. troops in what was described as a phony 
surrender, and some reportedly disguised 
themselves in civilian clothes. In the south, 
remnants of an army division moved heavy weapons 
into a residential area of Basra that U.S. and 
British forces were reluctant to fire upon.  
Military experts predicted that the resistance in 
the south was so disorganized and relatively 
small-scale that it would die out quickly. (NE 
Schmitt, NYT, 26 Mar) 
Schmitt, writing on March 26, 2003, provides a 
summary of the resistance encountered thus far by 
U.S. forces since the beginning of the war.  He 
uses “three days of routing Iraqi forces,” and “a 
series of sobering engagements.”  While listing 
specific incidents, Schmitt merely uses them to 
reinforce the thematic framing of his passage.   
It appears that the frontline access of the embedded 
reporters placed them in a position to compose more 
episodic accounts.  Upon assessing the specific framing 
employed by the embedded and non-embedded journalists, this 
trend held true for their individual reports of the 
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fighting during the period of this study.  Access is 
quintessential to writing episodically.  Devoid of this, 
non-embedded journalists tended to pen more thematic 
passages concerning the progress of the war. 
8. Factor # 8: Balanced Reporting 
With the campaign to topple Saddam Hussein complete, 
it is quite easy to look back over the course of the 26 
days between the start of the war on March 20, 2003, and 
the capture of Tikrit on April 14, 2003, and make an 
objective evaluation of what truly was of consequence 
during that time period.  It is also easy to see what fears 
were unfounded.  Of course, the reporters covering the 
conflict did not enjoy the benefit of hindsight and were 
forced to make a decision concerning the content of their 
stories.   
The corpus reveals that both embedded and non-embedded 
reporters exercised objectivity in crafting their articles.  
To be sure, the reporters were quick to write of the 
impressive successes of the U.S. military, but they were 
also quick to address some of the not—so—flattering events 
of the war.  The reporters consistently wrote of 
unsuccessful attacks, difficulty in protecting the supply 
lines, friendly fire incidents, the advance stalling or 
falling behind schedule, and equipment malfunctioning.  
Nothing appeared to be off limits with either the embedded 
or non-embedded reporters.  They wrote of discontent among 
critics of the war strategy, the relief of a U.S. Marine 
regimental commander, and exposed to the public when U.S. 
troops mistakenly killed Iraqi civilians at a checkpoint in 
late March 2003.  The corpus is replete with passages such 
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as these, which very effectively demonstrate the balanced 
nature of the reporters’ writing: 
“The planned assault on Baghdad is now about 
three days behind schedule… (Kifner, NYT, 28 Mar) 
“Spare parts are scarce—mechanics are 
cannibalizing wrecked Amtracs to keep others 
running—and many Marine units have had their 
rations cut to one ready-to-eat meal a day for 
the last several days.” (Kifner, NYT, 02 Apr) 
Kifner lets the reading audience know the harsh truth 
about the U.S campaign falling behind schedule and the lack 
of spare parts and rations—a startling revelation 
considering the highly-touted American war machine. 
The firefight that unfolded today in front of the 
American caravan illustrated the difficulty the 
military is having in resupplying its troops at 
the front line. (Filkins, NYT, 28 Mar) 
The fact that Filkins writes of the difficulties the 
U.S. forces are experiencing in dealing with the enemy was 
not an aberration.  He also makes it clear that this 
“firefight” is illustrative of a larger problem—not an 
isolated incident.  The readiness with which the reporters 
displayed in their writing to expose the truth, regardless 
of how their article or passage painted the military, is 
evidenced by the following:  
A block away, an Iraqi family grieved, smaller 
than it was a day before.  Omar, a 15 year-old 
boy, sat on the roadside weeping, drenched in the 
blood of his father, shot dead by American 
Marines for running a roadblock here…six members 
of Omar’s family were dead, covered by blankets 
on the roadside.  Among them were Omar’s father, 
mother, brother and sister.  A two year-old boy, 
Ali, had been shot in the face. (Filkins, NYT, 06 
Apr) 
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In a separate incident, at least nine Marines 
died in the fighting.  A military source said 
today that preliminary indications suggested they 
might have been killed by fire from an A-10 
Thunderbolt II ground attack plane trying to help 
them. (Baker, WP, 28 Mar) 
…3rd Infantry soldiers shot at a vehicle at a 
similar checkpoint, killing ten Iraqi civilians… 
(Branigin, WP, 06 Apr) 
The elation has since faded following the 
accidental destruction of a British fighter plane 
by another Patriot battery, killing the crew of 
two, and the attack by a U.S. warplane on a 
Patriot radar. (Zucchino, LAT, 02 Apr) 
None of these passages can be classified as being even 
remotely complementary of U.S. forces.  They address 
soldiers mistakenly killing civilians, and the inept 
actions of Americans that resulted in fratricide—an 
understandably explosive and sensitive issue for all 
involved.   
Similar balanced reporting from the non-embedded 
reporters complemented the even-handed accounts of the 
embedded journalists: 
…Rumsfled has become a lightning rod for 
criticism because he has not been frank with the 
public about the flawed assumptions and the level 
of force that was on hand at the start of the war 
as a result. (NE Loeb, WP, 02 Apr) 
Vernon Loeb’s refusal to merely pen rosy accounts of 
the administration’s handling of the war are even more 
telling considering the fact that U.S. forces were still 
engaged in combat with the enemy at the time the above was 
written.  Stating that one of the primary individuals 
responsible for devising the strategy to topple Saddam 
Hussein had “flawed assumptions” is illustrative of a non-
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embedded reporter not allowing feelings of patriotism to 
color his writing.  Likewise, Loeb’s discussion concerning 
the accidental destruction of a British aircraft by U.S. 
forces demonstrates his willingness to remain above any 
personal bias.  In fact, using a quote from the U.S. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stating that the 
state-of-the-art technology (that supposedly is one of the 
great strengths of the U.S. military) “broke down some 
where” does not paint a flattering picture of the military 
or its leadership: 
Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on ABC’s “This Week” 
that electronic procedures for identifying and 
differentiating friendly and enemy aircraft 
“broke down some where.” (NE Loeb, WP, 24 Mar) 
Thomas Ricks provides a brutal assessment of the 
effectiveness of the U.S. strategy—as well as unwittingly 
providing the Iraqi leadership with a rough estimate of the 
size of the forces closing in on their capital city: 
The continued Iraqi resistance specifically calls 
into question the efficacy of the biggest 
psychological operations campaign waged by the 
U.S. military…[an Army officer] said he continues 
to worry that the overall U.S. invasion force—a 
third the size of that which ousted Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait in 1991—is too small.(NE Ricks, WP, 
24 Mar) 
In the first week of April 2003, Marine Maj General 
James Mattis, Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division, 
relieved one of his regimental commanders.  Ricks wrote an 
821-word article on the implications of this action.  
The Marine Corps relieved one of its top 
commanders in Iraq Friday, an extremely unusual 
action, especially for a unit engaged in 
combat…The U.S. military was unusually guarded 
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about discussing the reason for the battlefield 
removal.  The Central Command, the U.S. military 
headquarters for the war, announced the action 
but offered no explanation for it. (NE Ricks, WP, 
06 Apr) 
Again, just as with Loeb, Ricks wrote his account, 
even naming the specific unit, while the 6000 Marines in 
that unit were still engaged in combat—extraordinary 
considering the controversial nature of the article and the 
families of those Marines at war having to read about how 
the man responsible for their loved ones lives’ was 
relieved of command.  
9. Factor # 9: Theme Development 
The final factor used in this study to investigate the 
posited differences in the content of the embedded and non-
embedded reporting during Operation Iraqi Freedom are 
individual themes that were uncovered during the reading of 
the corpus. The initial coding produced six topical themes, 
as well as emergent coding of eight additional topical 
themes.  The topics are listed below. (*** annotates an 
initially coded category.) 
 1) Combat quotes*** 
 2) Enemy resistance*** 
 3) Enemy warfighting tactics, techniques, and  
  procedures 
 4) Human casualties / destroyed equipment  
 5) Operational tempo/speed of campaign*** 
 6) Iraqi reaction to U.S. invasion 
 7) Equipment failures 
 8) Looting*** 
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 9) Tactical mistakes 
 10) Atrocities*** 
 11) Changing plans / flexibility*** 
 12) Enemy chemical weapons use 
 13) Caution / warnings of difficulty 
Upon completion of coding of the entire corpus, 702 
passages grouped in 13 topical themes from embedded and 
non-embedded journalists were collected into the project 
database.  
 While both the embedded and non-embedded reporters 
included the above themes within their writings, the 
difference between the two groups existed in the emphasis 
each placed on certain themes.  Comparing the 13 themes 
against the events of the war, it is natural that embedded 
reporters would concentrate on particular themes as a 
result of their proximity to the action.  It is just as 
fitting that non-embedded reporters would gravitate to 
other themes which they could more effectively write about 
than not.  A simple way to describe the difference in the 
topical emphasis is that as a result of their access and 
proximity, non-embedded reporters took a macro view of the 
war, while embedded reporters took a micro view.  The 
method the U.S. military uses to differentiate between such 
areas of focus in the conduct of war is termed “levels of 
war.”  (MCDP-1, 1997)   
“Levels of war” is a doctrinal definition describing 
the hierarchical levels at which activities in war occur.  
The three levels of war are the strategic, operational, and 
tactical. (MCDP-1, 1997)  The highest level is strategic, 
with the lowest level being tactical. The operational level 
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is the bridge between the two.  The following definitions 
apply: 
Strategic: activities focusing on national policy 
objectives. (MCDP-1, 1997) 
Operational: when, where, and under what conditions to 
engage the enemy in battle—as well as refuse battle in 
support of higher aims. (MCDP-1, 1997)  
 Tactical: concepts and methods to accomplish a 
particular mission in combat or other military operations. 
(MCDP-1, 1997) 
The examination of the corpus revealed that embedded 
reporters penned articles recounting actions at 
predominantly the tactical and operational level of war. It 
is posited that this is a result of the embedded reporters’ 
direct access to the actual events as they occurred on the 
ground.  Because the embedded reporters were positioned at 
various echelons of units, i.e., platoon, company, 
battalion, division, and corps, they would naturally write 
about the tactical and operational maneuvers of the 
soldiers and Marines to which they were attached.    
Conversely, non-embedded reporters, whether attending 
briefings at the Pentagon or the White House, or querying a 
civilian pundit, submitted articles reporting at the 
operational and strategic level—simply because that is 
where these level issues were discussed. For example, non-
embedded reporters wrote: 
Strategic: Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld 
summarized this carrot-and-stick approach at a 
Pentagon briefing yesterday. "We continue to feel 
that there's no need for a broader conflict if 
the Iraqi leaders act to save themselves," he 
said. But, he continued, "what will follow will 
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not be a repeat of any other conflict. It will be 
of a force and scope and scale that has been 
beyond what has been seen before." (NE Ricks, WP, 
21 Mar) 
Operational: "We have shifted to a very, very 
robust psy-ops [psychological operations] 
campaign," the official said. "The message 
continues to be to surrender." (NE Miller, LAT, 
21 Mar) 
Strategic: "If this [the invasion] is successful 
it will open up more flexibility in future 
operations," said Duke University political 
scientist Peter Feaver, an expert on the 
political implications of the use of force. "It 
would certainly be existence of a proof that 
other approaches do not lead to certain 
disaster." (NE Ricks, WP, 24 Mar) 
Embedded reporters, being much closer to the action, 
submitted the passages below.  Note the different focus of 
the actions between the two groups: 
Tactical: By this evening, as reports came in of 
fighting in and around Nasiriyah, where vital 
bridges span the Euphrates River, and of 
stiffening resistance by some Iraqi units, the 
mood had turned much grimmer.  In another 
indication of stiffening local resistance, a 
Marine officer returned here late tonight with a 
harrowing tale of a drive through a village near 
Basra in which two Marine Humvees were ambushed 
with rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47 assault 
rifles and light machine guns as they drove into 
town.  They barely escaped after a wild shootout, 
with the officer blazing away with a shotgun. Two 
of the Marines were wounded and had to be 
medevaced. (Filkins, NYT, 24 Mar) 
Operational: The rapid advance of American forces 
through Iraq has left the spearhead of the army 
300 miles away from its main base. As a result, 
the supply lines are stretched thin and are 
vulnerable to the kinds of attacks that have left 
this convoy standing still since Tuesday. 
(Filkins, WP, 28 Mar) 
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Tactical: The Republican Guard forces mounted an 
intense counterattack, commanders said. Each of 
the 29 Abrams tanks and 14 Bradley fighting 
vehicles that roared into the city was peppered 
with holes from small arms and grenades. Upon 
their return, some were still smoking. (Zucchino, 
LAT, 06 Apr) 
It was evident that while embedded journalists focused 
on the specific and unique events on the ground, the non-
embedded reporters described larger strategic objectives 
that exist at the higher levels of command and government. 
Of the 13 coded themes, embedded reporters spoke with 
much greater emphasis on enemy resistance, human 
casualties/destroyed equipment, operational tempo/speed of 
campaign, and enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures by 
a 2:1 or 3:1 ratio when compared to the non-embedded 
reporters.  For example, the topical theme “enemy 
resistance” resulted in 76 coded passages from the embedded 
reporters, while the non-embedded articles yielded 31 
passages.  “Operational tempo/speed of campaign,” was 
mentioned 31 times by the embedded reporters compared to 
the eight passages identified in the non-embedded passage 
database. For embedded reporters traveling with the armored 
columns racing to Baghdad, personally witnessing combat and 
its horrific cost, these results are illustrative of the 
influence the embedded experience had in determining the 
content of these writers. 
Non-embedded reporters placed greater emphasis on 
subject matter that addressed much larger issues beyond the 
concern of the embedded reporters.  For example, “Caution / 
warnings of difficulty” was cited twice as many times in 
the project database by the non-embedded reporters than 
their embedded counterparts.  This is illustrative of the 
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non-embedded journalists’ sources (read access)—
administration officials who often tried to assuage the 
fears of the public, and retired military officers who 
offered educated opinions from the comfort of their 
Washington or new York office. The same 2:1 ratio can be 
applied to the topical category, “Iraqi reaction.”  
Additionally, non-embedded journalists more often addressed 
this theme at a higher level, i.e., reaction of Iraqi 
leaders or other Arab governments taken from wire reports 
compared to the embedded reporter’s young Iraqi living in 
the slums of Baghdad. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In the course of this study, the author examined a 
corpus of news articles produced by embedded and non-
embedded journalists during Operation Iraqi Freedom.  From 
nine embedded journalists and ten non-embedded journalists, 
eight days of news articles chosen according to the events 
transpiring on the battlefield were selected for 
examination.   
The examination of the corpus revealed that embedded 
and non-embedded reporters approached the writing of news 
articles in different manners on eight of the nine 
exploratory factors.  The above results of this exploration 
of embedded and non-embedded news articles from Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, as they apply to the research questions of 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Wars are always accompanied by lies. Lies about 
losses, lies about victories, lies about the 
war’s victims. As a war reporter, you have to try 
to cut through the lies  and their half-brother, 
war propaganda, to uncover some kind of truth.   
Correspondent in Baghdad, Iraq, March 15, 2003 
(Anonymous, 2003) 
Penned on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 
reporter quoted above succinctly captures the raison d’etre 
of the war correspondent ever since the gregarious Billy 
Russell first set the standard over 150 years ago.  Indeed, 
the ability of journalists to “cut through the lies,” and 
“uncover some kind of truth” was incredibly enhanced by the 
U.S. Department of Defense’s embedded media program 
instituted for the campaign to topple the Hussein regime in 
Iraq.  While their immediate and highly dramatic accounts 
offered a perspective not before seen by the news-hungry 
U.S. public, they also raised questions about the 
effectiveness of the embedded program.  Some critics 
thought that the journalistic focus at the individual 
soldier and Marine-level came at the expense of the overall 
story of the war. (Ayers, 2004)  Reporting by the embedded 
media was negatively described as looking through a “soda-
straw,” (Smith, 2003, Pasquarett, 2003), or “into a 
microscope.” (Harper, 2004)  One embedded war correspondent 
compared being embedded as being the same as the number-two 
dog in a sled dog team.  “You saw an awful lot of the dog 
in front of you, and a little to the left and right.” 
(Smith, 2003)   
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This thesis was written to explore the embedded media 
program during Operation Iraqi Freedom and to specifically 
answer the following research questions: (1) How did 
embedded journalists affect the content of U.S. news 
reporting of Operation Iraqi Freedom?  (2) Was the 
reporting of the embedded and non-embedded journalists 
balanced? (3) Were the critics’ accusations of “soda straw” 
reporting justified? Or in other words, is the embedded 
corpus narrower in scope and depth than the non-embedded 
corpus?  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
In attempting to answer the research questions, a 
review of the literature surrounding the evolution of the 
war correspondent revealed that the tale of the war 
correspondent during the 150 years that they have plied 
their trade has been one of many highs and lows.  They have 
endured excessive censorship, questions of objectivity, and 
troubles with access to the front lines.  Conversely, they 
have experienced tremendous access and freedom on the 
battlefield.  The reporters of Operation Iraqi Freedom are 
the inheritors of this checkered legacy.  Additionally, 
advances in technology have greatly enhanced the ability of 
the war correspondent to transmit breaking news almost 
instantaneously to a news hungry public.  With the embedded 
media program practiced in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 
American public was able to view the face of modern warfare 
as never before.  By applying the ten factors discussed in 
Chapter IV to the corpus of this study, the author has been 
able to gain valuable insight to the newspaper reporting of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The following conclusions are 
offered to the research questions of this study: 
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1. Research Question # 1 
The first research question of this study was “How did 
embedded journalists affect the content of U.S. news 
reporting of Operation Iraqi Freedom?” 
Through the lens of the ten factors listed in Table 
16, the examination of the corpus revealed that embedded 
and non-embedded reporters approached the writing of news 
articles in different manners on eight of the ten factors, 
which ultimately resulted in a markedly different body of 
work when compared to their non-embedded counterparts. 
 
Table 15.    Study results 
FACTOR EMBEDDED NON-EMBEDDED 
News sources Individual soldiers, and 
Marines; quotes from 
enlisted and junior officers 
in direct contact with the 
enemy 
High-ranking administration 
and Pentagon officials, 
general officers, retired 
officers and civilian 
military “experts” 
Lead paragraph Equal numbers of descriptive 
and news lead 
Overwhelmingly news lead 
Inverted pyramid Yes Yes; more so than embedded 
Framing Episodic Thematic 
Scope Narrow Broad 
Depth Rich in personal details 





Angle Equally news and feature 
articles 




Balanced accounts of the 
combat actions; controversy 
and problems with plans, 
enemy and equipment not 
avoided 
Balanced accounts of the 
combat actions; controversy 
and problems with plans, 
enemy and equipment not 
avoided 
Theme Emphasis placed on subject 
matter to which they were 
most exposed (enemy 
resistance, casualties, etc) 
Predominantly tactical 
“level of war”; some 
operational 
Emphasis placed on subject 
matter to which they were 
most exposed (warnings of 
difficulty/caution, Iraqi 
reaction, etc) Operational 
and strategic “level of war” 
The two groups of reporters differ in their news 
sources, types of lead paragraphs employed in the 
construction of their stories, and in the use of the 
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journalistic technique, “inverted pyramid.”  They also 
displayed a distinct tendency to report on different levels 
of warfare, with the embedded reporters also using a more 
narrow scope in the coverage of their subject as well as 
greater depth of reporting. The framing of their respective 
stories—either episodic or thematic—was also revealed to be 
a function of being embedded or non-embedded.  Each group 
of reporters also placed greater thematic emphasis on 
certain coded topics within the project database as a 
result of their respective status as either embedded or 
non-embedded. 
Although these factors reveal significant differences 
in their reporting, the two groups do not differ in the 
angle or point of view they took in producing their body of 
work during this time period.  No reporter appeared to 
focus solely on news stories or solely on feature stories.  
Most encouraging was the discovery that both embedded and 
non-embedded reporters produced a very balanced collection 
of stories about Operation Iraqi Freedom, readily exposing 
and reporting on both positive and negative aspects of the 
military campaign in Iraq.  The embedded reporter’s 
presence, proximity, and frontline access provided them 
exposure to a dramatically different set of raw information 
from which they ultimately crafted their stories.  The 
above results present a strong argument that the embedded 
reporters—the act of being embedded within military units—
greatly affected the content of the news reporting during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
2. Research Question # 2  
The second question posed by the author in this study 
was “Was the reporting of the embedded and non-embedded 
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journalists balanced? As discussed in Chapter II, one of 
the primary criticisms leveled at the embedded program was 
that their close proximity would breed familiarity, 
resulting in a hesitancy to write negatively about the 
military.  To a degree, the same can be said of their non-
embedded counterparts.  Not that they would be reticent in 
reporting negative stories about the conflict because of an 
attachment to the forces engaged in combat, but for another 
reason altogether: patriotism or loyalty.  For the non-
embedded reporters, their country was at war and feelings 
of patriotism may have softened their writing when it came 
to addressing controversial issues.  The pressure to do 
just this has historical precedent.  During the Vietnam 
War, “[A]nyone who questioned any aspect of official policy 
was at best a “liberal,” and at worst a “communist.” 
(McLaughlin, 2002)  Recall the question leveled at AP 
reporter Malcolm Browne during a press conference in Saigon 
by Admiral Harry P. Felt: “Why don’t you get on the team?” 
(Knightley, 1975)  Just as telling was the comment by Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey, addressing correspondents in 
1967: “[W]hen you speak to the American people give the 
benefit of the doubt to our side…We’re in this together.” 
(Aronson, 1970) 
In examining the writings of the embedded journalists, 
the author found no loss of objectivity on their part in 
reporting both breaking news and feature stories.  In fact, 
it appeared that as the campaign progressed, the reporters’ 
evolved in their situational awareness of the inner 
workings of the American military at war.  They became 
quickly seasoned and aware of the many contradictions, 
problems, idiosyncrasies of the conflict, and did not 
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hesitate to report on subjects that in the past would have 
been considered derogatory or not complementary in nature 
to the military. This is in direct contradiction to the 
pre-war criticisms put forth by opponents of the embedded 
program. Without doubt, the journalists in this study echo 
the sentiments of Steve Bell, a journalism instructor at 
Ball State University, regardless of embedded or non-
embedded status: 
I think that we are getting good journalism, of 
course, they’re the home team.  We’re Americans, 
they’re Americans.  When you report from a 
military unit consistently, you get to know the 
people, you are sharing their daily life, there 
is an emotional connection and attachment that 
comes with it, but…that doesn’t mean you’re going 
to hide things that are embarrassing or negative, 
not if you’re a good reporter. (Berkowitz, 2003) 
It is also correct to surmise that the amount of hand-
wringing by news pundits and media experts once the 
embedded program was announced played a subtle part in 
ensuring balanced coverage of the conflict by the embedded 
reporters.  Fully aware of the pitfalls that awaited them, 
the reporters appeared to take extra pains to exercise 
objectivity. Remaining objective in reporting is “something 
to be aware of, whether you’re covering the army or the 
local sewer district,” said Rick Atkinson.  “When you’re 
cheek-to-jowl with people you like, you can become attached 
to them, particularly when you have shared the hazards of 
combat and of everyday life.  It’s something to be aware 
of, but I felt I could keep my distance and report 
objectively.” (Ayers, 2004)  “Certainly you talk to people 
and get chummy with them, but there was always the 
separation that they were military and we were the media,” 
said John Roberts. (Ayers, 2004) Overall, the balanced 
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reporting discovered in this study reaffirms the claim of 
proponents of the embedded program that, “embed does not 
mean in bed.” (Overington, 2003) 
3. Research Question # 3 
The third research question presented in this study 
concerned a major criticism of the embedded reporters’ 
work: Were the critics’ accusations of “soda straw” 
reporting justified? Or in other words, is the embedded 
corpus narrower in scope and depth than the non-embedded 
corpus? 
This question was best answered by examining the 
results of the exploratory factors of framing, scope, and 
depth.  The very nature of episodic framing, as practiced 
by the embedded journalists, inevitably resulted in a very 
myopic glimpse into the events of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
The stories of the embedded reporters were specific 
snapshots in the timeline of the conflict.  The embedded 
reporters understood their job, knowing that their access 
would produce a narrower scope within their work: “I 
certainly did not get a clear picture of the war because we 
were so isolated,” said an embedded reporter with the 101st 
Airborne Division.  However, he conceded that it indeed was 
his job “to look at things through a microscope, not 
binoculars.” (Kurtz, 2003)  The corpus results support this 
statement.  When compared to the non-embedded journalists, 
the study revealed that embedded reporters, lacking the 
larger ability to piece together the events of the 
battlefield beyond their immediate observation, tended to 
compose articles that were more narrow in scope than the 
non-embedded journalists.  The non-embedded reporters, 
having greater time and resources, pulled the disparate 
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reports of the embedded reports together, sampling relevant 
facts, adding additional reporting from other sources, and 
thereby providing a fuller accounting of the conflict. 
Therefore it is accurate to state that the critics’ 
accusations of “soda straw” reporting were in fact 
justified. Although concerning television embedded 
reporting, the following quote is just as applicable to the 
print journalists: 
  The reason you have so many embedded reporters 
is that every day they each bring a slice, and 
then when you put all the slices together—with 
[CBS News National Correspondent] David Martin at 
the Pentagon, etcetera—then you have the whole 
pie. (Ayers, 2004) 
However, although narrow in scope, the vantage point 
provided by their embedded access produced an incredibly 
rich body of work, replete with details not available to 
the non-embedded reporters.  This depth of reporting 
resulted in vibrant word pictures of the fighting.  “I’d 
like to call it a bright, intense look at a small slice of 
the war,” opined embedded reporter John Roberts of CBS. 
(Ayers, 2004)  
Of interest was the discovery of a slight difference 
in the manner in which the newspapers in this study 
presented their coverage of the war, and is directly 
related to the above question concerning scope and depth of 
reporting.  The Los Angeles Times appeared to make an extra 
effort to ensure that the information in their articles 
provided wider look at the war than the other newspapers in 
this study.  This accomplished by the frequent inclusion of 
several embedded reporters’ accounts into one article under 
the byline of the primary contributor of the article.  For 
135
example, the April 10, 2003 article written by Geoffrey 
Mohan of the Times contains the footnote, “Times staff 
writer David Zucchino contributed to this report.” Tony 
Perry’s March 26, 2003 article states that “Geoffrey Mohan 
with the 3d Infantry Division” contributed to the report.  
David Zucchino’s April 2, 2003, article similarly states 
that “Times staff writer Tony Perry with the Marines in 
Iraq contributed to this report.”  This trend was also 
repeated among the other newspapers, but not to the degree 
that was found in the Los Angeles Times articles. 
 4. Impact of Embedded Reporting 
Regardless of which side of the embedded debate one 
falls on, “This [the embedded program] is going to change 
American war coverage forever.  The alternative—lack of 
access—is clearly far worse.  People got to see the human 
side of war in a way that really hasn’t happened since 
Vietnam.” (Kurtz, 2003) Overall, the media industry remains 
divided over the embedded program instituted during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Washington Post reporter Thomas 
E. Ricks gave the embed program “two thumbs up,” (Ayers, 
2004) while Normon Solomon said that the embedded program 
was “not a great moment” for journalism. (Zwirko, 2003)  
NBC’s Jim Alexrod, embedded with the 3ID said after the 
war:  
This will sound like I’ve drunk the Kool-Aid, but 
I found embedding to be an extremely positive 
experience.  There was some initial mistrust and 
suspicion: ‘Who are you guys and what are you 
going to do to harm us?’  But we got great 
stories and they [the military] got very positive 
coverage—in large part because there were some 
very compelling stories to tell about the 
military. (Kurtz, 2003) 
Victoria Clarke echoed Alexrod’s comments: 
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You’ve got hundreds and hundreds of 
journalists who have now had a very real and 
enlightening experience with the U.S. military, 
and that’s a good thing.  I’m sure there are 
still some skeptics on the military side, but 
they’re smaller in number, said Victoria Clarke. 
(Kurtz, 2003)   
The skeptics do indeed remain within the media.  The 
embeds were “doing a disservice to their readers or viewers 
by repeatedly and systematically accepting the assumptions 
of the [Bush] administration.” (Ranade, 2003)  “How do you 
manage [read control] the media in times of war?” writes 
another critic. “Thoroughly embed them.” (Berkowitz, 2003)  
Others called the embedded program “militainment.” 
(Andersen, 2003)  This contention finds little support from 
Peter Copeland of the Scripps Howard News Service.  
Copeland, himself a former war correspondent, said that, 
“critics who don’t like the coverage should put some of the 
burden on the media and stop trying to blame everything on 
‘censorship.’  I don’t think we should expect the Pentagon 
to do our jobs for us.  It’s our responsibility—not the 
military’s—to figure out how to cover the story.” (Shafer, 
2003) 
A March 28, 2003 poll conducted by the Pew Research 
Center concerning the media coverage of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom stated that, “[I]n general, the public has a 
positive opinion of the practice of embedding reporters 
with military forces.” (PRCa, 2003)  The poll states that 
58 percent of Americans think the embedded program is a 
“good thing,” while 34 percent have a negative view of the 
program. (PRCa, 2003)  A similar poll of 3,620 adults taken 
from March 20-April 7, 2003 by the Pew Research Center 
asked the question, “Do you think that reporters who are 
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traveling with the troops in Iraq are taking the sides of 
these troops too much, are being critical of the troops 
they’re traveling with, or are they being fair and 
objective in their reporting?” (PRCb, 2003)  The results 
were overwhelmingly positive, with the following results 
reported (PRCb, 2003): 
 Taking side of troops too much: 7%  
Too critical of the troops:     7% 
Fair and objective:            81% 
Don’t know/refused to answer:   5% 
Today, as the country of Iraq struggles to stand on 
its own after 30 years of brutal dictatorship, U.S. 
soldiers and Marines are fighting an intense 
counterinsurgency against a shadowy enemy.  And, just as 
they did during over a year ago, embedded reporters 
accompany U.S. troops during their daily firefights and gun 
battles with insurgent forces.  Their unique access as 
embedded media continues to provide a worldwide reading 
audience firsthand accounts of the conflict.  However, the 
audience on the receiving end of these reports must be sure 
to take other factors into account.  Considering the 
previously discussed opposing viewpoints of the embedded 
program, it is obvious that the program will remain 
controversial.  The picture that Americans received about 
the war in Iraq was through the media—it is beyond question 
that the media crafted the public’s interpretation of the 
events on the ground. Previous studies on the influence of 
the media on public opinion states that the press, “may not 
be successful much of the time in telling people what to 
think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its 
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readers what to think about.” (Cohen, 1963)  Further 
studies (McCombs, 1972, Shaw and McCombs, 1977) concerning 
agenda-setting, defined as “the creation of public 
awareness and concern of salient issues by the news media,” 
(AST, n.d.) could certainly result from the unfettered 
access of the embedded program.  The major combat phase of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom was relatively short compared to 
previous conflicts.  Over an extended period, the public 
could possibly turn against the conduct of the war.  Just 
as after the Vietnam War the perception existed that the 
barrage of body counts reported daily in the press 
undermined public support for that war, the access of the 
embedded reporters could similarly affect America’s support 
for any future conflict.  The Marine Corps recognized this 
dynamic, and stated that, “[B]efore we as a collective 
military society congratulate ourselves on the 
‘overwhelming success’ of the embed program, we need to 
pause and remember that we were both good and lucky…What 
would have been the headlines if the Coalition lost a 
battalion of infantrymen to a chemical attack?” 
(1stMardivAAR, 2003)  
The launching of the current embedded program during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom can be compared to releasing a 
genie from a lamp, never to be confined again. The public, 
with its voracious appetite for news will continue to 
demand such coverage of their sons and daughters engaged in 
the Global War on Terrorism.  Regardless of which side of 
the embedded debate one falls on, CBS News president Andrew 
Heyward opines: “This [the embedded program] is going to 
change American war coverage forever.  The alternative—lack 
of access—is clearly far worse.  People got to see the 
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human side of war in a way that really hasn’t happened 
since Vietnam.” (Kurtz, 2003b) With doubt, “[T]he age of 
‘embedded’ journalism has arrived.” (Kurtz, 2003a)  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The topic investigated during the course of this study 
was limited to embedded and non-embedded journalists 
reporting for major newspapers with a large national 
circulation as described in Chapter III.  Of equal interest 
would be examining the embedded and non-embedded reporting 
of smaller local newspapers located next to large military 
communities such as Camp Pendleton, California, Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina, or U.S. Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia.  The 
content of these reporters’ writing could be compared to 
equally populated areas of the United States without a 
significant military population in the local community.  
This study also focused solely on U.S. reporters.   
As discussed in Chapter II, the Pentagon also provided 
embedded “slots” to foreign newspapers.  Journalists from 
the UK, Germany, Japan, Norway, Saudi Arabia, France, 
Czechoslovakia, Canada, Israel, Russia, Australia, Canada, 
China, Korea, and even Al Jazeera—the controversial anti-
American network based out of Qatar. (ASDnames, 2003, 
Kurtz, 2003)  Foreign news agencies were granted around 150 
slots, with Al-Jazeera getting four—one each with the U.S. 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. (Carlson, 2003)  
Examining the content of these foreign writers when 
compared to their non-embedded counterparts would provide 
unique insight to how the United States’ actions in Iraq 
were viewed by the world.  As equally interesting would be 
a comparison between American embedded journalists and a 
similar number of foreign embedded journalists. 
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The medium chosen for this study—newspapers—could also 
be changed to further investigate the news coverage of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  News magazines, such as Time, 
Newsweek, or U.S. News and World Report could be examined 
for content.  More challenging would be an exploration of 
the context of the numerous live television reports from 
embedded journalists accompanying the U.S. units into 
combat.  Limited studies have attempted this with 
fascinating results. (Project for Excellence in Journalism, 
2003) What was the context of their reporting?  How was 
their embedded reporting framed for the audience watching 
the report?  Were there nuances in the embedded reporters’ 
language that indicated a loss of objectivity? What was 
most often shown?  Casualties?  Fighting?  Destroyed 
equipment?  Conducting interviews with embedded reporters—
gathering some of their insights as to how the embedded 
program affected their reporting—would also be an 
interesting study to compliment the results revealed in 









APPENDIX A: U.S DEPARTMENT DEFENSE MEDIA POLICY  
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UNCLAS 
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) ON EMBEDDING MEDIA 
DURING POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS IN THE U.S. 
CENTRAL COMMANDS (CENTCOM) AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). 
REFERENCES: REF. A. SECDEF MSG, DTG 172200Z JAN 03, SUBJ: 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) FOR MOVEMENT OF FORCES INTO THE 
CENTCOM AOR FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS. 
1. PURPOSE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE, POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES ON EMBEDDING NEWS MEDIA DURING POSSIBLE FUTURE 
OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS IN THE CENTCOM AOR. IT CAN BE ADAPTED 
FOR USE IN OTHER UNIFIED COMMAND AORS AS NECESSARY. 
2. POLICY. 
2.A. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) POLICY ON MEDIA COVERAGE 
OF FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS IS THAT MEDIA WILL HAVE LONG-TERM, 
MINIMALLY RESTRICTIVE ACCESS TO U.S. AIR, GROUND AND NAVAL 
FORCES THROUGH EMBEDDING. MEDIA COVERAGE OF ANY FUTURE 
OPERATION WILL, TO A LARGE EXTENT, SHAPE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF 
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THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NOW AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD. 
THIS HOLDS TRUE FOR THE U.S. PUBLIC; THE PUBLIC IN ALLIED 
COUNTRIES WHOSE OPINION CAN AFFECT THE DURABILITY OF OUR 
COALITION; AND PUBLICS IN COUNTRIES WHERE WE CONDUCT OPERATIONS, 
WHOSE PERCEPTIONS OF US CAN AFFECT THE COST AND DURATION OF OUR 
INVOLVEMENT. OUR ULTIMATE STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN BRINGING PEACE 
AND SECURITY TO THIS REGION WILL COME IN OUR LONG-TERM 
COMMITMENT TO SUPPORTING OUR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. WE NEED TO TELL 
THE FACTUAL STORY - GOOD OR BAD - BEFORE OTHERS SEED THE MEDIA 
WITH DISINFORMATION AND DISTORTIONS, AS THEY MOST CERTAINLY WILL 
CONTINUE TO DO. OUR PEOPLE IN THE FIELD NEED TO TELL OUR STORY 
– ONLY COMMANDERS CAN ENSURE THE MEDIA GET TO THE STORY 
ALONGSIDE THE TROOPS. WE MUST ORGANIZE FOR AND FACILITATE 
ACCESS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA TO OUR FORCES, 
INCLUDING THOSE FORCES ENGAGED IN GROUND OPERATIONS, WITH THE 
GOAL OF DOING SO RIGHT FROM THE START. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, WE 
WILL EMBED MEDIA WITH OUR UNITS. THESE EMBEDDED MEDIA WILL 
LIVE, WORK AND TRAVEL AS PART OF THE UNITS WITH WHICH THEY ARE 
EMBEDDED TO FACILITATE MAXIMUM, IN-DEPTH COVERAGE OF U.S. FORCES 
IN COMBAT AND RELATED OPERATIONS. COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
OFFICERS MUST WORK TOGETHER TO BALANCE THE NEED FOR MEDIA ACCESS 
WITH THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY. 
2.B. MEDIA WILL BE EMBEDDED WITH UNIT PERSONNEL AT AIR AND 
GROUND FORCES BASES AND AFLOAT TO ENSURE A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF 
ALL OPERATIONS. MEDIA WILL BE GIVEN ACCESS TO OPERATIONAL 
COMBAT MISSIONS, INCLUDING MISSION PREPARATION AND DEBRIEFING, 
WHENEVER POSSIBLE. 
2.C. A MEDIA EMBED IS DEFINED AS A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE 
REMAINING WITH A UNIT ON AN EXTENDED BASIS - PERHAPS A PERIOD OF 
WEEKS OR EVEN MONTHS. COMMANDERS WILL PROVIDE BILLETING, 
RATIONS AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, IF NEEDED, TO THE EMBEDDED MEDIA 
COMMENSURATE WITH THAT PROVIDED TO MEMBERS OF THE UNIT, AS WELL 
AS ACCESS TO MILITARY TRANSPORTATION AND ASSISTANCE WITH 
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COMMUNICATIONS FILING/TRANSMITTING MEDIA PRODUCTS, IF REQUIRED. 
2.C.1. EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE NOT AUTHORIZED USE OF THEIR OWN 
VEHICLES WHILE TRAVELING IN AN EMBEDDED STATUS. 
2.C.2. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, SPACE ON MILITARY TRANSPORTATION 
WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR MEDIA EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO COVER A 
PARTICULAR OPERATION. THE MEDIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR LOADING AND 
CARRYING THEIR OWN EQUIPMENT AT ALL TIMES. USE OF PRIORITY 
INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA TO COVER STORIES, AS 
WELL AS TO FILE STORIES, IS HIGHLY ENCOURAGED. SEATS ABOARD 
VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT AND NAVAL SHIPS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO 
ALLOW MAXIMUM COVERAGE OF U.S. TROOPS IN THE FIELD. 
2.C.3. UNITS SHOULD PLAN LIFT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO ASSIST 
IN MOVING MEDIA PRODUCTS TO AND FROM THE BATTLEFIELD SO AS TO 
TELL OUR STORY IN A TIMELY MANNER. IN THE EVENT OF COMMERCIAL 
COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES, MEDIA ARE AUTHORIZED TO FILE 
STORIES VIA EXPEDITIOUS MILITARY SIGNAL/COMMUNICATIONS 
CAPABILITIES. 
2.C.4. NO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY MEDIA IN THE 
CONDUCT OF THEIR DUTIES WILL BE SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED. 
HOWEVER, UNIT COMMANDERS MAY IMPOSE TEMPORARY RESTRICTIONS ON 
ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY REASONS. 
MEDIA WILL SEEK APPROVAL TO USE ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN A 
COMBAT/HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THE 
UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. THE USE OF 
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WILL BE DISCUSSED IN FULL WHEN THE 
MEDIA ARRIVE AT THEIR ASSIGNED UNIT. 
3. PROCEDURES. 
3.A. THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OASD(PA) IS THE CENTRAL AGENCY FOR MANAGING AND 
VETTING MEDIA EMBEDS TO INCLUDE ALLOCATING EMBED SLOTS TO MEDIA 
ORGANIZATIONS. EMBED AUTHORITY MAY BE DELEGATED TO SUBORDINATE 
ELEMENTS AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES AND AT THE 
DISCRETION OF OASD(PA). EMBED OPPORTUNITIES WILL BE ASSIGNED TO 
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MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS, NOT TO INDIVIDUAL REPORTERS. THE DECISION 
AS TO WHICH MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE WILL FILL ASSIGNED EMBED SLOTS 
WILL BE MADE BY THE DESIGNATED POC FOR EACH NEWS ORGANIZATION. 
3.A.1. IAW REF. A, COMMANDERS OF UNITS IN RECEIPT OF A 
DEPLOYMENT ORDER MAY EMBED REGIONAL/LOCAL MEDIA DURING 
PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT, DEPLOYMENT AND ARRIVAL IN THEATER 
UPON RECEIPT OF THEATER CLEARANCE FROM CENTCOM AND APPROVAL OF 
THE COMPONENT COMMAND. COMMANDERS WILL INFORM THESE MEDIA, 
PRIOR TO THE DEPLOYING EMBED, THAT OASD(PA) IS THE APPROVAL 
AUTHORITY FOR ALL COMBAT EMBEDS AND THAT THEIR PARTICULAR EMBED 
MAY END AFTER THE UNIT'S ARRIVAL IN THEATER. THE MEDIA 
ORGANIZATION MAY APPLY TO OASD(PA) FOR CONTINUED EMBEDDING, BUT 
THERE IS NO GUARANTEE AND THE MEDIA ORGANIZATION WILL HAVE TO 
MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND PAY FOR THE JOURNALISTS' RETURN TRIP. 
3.B. WITHOUT MAKING COMMITMENTS TO MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS, 
DEPLOYING UNITS WILL IDENTIFY LOCAL MEDIA FOR POTENTIAL EMBEDS 
AND NOMINATE THEM THROUGH PA CHANNELS TO OASD(PA) (POC: MAJ TIM 
BLAIR, DSN 227-1253; COMM. 703-697-1253; EMAIL 
TIMOTHY.BLAIR@OSD.MIL). INFORMATION REQUIRED TO BE FORWARDED 
INCLUDES MEDIA ORGANIZATION, TYPE OF MEDIA AND CONTACT 
INFORMATION INCLUDING BUREAU CHIEF/MANAGING EDITOR/NEWS 
DIRECTOR'S NAME; OFFICE, HOME AND CELL PHONE NUMBERS; PAGER 
NUMBERS AND EMAIL ADDRESSES. SUBMISSIONS FOR EMBEDS WITH 
SPECIFIC UNITS SHOULD INCLUDE AN UNIT'S RECOMMENDATION AS TO 
WHETHER THE REQUEST SHOULD BE HONORED. 
3.C. UNIT COMMANDERS SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS, THROUGH THEIR CHAIN 
OF COMMAND AND PA CHANNELS TO OASD(PA), THEIR DESIRE AND 
CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL MEDIA EMBEDS BEYOND THOSE 
ASSIGNED. 
3.D. FREELANCE MEDIA WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO EMBED IF THEY ARE 
SELECTED BY A NEWS ORGANIZATION AS THEIR EMBED REPRESENTATIVE. 
3.E. UNITS WILL BE AUTHORIZED DIRECT COORDINATION WITH MEDIA 
AFTER ASSIGNMENT AND APPROVAL BY OASD(PA). 
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3.E.1.UNITS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT ALL EMBEDDED MEDIA 
AND THEIR NEWS ORGANIZATIONS HAVE SIGNED THE "RELEASE, 
INDEMNIFICATION, AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT AND AGREEMENT NOT 
TO SUE", FOUND AT 
HTTP://WWW.DEFENSELINK.MIL/NEWS/FEB2003/D20030210EMBED.PDF. 
UNITS MUST MAINTAIN A COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT FOR ALL MEDIA 
EMBEDDED WITH THEIR UNIT. 
3.F. EMBEDDED MEDIA OPERATE AS PART OF THEIR ASSIGNED UNIT. AN 
ESCORT MAY BE ASSIGNED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE UNIT COMMANDER. 
THE ABSENCE OF A PA ESCORT IS NOT A REASON TO PRECLUDE MEDIA 
ACCESS TO OPERATIONS. 
3.G. COMMANDERS WILL ENSURE THE MEDIA ARE PROVIDED WITH EVERY 
OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE ACTUAL COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE PERSONAL 
SAFETY OF CORRESPONDENTS IS NOT A REASON TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM 
COMBAT AREAS. 
3.H. IF, IN THE OPINION OF THE UNIT COMMANDER, A MEDIA 
REPRESENTATIVE IS UNABLE TO WITHSTAND THE RIGOROUS CONDITIONS 
REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITH THE FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES, THE 
COMMANDER OR HIS/HER REPRESENTATIVE MAY LIMIT THE 
REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATION WITH OPERATIONAL FORCES TO ENSURE 
UNIT SAFETY AND INFORM OASD(PA) THROUGH PA CHANNELS AS SOON AS 
POSSIBLE. GENDER WILL NOT BE AN EXCLUDING FACTOR UNDER ANY 
CIRCUMSTANCE. 
3.I. IF FOR ANY REASON A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE CANNOT 
PARTICIPATE IN AN OPERATION, THEY WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO THE 
NEXT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS FOR THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION. 
3.J. COMMANDERS WILL OBTAIN THEATER CLEARANCE FROM CENTCOM/PA 
FOR MEDIA EMBARKING ON MILITARY CONVEYANCE FOR PURPOSES OF 
EMBEDDING. 
3.K. UNITS HOSTING EMBEDDED MEDIA WILL ISSUE INVITATIONAL 
TRAVEL ORDERS, AND NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL (NBC) GEAR. 
SEE PARA. 5. FOR DETAILS ON WHICH ITEMS ARE ISSUED AND WHICH 
ITEMS THE MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE TO PROVIDE FOR THEMSELVES. 
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3.L. MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING THEIR OWN PASSPORTS 
AND VISAS. 
3.M. MEDIA WILL AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE CENTCOM/OASD(PA) GROUND 
RULES STATED IN PARA. 4 OF THIS MESSAGE IN EXCHANGE FOR 
COMMAND/UNIT-PROVIDED SUPPORT AND ACCESS TO SERVICE MEMBERS, 
INFORMATION AND OTHER PREVIOUSLY-STATED PRIVILEGES. ANY 
VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES COULD RESULT IN TERMINATION OF 
THAT MEDIA'S EMBED OPPORTUNITY. 
3.N. DISPUTES/DIFFICULTIES. ISSUES, QUESTIONS, DIFFICULTIES OR 
DISPUTES ASSOCIATED WITH GROUND RULES OR OTHER ASPECTS OF 
EMBEDDING MEDIA THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT THE UNIT LEVEL, OR 
THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, WILL BE FORWARDED THROUGH PA 
CHANNELS FOR RESOLUTION. COMMANDERS WHO WISH TO TERMINATE AN 
EMBED FOR CAUSE MUST NOTIFY CENTCOM/PA PRIOR TO TERMINATION. IF 
A DISPUTE CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT A LOWER LEVEL, OASD(PA) WILL BE 
THE FINAL RESOLUTION AUTHORITY. IN ALL CASES, THIS SHOULD BE 
DONE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE TO PRESERVE THE NEWS VALUE OF 
THE SITUATION. 
3.O. MEDIA WILL PAY THEIR OWN BILLETING EXPENSES IF BILLETED IN 
A COMMERCIAL FACILITY. 
3.P. MEDIA WILL DEPLOY WITH THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT TO COLLECT 
AND TRANSMIT THEIR STORIES. 
3.Q. THE STANDARD FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION SHOULD BE TO ASK 
"WHY NOT RELEASE" VICE "WHY RELEASE." DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE 
ASAP, PREFERABLY IN MINUTES, NOT HOURS. 
3.R. THERE IS NO GENERAL REVIEW PROCESS FOR MEDIA PRODUCTS. 
SEE PARA 6.A. FOR FURTHER DETAIL CONCERNING SECURITY AT THE 
SOURCE. 
3.S. MEDIA WILL ONLY BE GRANTED ACCESS TO DETAINEES OR EPWS 
WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949. SEE 
PARA. 4.G.17. FOR THE GROUND RULE. 
3.T. HAVING EMBEDDED MEDIA DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONTACT WITH OTHER 
MEDIA. EMBEDDED MEDIA, AS A RESULT OF TIME INVESTED WITH THE 
147
UNIT AND GROUND RULES AGREEMENT, MAY HAVE A DIFFERENT LEVEL OF 
ACCESS. 
3.U. CENTCOM/PA WILL ACCOUNT FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA DURING THE TIME 
THE MEDIA IS EMBEDDED IN THEATER. CENTCOM/PA WILL REPORT 
CHANGES IN EMBED STATUS TO OASD(PA) AS THEY OCCUR. 
3.V. IF A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE IS KILLED OR INJURED IN THE 
COURSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE UNIT WILL IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY 
OASD(PA), THROUGH PA CHANNELS. OASD(PA) WILL CONTACT THE 
RESPECTIVE MEDIA ORGANIZATION(S), WHICH WILL MAKE NEXT OF KIN 
NOTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL'S WISHES. 
3.W. MEDIA MAY TERMINATE THEIR EMBED OPPORTUNITY AT ANY TIME. 
UNIT COMMANDERS WILL PROVIDE, AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS 
AND BASED ON THE AVAILABILITY OF TRANSPORTATION, MOVEMENT BACK 
TO THE NEAREST LOCATION WITH COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION. 
3.W.1. DEPARTING MEDIA WILL BE DEBRIEFED ON OPERATIONAL 
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AS APPLICABLE TO ONGOING AND FUTURE 
OPERATIONS WHICH THEY MAY NOW HAVE INFORMATION CONCERNING. 
4. GROUND RULES. FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF U.S. FORCES 
AND EMBEDDED MEDIA, MEDIA WILL ADHERE TO ESTABLISHED GROUND 
RULES. GROUND RULES WILL BE AGREED TO IN ADVANCE AND SIGNED BY 
MEDIA PRIOR TO EMBEDDING. VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES MAY 
RESULT IN THE IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE EMBED AND REMOVAL 
FROM THE AOR. THESE GROUND RULES RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE 
MEDIA TO COVER MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ARE IN NO WAY INTENDED TO 
PREVENT RELEASE OF DEROGATORY, EMBARRASSING, NEGATIVE OR 
UNCOMPLIMENTARY INFORMATION. ANY MODIFICATION TO THE STANDARD 
GROUND RULES WILL BE FORWARDED THROUGH THE PA CHANNELS TO 
CENTCOM/PA FOR APPROVAL. STANDARD GROUND RULES ARE: 
4.A. ALL INTERVIEWS WITH SERVICE MEMBERS WILL BE ON THE RECORD. 
SECURITY AT THE SOURCE IS THE POLICY. INTERVIEWS WITH PILOTS 
AND AIRCREW MEMBERS ARE AUTHORIZED UPON COMPLETION OF MISSIONS; 
HOWEVER, RELEASE OF INFORMATION MUST CONFORM TO THESE MEDIA 
GROUND RULES. 
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4.B. PRINT OR BROADCAST STORIES WILL BE DATELINED ACCORDING TO 
LOCAL GROUND RULES. LOCAL GROUND RULES WILL BE COORDINATED 
THROUGH COMMAND CHANNELS WITH CENTCOM. 
4.C. MEDIA EMBEDDED WITH U.S. FORCES ARE NOT PERMITTED TO CARRY 
PERSONAL FIREARMS. 
4.D. LIGHT DISCIPLINE RESTRICTIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED. VISIBLE 
LIGHT SOURCES, INCLUDING FLASH OR TELEVISION LIGHTS, FLASH 
CAMERAS WILL NOT BE USED WHEN OPERATING WITH FORCES AT NIGHT 
UNLESS SPECIFICALLY APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY THE ON-SCENE 
COMMANDER. 
4.E. EMBARGOES MAY BE IMPOSED TO PROTECT OPERATIONAL SECURITY. 
EMBARGOES WILL ONLY BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND WILL BE 
LIFTED AS SOON AS THE OPERATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE HAS PASSED. 
4.F. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE RELEASABLE. 
4.F.1. APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY FORCE STRENGTH FIGURES. 
4.F.2. APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY CASUALTY FIGURES BY SERVICE. 
EMBEDDED MEDIA MAY, WITHIN OPSEC LIMITS, CONFIRM UNIT CASUALTIES 
THEY HAVE WITNESSED. 
4.F.3. CONFIRMED FIGURES OF ENEMY PERSONNEL DETAINED OR 
CAPTURED. 
4.F.4. SIZE OF FRIENDLY FORCE PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTION OR 
OPERATION CAN BE DISCLOSED USING APPROXIMATE TERMS. SPECIFIC 
FORCE OR UNIT IDENTIFICATION MAY BE RELEASED WHEN IT NO LONGER 
WARRANTS SECURITY PROTECTION. 
4.F.5. INFORMATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY TARGETS AND 
OBJECTIVES PREVIOUSLY UNDER ATTACK. 
4.F.6. GENERIC DESCRIPTION OF ORIGIN OF AIR OPERATIONS, SUCH AS 
"LAND-BASED." 
4.F.7. DATE, TIME OR LOCATION OF PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY 
MISSIONS AND ACTIONS, AS WELL AS MISSION RESULTS ARE RELEASABLE 
ONLY IF DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS. 
4.F.8. TYPES OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN GENERAL TERMS. 
4.F.9. NUMBER OF AERIAL COMBAT OR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OR 
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SORTIES FLOWN IN CENTCOM'S AREA OF OPERATION. 
4.F.10. TYPE OF FORCES INVOLVED (E.G., AIR DEFENSE, INFANTRY, 
ARMOR, MARINES). 
4.F.11. ALLIED PARTICIPATION BY TYPE OF OPERATION (SHIPS, 
AIRCRAFT, GROUND UNITS, ETC.) AFTER APPROVAL OF THE ALLIED UNIT 
COMMANDER. 
4.F.12. OPERATION CODE NAMES. 
4.F.13. NAMES AND HOMETOWNS OF U.S. MILITARY UNITS. 
4.F.14. SERVICE MEMBERS' NAMES AND HOME TOWNS WITH THE 
INDIVIDUALS' CONSENT. 
4.G. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE NOT RELEASABLE 
SINCE THEIR PUBLICATION OR BROADCAST COULD JEOPARDIZE OPERATIONS 
AND ENDANGER LIVES. 
4.G.1. SPECIFIC NUMBER OF TROOPS IN UNITS BELOW CORPS/MEF 
LEVEL. 
4.G.2. SPECIFIC NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IN UNITS AT OR BELOW THE AIR 
EXPEDITIONARY WING LEVEL. 
4.G.3. SPECIFIC NUMBERS REGARDING OTHER EQUIPMENT OR CRITICAL 
SUPPLIES (E.G. ARTILLERY, TANKS, LANDING CRAFT, RADARS, TRUCKS, 
WATER, ETC.). 
4.G.4. SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF SHIPS IN UNITS BELOW THE CARRIER 
BATTLE GROUP LEVEL. 
4.G.5. NAMES OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC 
LOCATIONS OF MILITARY UNITS IN THE CENTCOM AREA OF 
RESPONSIBILITY, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY RELEASED BY THE DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE OR AUTHORIZED BY THE CENTCOM COMMANDER. NEWS AND 
IMAGERY PRODUCTS THAT IDENTIFY OR INCLUDE IDENTIFIABLE FEATURES 
OF THESE LOCATIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE. 
4.G.6. INFORMATION REGARDING FUTURE OPERATIONS. 
4.G.7. INFORMATION REGARDING FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES AT 
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR ENCAMPMENTS (EXCEPT THOSE WHICH ARE 
VISIBLE OR READILY APPARENT). 
4.G.8. PHOTOGRAPHY SHOWING LEVEL OF SECURITY AT MILITARY 
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INSTALLATIONS OR ENCAMPMENTS. 
4.G.9. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. 
4.G.10. INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES 
COMPROMISING TACTICS, TECHNIQUES OR PROCEDURES. 
4.G.11. EXTRA PRECAUTIONS IN REPORTING WILL BE REQUIRED AT THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES TO MAXIMIZE OPERATIONAL SURPRISE. 
LIVE BROADCASTS FROM AIRFIELDS, ON THE GROUND OR AFLOAT, BY 
EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE PROHIBITED UNTIL THE SAFE RETURN OF THE 
INITIAL STRIKE PACKAGE OR UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY THE UNIT 
COMMANDER. 
4.G.12. DURING AN OPERATION, SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY 
FORCE TROOP MOVEMENTS, TACTICAL DEPLOYMENTS, AND DISPOSITIONS 
THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE OPERATIONAL SECURITY OR LIVES. 
INFORMATION ON ON-GOING ENGAGEMENTS WILL NOT BE RELEASED UNLESS 
AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE BY ON-SCENE COMMANDER. 
4.G.13. INFORMATION ON SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS, UNIQUE 
OPERATIONS METHODOLOGY OR TACTICS, FOR EXAMPLE, AIR OPERATIONS, 
ANGLES OF ATTACK, AND SPEEDS; NAVAL TACTICAL OR EVASIVE 
MANEUVERS, ETC. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "LOW" OR "FAST" MAY BE 
USED. 
4.G.14. INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY ELECTRONIC 
WARFARE. 
4.G.15. INFORMATION IDENTIFYING POSTPONED OR CANCELED 
OPERATIONS. 
4.G.16. INFORMATION ON MISSING OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT OR MISSING 
VESSELS WHILE SEARCH AND RESCUE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS ARE 
BEING PLANNED OR UNDERWAY. 
4.G.17. INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY CAMOUFLAGE, 
COVER, DECEPTION, TARGETING, DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE, 
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, OR SECURITY MEASURES. 
4.G.18. NO PHOTOGRAPHS OR OTHER VISUAL MEDIA SHOWING AN ENEMY 
PRISONER OF WAR OR DETAINEE'S RECOGNIZABLE FACE, NAMETAG OR 
OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURE OR ITEM MAY BE TAKEN. 
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4.G.19. STILL OR VIDEO IMAGERY OF CUSTODY OPERATIONS OR 
INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONS UNDER CUSTODY. 
4.H. THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES AND POLICIES APPLY TO COVERAGE OF 
WOUNDED, INJURED, AND ILL PERSONNEL: 
4.H.1. MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE REMINDED OF THE 
SENSITIVITY OF USING NAMES OF INDIVIDUAL CASUALTIES OR 
PHOTOGRAPHS THEY MAY HAVE TAKEN WHICH CLEARLY IDENTIFY 
CASUALTIES UNTIL AFTER NOTIFICATION OF THE NOK AND RELEASE BY 
OASD(PA). 
4.H.2. BATTLEFIELD CASUALTIES MAY BE COVERED BY EMBEDDED MEDIA 
AS LONG AS THE SERVICE MEMBER'S IDENTITY IS PROTECTED FROM 
DISCLOSURE FOR 72 HOURS OR UPON VERIFICATION OF NOK 
NOTIFICATION, WHICHEVER IS FIRST. 
4.H.3. MEDIA VISITS TO MEDICAL FACILITIES WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, 
OPERATIONS ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS BY ATTENDING PHYSICIANS. IF 
APPROVED, SERVICE OR MEDICAL FACILITY PERSONNEL MUST ESCORT 
MEDIA AT ALL TIMES. 
4.H.4. PATIENT WELFARE, PATIENT PRIVACY, AND NEXT OF KIN/FAMILY 
CONSIDERATIONS ARE THE GOVERNING CONCERNS ABOUT NEWS MEDIA 
COVERAGE OF WOUNDED, INJURED, AND ILL PERSONNEL IN MEDICAL 
TREATMENT FACILITIES OR OTHER CASUALTY COLLECTION AND TREATMENT 
LOCATIONS. 
4.H.5. MEDIA VISITS ARE AUTHORIZED TO MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES, 
BUT MUST BE APPROVED BY THE MEDICAL FACILITY COMMANDER AND 
ATTENDING PHYSICIAN AND MUST NOT INTERFERE WITH MEDICAL 
TREATMENT. REQUESTS TO VISIT MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES OUTSIDE 
THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES WILL BE COORDINATED BY THE UNIFIED 
COMMAND PA. 
4.H.6. REPORTERS MAY VISIT THOSE AREAS DESIGNATED BY THE 
FACILITY COMMANDER, BUT WILL NOT BE ALLOWED IN OPERATING ROOMS 
DURING OPERATING PROCEDURES. 
4.H.7. PERMISSION TO INTERVIEW OR PHOTOGRAPH A PATIENT WILL BE 
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GRANTED ONLY WITH THE CONSENT OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR 
FACILITY COMMANDER AND WITH THE PATIENT'S INFORMED CONSENT, 
WITNESSED BY THE ESCORT. 
4.H.8. "INFORMED CONSENT" MEANS THE PATIENT UNDERSTANDS HIS OR 
HER PICTURE AND COMMENTS ARE BEING COLLECTED FOR NEWS MEDIA 
PURPOSES AND THEY MAY APPEAR NATIONWIDE IN NEWS MEDIA REPORTS. 
4.H.9. THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR ESCORT SHOULD ADVISE THE 
SERVICE MEMBER IF NOK HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. 
5. IMMUNIZATIONS AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR. 
5.A. MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD ENSURE THAT MEDIA ARE PROPERLY 
IMMUNIZED BEFORE EMBEDDING WITH UNITS. THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL (CDC)-RECOMMENDED IMMUNIZATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT TO THE 
MIDDLE EAST INCLUDE HEPATITIS A; HEPATITIS B; RABIES; 
TETANUSDIPHTHERIA; AND TYPHOID. THE CDC RECOMMENDS MENINGOCOCCAL 
IMMUNIZATIONS FOR VISITORS TO MECCA. IF TRAVELING TO CERTAIN 
AREAS IN THE CENTCOM AOR, THE CDC RECOMMENDS TAKING PRESCRIPTION 
ANTIMALARIAL DRUGS. ANTHRAX AND SMALLPOX VACCINES WILL BE 
PROVIDED TO THE MEDIA AT NO EXPENSE TO THE GOVERNMENT (THE MEDIA 
OUTLET WILL BEAR THE EXPENSE). FOR MORE HEALTH INFORMATION FOR 
TRAVELERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST, GO TO THE CDC WEB SITE AT 
HTTP://WWW.CDC.GOV/TRAVEL/MIDEAST.HTM. 
5.B. BECAUSE THE USE OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR, SUCH AS 
HELMETS OR FLAK VESTS, IS BOTH A PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
CHOICE, MEDIA WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROCURING/USING SUCH 
EQUIPMENT. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR, AS WELL AS CLOTHING, WILL 
BE SUBDUED IN COLOR AND APPEARANCE. 
5.C. EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE AUTHORIZED AND REQUIRED TO BE PROVIDED 
WITH, ON A TEMPORARY LOAN BASIS, NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL 
(NBC) PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT BY THE UNIT WITH WHICH THEY ARE 
EMBEDDED. UNIT PERSONNEL WILL PROVIDE BASIC INSTRUCTION IN THE 
PROPER WEAR, USE, AND MAINTENANCE OF THE EQUIPMENT. UPON 
TERMINATION OF THE EMBED, INITIATED BY EITHER PARTY, THE NBC 
EQUIPMENT SHALL BE RETURNED TO THE EMBEDDING UNIT. IF 
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SUFFICIENT NBC PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR 
EMBEDDED MEDIA, COMMANDERS MAY PURCHASE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT, 
WITH FUNDS NORMALLY AVAILABLE FOR THAT PURPOSE, AND LOAN IT TO 
EMBEDDED MEDIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PARAGRAPH. 
6. SECURITY 
6.A. MEDIA PRODUCTS WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO SECURITY REVIEW OR 
CENSORSHIP EXCEPT AS INDICATED IN PARA. 6.A.1. SECURITY AT THE 
SOURCE WILL BE THE RULE. U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL SHALL PROTECT 
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FROM UNAUTHORIZED OR INADVERTENT 
DISCLOSURE. MEDIA PROVIDED ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION, 
INFORMATION WHICH IS NOT CLASSIFIED BUT WHICH MAY BE OF 
OPERATIONAL VALUE TO AN ADVERSARY OR WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER 
UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION MAY REVEAL CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, WILL 
BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE BY THE UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER 
DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OR 
DISCLOSURE OF SUCH INFORMATION. WHEN IN DOUBT, MEDIA WILL 
CONSULT WITH THE UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED 
REPRESENTATIVE. 
6.A.1. THE NATURE OF THE EMBEDDING PROCESS MAY INVOLVE 
OBSERVATION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION, INCLUDING TROOP MOVEMENTS, 
BATTLE PREPARATIONS, MATERIEL CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES 
AND OTHER INFORMATION AS LISTED IN PARA. 4.G. WHEN A COMMANDER 
OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT 
A MEDIA MEMBER WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THIS TYPE OF SENSITIVE 
INFORMATION, PRIOR TO ALLOWING SUCH ACCESS, HE/SHE WILL TAKE 
PRUDENT PRECAUTIONS TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THAT INFORMATION. 
THE PRIMARY SAFEGUARD WILL BE TO BRIEF MEDIA IN ADVANCE ABOUT 
WHAT INFORMATION IS SENSITIVE AND WHAT THE PARAMETERS ARE FOR 
COVERING THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION. IF MEDIA ARE INADVERTENTLY 
EXPOSED TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION THEY SHOULD BE BRIEFED AFTER 
EXPOSURE ON WHAT INFORMATION THEY SHOULD AVOID COVERING. IN 
INSTANCES WHERE A UNIT COMMANDER OR THE DESIGNATED 
REPRESENTATIVE DETERMINES THAT COVERAGE OF A STORY WILL INVOLVE 
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EXPOSURE TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION BEYOND THE SCOPE OF WHAT MAY 
BE PROTECTED BY PREBRIEFING OR DEBRIEFING, BUT COVERAGE OF WHICH 
IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE DOD, THE COMMANDER MAY OFFER 
ACCESS IF THE REPORTER AGREES TO A SECURITY REVIEW OF THEIR 
COVERAGE. AGREEMENT TO SECURITY REVIEW IN EXCHANGE FOR THIS 
TYPE OF ACCESS MUST BE STRICTLY VOLUNTARY AND IF THE REPORTER 
DOES NOT AGREE, THEN ACCESS MAY NOT BE GRANTED. IF A SECURITY 
REVIEW IS AGREED TO, IT WILL NOT INVOLVE ANY EDITORIAL CHANGES; 
IT WILL BE CONDUCTED SOLELY TO ENSURE THAT NO SENSITIVE OR 
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS INCLUDED IN THE PRODUCT. IF SUCH 
INFORMATION IS FOUND, THE MEDIA WILL BE ASKED TO REMOVE THAT 
INFORMATION FROM THE PRODUCT AND/OR EMBARGO THE PRODUCT UNTIL 
SUCH INFORMATION IS NO LONGER CLASSIFIED OR SENSITIVE. REVIEWS 
ARE TO BE DONE AS SOON AS PRACTICAL SO AS NOT TO INTERRUPT 
COMBAT OPERATIONS NOR DELAY REPORTING. IF THERE ARE DISPUTES 
RESULTING FROM THE SECURITY REVIEW PROCESS THEY MAY BE APPEALED 
THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, OR THROUGH PA CHANNELS TO OASD/PA. 
THIS PARAGRAPH DOES NOT AUTHORIZE COMMANDERS TO ALLOW MEDIA 
ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. 
6.A.2. MEDIA PRODUCTS WILL NOT BE CONFISCATED OR OTHERWISE 
IMPOUNDED. IF IT IS BELIEVED THAT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION HAS 
BEEN COMPROMISED AND THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE REFUSES TO REMOVE 
THAT INFORMATION NOTIFY THE CPIC AND/OR OASD/PA AS SOON AS 
POSSIBLE SO THE ISSUE MAY BE ADDRESSED WITH THE MEDIA 
ORGANIZATION'S MANAGEMENT. 
7. MISCELLANEOUS/COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: 
7.A. OASD(PA) IS THE INITIAL EMBED AUTHORITY. EMBEDDING 
PROCEDURES AND ASSIGNMENT AUTHORITY MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO 
CENTCOM PA AT A LATER DATE. THIS AUTHORITY MAY BE FURTHER 
DELEGATED AT CENTCOM'S DISCRETION. 
7.B. THIS GUIDANCE AUTHORIZES BLANKET APPROVAL FOR NON-LOCAL 
AND LOCAL MEDIA TRAVEL ABOARD DOD AIRLIFT FOR ALL EMBEDDED MEDIA 
ON A NO-COST, SPACE AVAILABLE BASIS. NO ADDITIONAL COSTS SHALL 
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BE INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IAW DODI 
5410.15, PARA 3.4. 
7.C. USE OF LIPSTICK AND HELMET-MOUNTED CAMERAS ON COMBAT 
SORTIES IS APPROVED AND ENCOURAGED TO THE GREATEST EXTENT 
POSSIBLE. 
8. OASD(PA) POC FOR EMBEDDING MEDIA IS MAJ TIM BLAIR, DSN 227- 
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